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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 1988, the U.S.S. Vincennes shot down Iran Air Flight 655,
while deployed to protect neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf. The Vincennes,
simultaneously engaged in a surface encounter, fired in the mistaken belief that
the civil airliner was an attacking Iranian military aircraft. Refusing a U.S.
offer of ex gratia compensation, Iran has taken its case to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).' The United States raised preliminary jurisdictional
1. Iran submitted its application to institute proceedings against the United States on May 17, 1989.
Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 28 I.L.M. 843 (1989) [hereinafter Iranian ICI Application]
(pagination references herein are to printed ICJ document). After numerous delays, Iran filed its legal
memorial on July 24, 1990. Iran Files Complaint to World Court over U.S. Downing ofAirbus, Reuters,
July 24, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file). While the case is pending, the memorial is not considered
a public document and thus the legal theories advanced before the ICJ by Iran can only be gleaned from
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objections on March 4, 1991,2 but given the jurisdictional provisions of the
applicable civil aviation treaty, it appears as though the U.S. challenge will
fail. Despite its withdrawal in the recent Case Concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua Case),3 the
United States will most likely remain before the ICJ to contest the Flight 655
case on its merits.
This article seeks to assess the legal theories upon which the ICJ should
rely in resolving the Flight 655 proceedings and to explore the implications
of these doctrines beyond this particular case. In its opinion the ICJ might
draw on one or more of five distinct substantive areas of the law: 1) trea-
ty-based international civil aviation law; 2) the right of self-defense under the
U.N. Charter; 3) traditional freedom of the seas principles; 4) customary air
and sea warfare law; and 5) fundamental human rights principles.4 The analy-
sis focuses on the primary obligations under international law incumbent upon
the Vincennes and the secondary obligation of state responsibility upon their
breach. The Flight 655 case presents the ICJ with the opportunity to clarify
limitations on the right of self-defense, specify the treatment of international
preliminary indications in its ICJ Application. The statement made by the Iranian Foreign Ministry at the
time the memorial was filed merely reiterated the Iranian position that the Vincennes' action in shooting
down Flight 655 was an intentional violation of international law. Iran Files Complaint Against USA for
Shooting Down Passenger Plane, Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 03:30 GMT 24 July 1990 (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Current file). This statement explicitly confirmed Iran's position that Flight 655 was shot
down within Iranian airspace, a claim that is only implicit in its ICJ Application. See infra note 65 and
accompanying text.
2. U.S. Contests World Court's Jurisdiction in Iran Airbus Case, Reuters, Mar. 5, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Wires file). Letter from Arthur T. Witteveen, ICJ Information Secretary, to David Linnan (May
2, 1991) [hereinafter ICJ Letter] (copy on file with Yale Journal of International Law).
3. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.)
1986 I.C.J. 4, 17 [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]. In the Nicaragua Case the United States did not recognize
the ICJ's power to indemnify the plaintiff based on principles of state responsibility. See, e.g., O'Connell,
The Prospects for Enforcing Monetary Judgments of the International Court of Justice: A Study of
Nicaragua's Judgment Against the United States, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 891 (1990). However, with U.S.
support, the U.N. Security Council recently affirmed the principle that international law provides for
indemnity in connection with the unlawful use of armed force. See S.C. Res. 674, _ U.N. SCOR at 3,
U.N. Doc. SIRES/674, 29 I.L.M. 1561-63 (1990). See also Note, The Downing of Iran Air Flight 655:
Highlighting the Need for International Adjudication of Damages, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 656
(1990).
4. This article does not discuss international human rights law as a potential source of obligation,
despite the view of at least one commentator that a human rights analysis might be applicable to the Flight
655 incident. See, e.g., Lowenfeld, Looking Back and Looking Ahead, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 336 (1989).
Rather, this inquiry argues that the law of armed conflict is directly applicable to the Vincennes' actions
under aviation treaty law. Recourse to human rights law is unnecessary for several reasons. First, the law
of armed conflict contains its own standards for the protection of noncombatants. Second, recourse to
human rights law would entail a shift in the focus of civil aviation law from the treatment of aircraft to
the treatment of passengers generally. Third, the unsettled nature of human rights law also makes it difficult
to apply in individual situations, leaving states unable to establish clear rules of conduct for their military
forces and civil aviation authorities. Finally, reliance on human rights law might deprive any derived rule
of broad acceptance, given some states' views that international law is inapplicable to individuals, or that
human rights issues present political rather than legal principles.
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civil aviation in limited or regional conflicts, and to delineate the responsibility
of a state when it has breached an international duty.
Views of the Flight 655 incident commonly fail to distinguish between the
Vincennes' misapprehension of attack by Flight 655 and the legality of Flight
655's destruction. They incorrectly deduce that the mistaken but reasonable
use of force against Flight 655 would be lawful if the Vincennes'simultaneous
use of force against attacking speedboats were legitimate and its mistaken
assessment of Flight 655 as an attacking F-14 were reasonable.' This inquiry
concludes that, irrespective of the reasonableness of the mistake and the
lawfulness of the use of force against the speedboats, the United States is
legally responsible for the downing of Flight 655.
Part II provides background for the analysis by reviewing the pertinent
facts of the Flight 655 incident, outlining the parties' arguments before the ICJ,
and the United States challenge to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Part III focuses
on the law of naval warfare. First, it explores the conflict between the rights
of free passage for neutrals and the rights of belligerents under older sea
warfare law together with the Vincennes' deployment to protect neutral ship-
ping in the Persian Gulf. It then discusses the development of the law govern-
ing modern-day neutral aircraft overflight of naval operations and the genesis
of the lawful force analysis pursued by the United States. Part IV outlines basic
international civil aviation law principles drawing in part on the law of the sea.
Part V explores the U.N. Charter interpretation and the duty applicable under
the general law of armed conflict with specific aspects of mistake. Part VI
discusses approaches to the mistaken use of armed force under the objective
or subjective basis of state responsibility. Finally, Part VII attempts to synthe-
size the preceding analysis and to outline an objective standard governing
injury to civilians and neutrals over international waters or territorial airspace.
I1. IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655: THE CASE
A. Prologue: The Facts
Events foreshadowing the downing of Flight 655 may be traced back as
early 1984,6 when the United States gave notice that U.S. naval forces operat-
5. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher stated that the United States would argue that
the Vincennes acted in self-defense after its crew mistook Iranianjetliner for hostile warplane and that "[tlhe
mere fact that this belief was erroneous does not alone make the actions of the Vincennes unlawful."
Kempster, Wary Bush Says Force is Still an Option on Hostage, L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 1990, at I1, col.
1 ; State Department Regular Briefing, Fed. News Serv., Aug. 15, 1989 [hereinafter State Department
Briefing].
6. "The presence and activities of naval forces in the Gulf area caused numerous problems to
international civil aviation." Report of ICAO Fact-Finding Investigation: Destruction of Iran Air Airbus
A300 in the Vicinity of Qeshm Island, Islamic Republic of Iran on 3 July 1988 (Nov. 1988), Attachment
B to Letter of S.S. Sidhu, International Civil Aviation Organization Secretary General (Jan. 11, 1989),
Vol. 16:245, 1991
Iran Air Flight 655
ing in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War would take measures against
perceived threats.' Aircraft flying below 2,000 feet not cleared for approach
to, or departure from, an airport were requested to avoid flying closer than
five nautical miles to U.S. warships. Aircraft approaching within that radius
were required to establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. warships on
121.5 MHz (international air distress or IAD frequency) or 243 MHz (military
air distress or MAD frequency). If their intentions were unclear, aircraft
approaching U.S. warships below 2,000 feet were at risk of being fired upon.
On May 17, 1987, while in international waters and outside the war zones
declared by both Iran and Iraq, the U.S. S. Stark was damaged by Iraqi Exocet
missiles launched from a location beyond the protective radius of the U.S.
warning As a result, U.S. naval commanders in the Persian Gulf received
revised rules of engagement clarifying their powers to take protective measures
when hostile intent was manifested and emphasizing both their responsibility
to protect their forces and their authority to act in self-defense in anticipation
of hostile attack.9
Beginning in early 1987, U.S. naval vessels commenced escorting convoys
through the Persian Gulf to keep open oil transportation routes during hostili-
ties.'0 Following the U.S.S. Stark incident, the United States publicized an
international notice to airmen (U.S. NOTAM) in September 1987, warning
that U.S. warships in the area were taking additional defensive precautions."
ICAO Doc. AN 13/4.3-897, at 11, C-1 - C-4 [hereinafter ICAO Report]; see also 28 I.L.M. 896 (1989).
The ICAO was concerned with warships vectoring aircraft without regard to civilian air traffic control and
feared problems caused by incompatible communications equipment and by misinterpreted challenges to
aircraft during critical takeoff and landing periods. Id. at C-2 to C-4. During June, the month immediately
preceding the Flight 655 incident, all U.S. naval forces in the Gulf issued a combined total of 150 aircraft
challenges, of which two were to commercial aircraft and 125 were to Iranian military aircraft. The
Department of Defense provided no further detail concerning the geographic distribution of the challenges.
See Department of Defense Investigation Report: Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding
the Downing oflran AirFlight 655 on 3 July 1988, App. E to the ICAO Report, supra, at E-18 [hereinafter
DOD Report].
7. See ICAO Report, supra note 6, at 10 (copies of the joint USCINCPAC and USCINCCENT
NOTAM (112119 KFDC) are on file in the offices of the Yale Journal of International Law).
8. See Vlahos, The Stark Report, PROC. U.S. NAVAL INsT., May 1988, at 64. Two Exocet missiles
were launched, one at a distance of 22.5 nautical miles and the other somewhat closer. Id.
9. See Parks, Righting the Rules of Engagement, PRoc. U.S. NAVAL INST., May 1989, at 83.
10. At first, protective measures were limited to American-flagged vessels. From 1981 to 1988, Iran
and Iraq made approximately 453 attacks on Persian Gulf shipping. O'Rourke, Gulf Ops, PROC. U.S.
NAVAL INST., May 1989, at 42, 43 [hereinafter O'Rourke, Gulf Ops]. See also O'Rourke, The Tanker
War, PROc. U.S. NAVAL INsT., May 1988, at 30, 31-32 [hereinafter O'Rourke, The Tanker War]
(information on flag registry, type of merchant ship attacked, method of attack and casualties from 1984-
87). See McDonald, The Convoy Mission, id. at 36. Minor incidents involving Iraqi or Iranian firing on
or near U.S. naval forces continued through early 1988. During the first half of 1988, 27 attacks on
merchant shipping were attributed to Iraq and 42 to Iran. See O'Rourke, Gulf Ops, supra, at 43. Many
of the attacks on Iran's merchant shipping during this period were carried out by Iranian Revolutionary
Guards employing high speed small boats. See Chapin, Countering Guerillas in the Gulf, PROC. U.S.
NAVAL INsT., Jan. 1988, at 65, 67.
11. See ICAO Report, supra note 6, at 10-11, F-4 to F-5 (a copy of the NOTAM (FAA FDC 052/87)
is on file in the offices of the Yale Journal of International Law).
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Under the new terms, all aircraft operating in the Persian Gulf area were
advised to monitor the IAD or MAD frequencies. Unidentified aircraft and
those approaching U.S. warships with unknown intentions would be contacted
on these frequencies. Aircraft failing to respond to warnings or to requests for
identification or those generally operating in a threatening manner, risked being
attacked. The U.S. NOTAM was widely disseminated through the Federal
Aviation Administration as well as through military and civilian channels.
However, it was not promulgated by the responsible treaty-based international
civil aviation authorities."2 The U.S. NOTAM, which lacked distance and
altitude warnings, was incompatible with the predictability required for safety
purposes in international civil aviation.13
On April 18, 1988, U.S. warships and aircraft undertook Operation
Praying Mantis, a naval operation directed against Iranian oil platforms and
naval vessels implicated in Gulf attacks on merchant shipping. 4 During the
course of the operation, Iranian military aircraft were launched from nearby
Bandar Abbas airfield, the civilian-military airport from which Flight 655 took
off. At various times, these Iranian aircraft appeared close to attacking U.S.
aircraft."5 Other Iranian aircraft, observed events from afar, apparently to
provide radar information, thereby exhibiting "targeting behavior."16 Further,
the U.S. policy expressly limiting protective measures to American-flagged
vessels was modified in the course of the operation to allow U.S. naval aircraft
to respond to retaliatory Iranian attacks on nearby oilfield shipping. 7 Soon
thereafter, the Secretary of Defense issued a policy statement recognizing a
relatively narrow set of traditional belligerent rights under the law of sea
warfare, while otherwise implicitly asserting rights of neutrals premised on
traditional ideas of free passage on the high seas even during wartime.'"
12. Id.
13. See id. at 11.
14. See Langston & Bringle, The Air Wiew: Operation Praying Mantis, PROC. U.S. NAVAL INST.,
May 1989, at 54; Perkins, The Surface View: Operation Praying Mantis, PRoc. U.S. NAVAL INST., supra,
at 66. Operation Praying Mantis was organized after the U.S.S. Roberts sustained serious mine damage;
the mining was attributed to Iran. See O'Rourke, GulfOps, supra note 10, at 44.
15. See Langston & Bringle, supra note 14, at 57-58.
16. Perkins, supra note 14, at 70. See also The Vincennes Incident, PROC. U.S. NAVAL INST., Jan.
1990, at 19, 20 (letter to editor from M.C. Agresti, officer on the Vincennes).
17. President Reagan authorized U.S. naval aircraft to attack Iranian speedboats in the vicinity of the
Scan Bay, an oilfield barge of Panamanian registry with fifteen American oilworkers aboard, when it
reported itself under attack. O'Rourke, GulfOps, supra note 10, at 47.
18. In an April 29, 1988 policy statement, the U.S. Secretary of Defense announced that:
[a]id will be provided to friendly, innocent, neutral vessels flying a non-belligerent flag outside
declared war-exclusion zones that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and
search by a Persian Gulf belligerent. Following a request from the vessel under attack, assistance
will be rendered by a U.S. warship or aircraft [if its mission permits such assistance].
Id. The United States was not the first nation with naval forces in the Gulf to adopt this position. France
had apparently adopted and acted on a similar policy as early as December 1987. Id. See also Cigar, The
Soviet Navy in the Persian Gulf- Naval Diplomacy in a Combat Zone, 42 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 56 (Spring
1986). The above policy statement does not refer to the high seas, presumably in an attempt to equate
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On May 20, 1988, the Vincennes arrived in the Persian Gulf.19 During
the afternoon and evening hours of July 2, 1988, and continuing into the
morning of July 3, armed speedboats manned with Iranian Revolutionary
Guards positioned themselves at the western approach to the Strait of Hormuz
and challenged merchant ships, a tactic that previously,had been a precursor
to attack.20 During the evening of July 2, the U.S.S. Montgomery responded
to the distress call of a Danish-registered supertanker reportedly under attack
by three Iranian speedboats. 2 The same day, two Iranian F-14 aircraft came
within seven miles of another U.S. warship, the U.S.S. Halsey.' Other F-14
aircraft were known to have been deployed recently to Bandar Abbas air-
field.Y
Early on the morning of July 3, while on patrol in the western approaches
to the Strait of Hormuz, the Montgomery listened to challenges over the radio
and observed numerous armed Iranian speedboats approaching a Pakistani
merchant vessel. Shortly thereafter it heard several explosions to the north,
in the direction of the Iranian side of the Strait. The Vincennes was dispatched
to the area to investigate the Montgomery's report of speedboats apparently
preparing to attack merchant ships.24 The Vincennes' helicopter was sent into
the area, where it reportedly was fired upon by Iranian small boats at approxi-
mately 9:15 a.m. local time.
The Vincennes and the Montgomery immediately headed to the location of
the helicopter and speedboats. This brought them relatively close to the
offshore Iranian islands of Qeshm and Hengham. Upon their arrival, some
armed Iranian speedboats were deemed to have demonstrated hostile intent.
transit passage rights through the Strait of Hormuz, with traditional high seas free passage rights. See infra
notes 252-54. In addition, this statement might be interpreted as approving "war-exclusion zones." But see
Leckow, The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulfy The Law of War Zones, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 629, 637-38
(1988) (Iraqi exclusion zone is illegal); Russo, Neutrality at Sea in Transition: State Practice-in the Gulf
War as Emerging International Customary Law, 19 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 381, 389-90 (1988) (criticizing
Iraqi sink-on-sight instructions for its war zone and opining that even within war zone only regular military
targets could be attacked); Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone Device in the Law of Naval Warfare, 24 CANADIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 91, 116-22 (1986) (neither belligerent paid particular heed to legal issues connected with
either side's exclusion zones); Note, AirAttacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Gulfy The Legality of
the Iraqi Exclusion Zone and Iranian Reprisals, 8 B.C. INT'L CoMp. L. REV. 517 (1985) (Iraqi exclusion
zone is illegal). See also Levie, Means and Methods of Combat at Sea, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM.
727, 736-38 (1988) (discussion of different publicists). Despite'this ambiguity, most recent expressions
of U.S. views appear to cast doubt on the legality of war zones. See DEP'T. OF THE NAVY (JAG),
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENTTO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 7-38
n.141 (NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10 1989) [hereinafter 1989 ANNOTATED COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK].
19. On June 28, 1988, the Vincennes received copies of the flight schedules for commercial airliners
overflying the Persian Gulf. DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-16.
20. See id. at E-6 to E-7.
21. Id. at E-7.
22. Downing of Iranian Airliner: Hearing Before Armed Services Comm., 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
(Sept. 8, 1988), Fed. News Serv. (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file) [hereinafterArmed Services Committee
Hearing].
23. DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-6.
24. Id. at E-7.
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At 9:43 a.m., the Vincennes opened fire on these boats with its forward five-
inch gun.' At this time, the Vincennes was also closely monitoring a P-3
Iranian military aircraft, which was some sixty-two nautical miles to the
west.26 During these events the Vincennes was approximately forty-seven
nautical miles from Bandar Abbas airfield and approximately eleven nautical
miles from Iran's Qeshm Island. The Montgomery was even closer to Iranian
territory, approximately seven nautical miles from Hengham Island. Thus,
apparently both the Vincennes and the Montgomery were within the twelve mile
limit of Iranian territorial seas. Although within an international strait, they
were approximately thirty-two nautical miles from the closest portion of the
Iranian mainland and approximately twenty nautical miles from the closest
Omani territory on the far side of the Strait of Hormuz.27 A third warship,
the U.S. S. Sides, was located approximately eighteen nautical miles from the
Vincennes, fifteen nautical miles from Flight 655's closest eventual ap-
proach.28
In the midst of the Vincennes' surface engagement with the speedboats, 29
at 9:47 a.m., Flight 655 took off from Bandar Abbas airfield with 290 persons
on board. It was a commercial flight scheduled to travel to Dubai at an altitude
of 14,000 feet within a recognized twenty mile-wide international air corridor
(A59) °30 Flight 655 departed from Bandar Abbas twenty minutes behind
schedule and began a steady climb to its assigned altitude of 14,000 feet. At
this point the exact chronology becomes crucial, because Flight 655 was
airborne for only seven minutes. During all seven minutes, the aircraft stayed
within its assigned flight corridor, departing a maximum of four miles from
its centerline.
Within the Vincennes Combat Information Center (CIC) separate groups
controlled air and surface engagements, each group coordinated by an officer
reporting to the commander of the Vincennes. A reconstruction of events
employing the Vincennes' computer data shows that, apparently under combat
stress, CIC personnel responsible for air defense misinterpreted significant por-
25. Id.
26. Id. at E-31.
27. All distances are based on the scale and locational plots of Figure 2: Track of IR655 of the ICAO
Report, supra note 6, at 22, which were derived from data provided by the Vincennes. See Figure 1, infra,
for illustration of the location of the relevant parties.
28. DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-26. The Montgomery was approximately five nautical miles from
the Vincennes. Id. at E-25, E-39.
29. Iran had instituted a procedure for notifying its air traffic control facilities of military activities
that posed a risk to civil aircraft. In such a case no air traffic clearances were given to civil aircraft
intending to fly through the affected airspace. However, such a notice was not in effect on July 3. The
Bandar Abbas and Teheran air traffic control units were apparently unaware of hostile activities at sea.
ICAO Report, supra note 6, at 12.
30. A59, the air corridor ten miles wide on both sides of a centerline, was the route used for flights
between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, as well as Kabul and Jeddah. Between June 2 and July 3, 1988, there
were a total of sixty-six flights on A59, with a maximum of six flights on any one day. Id.
252
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tions of the objective data." The Vincennes' radar began to monitor Flight
655 almost immediately upon its takeoff. Although the airbus had been as-
signed a distinctive friend or foe IFF Mode Three civilian transponder signal,
apparently soon after take-off, Vincennes' personnel mistakenly attributed to
the airbus an IFF Mode Two military transponder signal of a variety used in
the past by Iranian F-14 aircraft.32 Vincennes CIC personnel consulted com-
mercial air schedules at 9:45 a.m., but because of the airbus' delayed takeoff,
they failed to identify the unknown aircraft as a commercial flight. At the same
time, the Vincennes contacted the Iranian P-3 aircraft and instructed it to keep
clear of the Vincennes.
At 9:49 a.m., the Vincennes broadcast its first challenge and warning--inc-
luding the course, altitude and distance of the aircraft--on the MAD frequency,
which Flight 655 was unequipped to receive. At 9:50 a.m., the Vincennes
repeated its warning on the IAD frequency, employing longitude and latitude
coordinates. Flight 655 was equipped to receive the IAD frequency.33 The
Vincennes' forward gun misfired at this point in the ongoing surface engage-
ment. To permit firing of its after-gun, it executed a high speed turn, which
was sharp enough to dislodge loose objects in the CIC. This presumably
increased the sense of urgency and attack among Vincennes' personnel.3 At
thirty-two nautical miles, the Vincennes reported to its task force commander
by radio that it was being approached by an inbound F-14 aircraft not re-
sponding to warnings. At this time, the Vincennes took tactical command of
the U.S. S. Sides.35 At 9:51 a.m., the commanding officer of the Vincennes
informed its task force commander of his intention to engage the putative
Iranian F-14 aircraft at twenty nautical miles. The task force commander
concurred, but advised the Vincennes to warn the aircraft before firing.36 The
Vincennes then delivered challenges to the "Iranian fighter" on MAD frequency
and the "unidentified aircraft" on IAD frequencies, giving course, speed and
altitude. 7 Meanwhile the U.S. S. Sides' personnel evaluated Flight 655 as an
Iranian commercial flight,3" and an officer in the Vincennes CIC suggested
31. See DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-4, E-48 to E-49. Navy psychiatrists who were consulted in
the formal U.S. investigation referred to such misinterpretation as "scenario fulfillment."
32. The Mode Two IFF signal apparently came from an Iranian C-140 aircraft. See The Vincennes
Incident, supra note 16, at 19. See also DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-51.
33. DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-34.
34. While the data from the Vincennes' system only Flight 655's assigned IFF Mode Three signal,
multiple CIC personnel recalled identification of Flight 655 as an F-14; some even remembered observing
IFF Mode Two signals. Id. at E-35.
35. Id.
36. Id. at E-36.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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to his commanding officer the possibility that the aircraft was a commercial
flight.3 9
At 9:52 a.m., while the airbus was at an altitude of 10,000 feet and a
distance of twenty-five nautical miles, the Vincennes issued another warning
on MAD frequency. At twenty nautical miles successive warnings were
transmitted on IAD and MAD frequencies.40 At this point several CIC per-
sonnel remarked that the altitude of the unidentified aircraft began to decrease
while its speed increased, as though in an attack dive. However, the Vin-
cennes' systems data indicated that the aircraft was still ascending.41 At 9:53
a.m., the U. S. S. Sides' commanding officer determined Flight 655 not to be
a threat, and the personnel in the command center concluded that the un-
identified aircraft might be a commercial airliner.42
Approximately forty seconds before the Vincennes fired its missiles, the
U.S. S. Sides issued a warning on LAD frequency identifying Flight 655 by
range, bearing and, unlike the Vincennes' warnings, its correct IFF Mode
Three signal.43 While Flight 655 was at 12,000 feet and still ascending,
various Vincennes CIC personnel noted that the unidentified aircraft had
descended several thousand feet by the time it had reached a distance of twelve
nautical miles." The Vincennes issued a last warning on MAD frequency.4 5
At 9:54 a.m. and ten nautical miles distance, the Vincennes fired anti-aircraft
missiles. At that time, Flight 655 was at 12,950 feet and still climbing.46 The
airbus was struck by the Vincennes' missiles at a distance of eight nautical
miles and at an altitude of 13,500 feet.47
At the time he ordered the missile launch, the commanding officer of the
Vincennes believed that the Vincennes and the Montgomery were the subject
of a coordinated sea and air attack involving Revolutionary Guard speedboats
and an F-14 aircraft, which was in fact Flight 655" Based on the surveillance
information obtained on the nearby Iranian P-3 aircraft which had exhibited
"targeting behavior," the commanding officer thought the Iranians were
conducting a coordinated attack on the Vincennes.48 Apart from the immediate
39. Id. at E-37.
40. Id. at E-37 to E-38.
41. Id. at E-38.
42. Id. at E-39.
43. Id. at E-40.
44. Id. at E-39 to E-40.
45. Id. at E-40.
46. Id. at E-41. The Vincennes CIC personnel predominantly recalled the target's altitude at firing
as having been between 7,000 and 8,000 feet.
47. Id. at E-42.
48. See Armed Services Committee Hearing, supra note 22; Friedman, The Vincennes Incident, PROC.
U.S. NAVAL INST., May 1989, at 72. But see Comments & Discussion, The Vincennes Incident, PROC.
U.S. NAVAL INST., Sept. 1989, at 87 [hereinafter Carlson letter] (letter to the editor from D.R. Carlson,
Commanding Officer of U.S.S. Sides, criticizing Friedman's evaluation). For responses to the Carlson
letter, see, e.g., The Vincennes Incident, supra note 16.
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situation, this mistaken perception was linked to similar Iranian military
behavior displayed during Operation Praying Mantis and during the first few
days of July 1988.
Since Flight 655's crew is dead and its flight recorder apparently remains
unrecovered, any reconstruction of the crew's perspective is difficult. However
speculative an answer may be, though, the question must be addressed why
Flight 655 did not'respond to the Vincennes' radio challenges commencing
approximately three minutes after its departure from Bandar Abbas. Flight
655's radio simply was not capable of receiving the seven warnings on MAD
frequency. But it was capable of receiving the four warnings on IAD frequen-
cy. An ultimate explanation for Flight 655's failure to respond to the four
warnings on IAD frequency -- three from the Vincennes and the final warning
from the U.S.S. Sides - may never be known, because nobody knows the
actual radio frequency and channel selection on Flight 655's two dual channel
radios at the specific time each IAD frequency warning was given.49 Recon-
structing Flight 655's communications, it appears that the first, third, and
fourth challenges on IAD frequency did not coincide with Flight 655's routine
message traffic.5° However, the warnings in their general form may have
been difficult to decipher even had one radio been tuned to the IAD frequency
at all times. Only the fourth and final
49. Following the 1987 dissemination of the U.S. NOTAM, Iran Air had directed its aircraft to
monitor IAD frequencies while flying over the Persian Gulf. This warning was repeated at Flight 655's
preflight crew briefing. Although Flight 655 was equipped with two dual channel radios, the channels were
switched back and forth manually between IAD and air traffic control frequencies because only two of the
four channels could be used at any one time. See ICAO Report, supra note 6, at 13. During take off, Flight
655 communicated in rapid succession on three separate frequencies with Bandar Abbas airport tower,
Bandar Abbas approach, and Teheran air traffic control. Additionally, it soon would have been required
to contact Dubai. Presumably, Flight 655 also should have monitored the IAD frequency as required by
Iran Air policy. Thus, Flight 655 had to work with at least five different frequencies, only two of which
could be received simultaneously.
50. Id. at 16.
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Figure 1. Positions within the Strait of Hormuz during the Flight 655 incident. At the time of missile
launch, the Vincennes was located at 26* 30' 47" North, 56* 00' 57" East, the Montgomery was located
at 26* 31' North, 55 ° 55' 12" East, and Flight 655 was located at 26" 40' 06" North, 0560 02' 41" East.
Locations and track of Flight 655 are based on data from the Vincennes contained in the ICAO Report.
For a description of the Strait placing the events within its bounds, see I OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE FntST
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 129-30 (1958), U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
13/6/Add. 1.
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challenge from the U.S.S. Sides referred to Flight 655 by its easily recogniz-
able IFF Mode Three signal."' Retrospectively, it is impossible to determine
whether Flight 655's lack of response to the warnings was due to its failure
to monitor the LAD frequency while still caught up in takeoff procedures or
whether the crew did not identify their flight as the one being challenged.
Therefore, considering their timing and the form of delivery, though, it seems
unlikely that Flight 655 received or understood the warnings despite the efforts
of the Vincennes' crew.
Both the U.S. Department of Defense52 and the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization (ICAO), the treaty-based regulatory authority for internation-
al civil aviation,53 conducted formal investigations of the Flight 655 incident.
Both investigations concluded that the Vincennes had shot down Flight 655 in
the good faith, but mistaken belief that it was a military aircraft with hostile
intentions.54 Among the immediate causes cited for the misperception were:
intelligence warnings of Iranian military activities, heightened concern by the
Vincennes that the unidentified aircraft was part of a larger attack, the Vin-
cennes inability to match the unidentified aircraft with a scheduled commercial
departure, the mistaken association of a military IFF Mode Two signal with
the aircraft, reports by some Vincennes CIC personnel of the aircraft descend-
ing and accelerating in a manner approximating an attack profile, Flight 655's
course closing directly on the Vincennes and Montgomery while slightly
diverging from A59's centerline, a lack of identifiable weather radar or similar
electronic emissions characteristically associated with civilian aircraft, the
continuing identification of Flight 655 as an F-14, and Flight 655's failure to
respond to warnings.
The U.S. Department of Defense and the ICAO agreed on immediate
causation, but differed in their evaluations of the incident. The Defense
Department Report concluded that under the circumstances, the downing of
Flight 655 was not the result of negligent or culpable conduct by U.S. Navy
personnel. Essentially, this meant that the mistake was reasonable.55 The
Report also concluded that Iran shared responsibility for the tragedy, because
it had permitted its civilian airliner to fly at a relatively low altitude air route
in close proximity to armed conflict between Iranian Revolutionary Guard
speedboats and U.S. naval vessels.56
51. Id. at 17.
52. DOD Report, supra note 6.
53. ICAO Report, supra note 6.
54. See DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-46; ICAO Report, supra note 6, at 24-25.
55. DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-46 to E-47.
56. Id. at E-46. The Defense Department's preliminary recommendation, later withdrawn by a higher
authority, was that all Persian Gulf overflights should be at relatively high altitudes to remove them from
the reach of the combatants' missiles because the safety of low level civil air traffic in the Gulf could not
be assured otherwise.
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The ICAO investigation did not express any opinion on the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the Vincennes' mistake. Instead, the ICAO proposed
a series of safety measures that would-leave international civil aviation largely
undisturbed, while requiring combatants to share information with civilian air
traffic control and to accommodate the routine operation of international civil
aviation. At issue between the two positions is the larger question whether
international civil aviation law or international legal principles governing the
use of force take precedence when civil aircraft operate in war theaters.
Although U.S. Navy channels initially reported the downing of Flight 655
as the destruction of an Iranian F-14, within a relatively short period of time
the tragedy became the focus of discussion before the U.N. Security Council
and the ICAO. The United States offered direct compensation to the families
of the 290 persons who perished on Flight 655,"7 but refused to admit fault
or to compensate Iran Air for the loss of its airbus.5" Although this ex gratia
offer remains open, Iran has declined it and instead has chosen to pursue the
case before the ICJ.
B. The Legal Arguments
Although the confidential nature of the ongoing ICI proceedings conceals
the precise legal positions of the parties,5 9 the legal theories apparent in the
public statements of Iran and the United States reveal a-significant difference
of opinion concerning which, if any, international law obligations were violated
in the shooting down of Flight 655. In part, the divergence is attributable to
differing characterizations of the facts. The Iranian view disregards the ongoing
speedboat attack on the Vincennes, thus casting the U.S. conduct simply as a
violation of international civil aviation law. The United States has premised
its position on the idea that the downing of Flight 655 occurred in self-defense
and was therefore incidental to the lawful use of force. Thus, the U.S. position
appears to ignore any problems of civil aviation law. Beyond these differing
factual perceptions of the incident, the two states also disagree over the
applicable legal concepts, with Iran focusing on principles of international civil
aviation law and the U.S. on the law of armed conflict.
57. Compensation offered amounted to $250,000 for heads of household working to support a family
and $100,000 for all other persons. See Kempster, supra note 5. The offer was apparently acceptable to
states other than Iran, because they accepted compensation for the death of their citizens. Lacayo, A Game
of Winks and Nods; Why Both Sides Are Downplaying a U.S. Payment to Iran, TIME, Nov. 20, 1989, at
65, col. 1.
58. The United States wanted to avoid channeling the funds through the Iranian government, which
presumably would have final control over the amount disbursed. U.S. Offers Airbus Compensation, Facts
on File World News Digest, July 28, 1989, at 561, col. D1.
59. See supra note 1; ICJ Letter, supra note 2. -
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1. Iranian Position Before the International Court of Justice
In its ICJ Application, Iran took the position that in shooting down Flight
655, the United States violated the air safety and overflight provisions of the
1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), 6 and
the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage) (Montreal Convention), 61 an antiter-
rorism and air-hijacking treaty.62 Iran requested that the ICJ declare that the
United States had violated the Chicago Convention, including its preamble,
articles 1, 2, 3 bis,63 44(a) and 44(h), and annex 15, as well as recommenda-
tion 2.6/1 of the Third Middle East Regional Air Navigation Meeting of the
ICAO (recommendation 2.6/1).64 Iran's primary legal contentions before the
ICJ probably wil be twofold: 1) the Vincennes' action violated Iran's right to
control the airspace above its territory, including the airspace above its territo-
rial seas (hence the recitation of articles 1 and 2); and 2) the use of armed
force against civil aircraft is absolutely prohibited under the preamble, articles
44(a) and 44(h), and proposed article 3 bis, which Iran presumably views as
declaratory of existing law. The unspoken assumption behind these claims is
that international civil aviation law trumps self-defense concerns.
The Iranian invocation of recommendation 2.6/1 touches on state attitudes
with respect to prohibited zones and danger zones over international waters.
The recommendation, promulgated in 1984, addresses the problem of coopera-
tion in air traffic control, specifically the coordination of military and civil use
of airspace to maximize air safety.6 The recommendation criticizes the invo-
cation of prohibited zones for military purposes over international waters.66
It essentially provides that temporary military danger zones outside a state's
territory may be established only in consultation with responsible air traffic
control authorities.67 By referring to annex 15 of the Chicago Convention,
60. Convention Between the United States ofAmerica and Other Governments Respecting International
Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago
Convention]. The United States is a party to the Chicago Convention.
61. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage),
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971) [hereinafter Montreal
Convention]. The United States is a party to the Montreal Convention.
62. See Iranian ICJ Application, supra note 1, at 8, 10; Cody, Iran Suing U.S. in World Court:
Compensation Sought for Vincennes'Shooting Down ofAirliner, Wash. Post, May 20, 1989, at A16, col.
1.
63. Article 3 bis is inapplicable because the proposed amendment has not yet been adopted by the
requisite number of parties. See supra note 256.
64. See ICAO, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES: AERONAUTICAL
INFORMATION SERVICES, ANNEX 15 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (7th ed.
1987); Report of the ThirdMiddle East Regional AirNavigation Meeting (March 27-April 13, 1984), ICAO
Doc. 9434 [hereinafter Third MIDRANReport].
65. Id. at 2.6/1 (e), (g); id. at 2.6.8.
66. Id. at 2.6/1 (e).
67. Id. at 2.611 (g).
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Iran apparently contends that the U.S. NOTAM had no legal effect, either
because it attempted to create what otherwise might be considered temporary
airspace reservations in the Persian Gulf, or because the U.S. NOTAM did
not constitute effective notice of U.S. variation under article 38 of the Chicago
Convention.68
2. American Position Before the International Court of Justice
American views with respect to the Flight 655 incident have been expressed
in mixed fora, including the U.N. Security Council, the ICAO Council, in
cooperation with the ICAO investigation, the official Department of Defense
Report, and in the congressional testimony of the Department of State's Legal
Adviser and various naval officers responsible for the official Department of
Defense investigation. As a result, one should recognize that official U.S.
statements concerning the Flight 655 incident represent a mixture of political
and legal viewpoints. The United States has consistently asserted the position
that, as a matter of international law, it is not legally responsible for the
downing of Flight 655. It bases this contention on two claims: First, the
Vincennes shot down Flight 655 in the good faith belief that it was a hostile
aircraft threatening immediate harm to the Vincennes and/or the Montgomery.
Second, Iran shares responsibility for the tragic accident.
The Legal Adviser asserted before Congress that because the use of force
against Flight 655 was lawful, state responsibility principles precluded legal
responsibility for the downing of Flight 655.69 Significantly, the testimony
concerning "lawful force" fails to articulate clearly the reasoning followed in
reaching such a legal conclusion. The legal significance of the second claim
of shared Iranian responsibility, however, is less obvious. It might be consid-
ered solely a political statement, similar to then Vice-President Bush's state-
ments before the U.N. Security Council that the Flight 655 incident would not
have occurred but for Iran's continuing failure to comply with Security Council
resolutions seeking to end the Iran-Iraq War.7" On the other hand, the attempt
to assign legal responsibility to Iran also resembles an omissions analysis in
that it asserts that Iranian officials were at fault for not preventing Flight 655
from overflying a warship engaged in battle.7
68. The ICAO Report indicated specifically that the U.S. NOTAM did not conform to the requirements
of annex 15. See ICAO Report, supra note 6, at 11.
69. See DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2139, Oct. 1988, at 58-59, reprinted in Agora: The Downing ofIran
Air Flight 655, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 320, 321-22 (1989) [hereinafter Agora].
70. I.
71. Id. at 321.
260
Vol. 16:245, 1991
Iran Air Flight 655
Regarding the speedboat attack on the Vincennes, the Legal Adviser's
congressional testimony on August 4, 1988, included two basic statements
concerning the claim of shared Iranian responsibility:
The Government of Iran should not have allowed gunboats to attack our vessels and
aircraft. That government also should not have allowed a passenger airline [sic] to
fly over a battle zone - especially not unless it was equipped and prepared to
respond to our Navy's repeated warnings.'
The Legal Adviser seemed to contemplate two separate breaches of legal
duties, one in connection with the speedboat attack and the other in permitting
overflight of the surface engagement by a civilian airliner.
Given the Legal Adviser's position as a legal rather than a diplomatic
officer and the fact that he was speaking to Congress, it seems likely that the
omissions analysis has a legal rather than a diplomatic significance. However,
this analysis is problematic because the speedboat attack was actually undertak-
en by an irregular force, the Revolutionary Guards, as opposed to Iran's
regular armed services. The Legal Adviser's statement must be contrasted with
Vice-President Bush's assertion before the U.N. Security Council that:
The U.S.S. Vincennes acted in self-defense. This tragic accident occurred against a
backdrop of repeated, unjustified, unprovoked, and unlawful Iranian attacks against U.S.
merchant shipping and armed forces . . . It occurred in the midst of a naval attack
initiated by Iranian vessels against a neutral vessel and, subsequently, against the
Vincennes when it came to the aid of the innocent ship in distress.'
The above formulations are strikingly different. The Legal Adviser was
apparently unwilling or unable formally to attribute the speedboat attack on
the Vincennes to the Iranian government. If the Legal Adviser's choice of
words reflects underlying concern about formal attribution of the action to Iran,
the legal basis for this reluctance may be sought in the recent Case Concerning
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran.74 To the extent
72. DEP'T ST. BULL., No. 2139, Oct. 1988, at 58-59, reprinted in Agora, supra note 69, at 321-22.
73. DEP'T ST. BuLL., No. 2138, Sept. 1988, at 42-43, reprinted in Agora, supra note 69, at 321.
The Vice-President's statement should be understood as an attempt to fit the use of armed force by the
Vincennes into the scheme of the United Nations Charter, and specifically into article 51. However, as a
legal matter it is debatable whether the repulse of an attack by an armed band constitutes self-defense for
international law purposes. See, e.g., Linman, Self-Defense, Necessity and U.N. Collective Security Under
International Law: American and Other Views, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 27, 76 n.74, 115 n.223
(1991).
74. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (Iran v. U.S.), 1980
I.C.J. 3 [hereinafter Hostage Case]. The United States asserted that the armed "militants" occupying the
American Embassy and holding the hostages acted on behalf of Iran's revolutionary government and
therefore under color of state authority. See [1980] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM. 91. The ICJ opined that the
conduct of the militants who had seized the Embassy and its staff "might be considered as itself directly
imputable to the Iranian State only if it were established that... the militants acted on behalf of the State."
Hostage Case, supra, at 29. For this precedent and the agency-style "on behalf of" analysis, see RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §207(c) (1989) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT THIRD].
The ICJ eventually attributed responsibility to Iran on the basis of its post hoc governmental approval
of the militants' action where the hostage situation occurred in its territory and continued over an extended
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attribution of the speedboat attack is problematic, Iran's violation of interna-
tional law in connection with the sea attack should not be characterized as a
government-sponsored armed attack, but rather as a violation by omission of
the government's duty to prevent the use of its territory and the activities of
its nationals in preying on neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf.7'
Then Vice-President Bush's statement before the U.N. Security Council
in which he asserted that the Vincennes defended itself against an attack by
"Iranian vessels" may be subject to further interpretation. Under some views
of international law, self-defense can only be asserted against the attack of
another state, while a necessity analysis governs appropriate responses for
attacks on a state by private individuals traditionally referred to as "armed
bands."'76 On the one hand, harboring armed bands may raise the issue of
indirect aggression under international law.' On the other hand, armed band
period of time. Hostage Case, supra, at 29. However, the ICJ did not automatically accept the U.S. position
that the "Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the [militants']
conduct, violated its obligations." Id. at 30. This is even more surprising since the case arose out of an
ongoing, and almost universally condemned violation of diplomatic and consular immunities. To the extent
such concerns underlie the Legal Adviser's choice of words, they merely reflect the larger legal problem
developing in the area of indirect aggression and the treatment of armed bands under international law.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
75. See generally 1 J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO
WHICH THE UNTrrED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 539-63 (1898); C. BEAmAN, THE NATIONAL AND PRIVATE
"ALABAMA CLAIMs" AND THEIR "FINAL AND AMICABLE" SETTLEMENT (1871) (Alabama arbitration
involved British responsibility for havoc wrought outside its territory by Confederate raider Alabama and
similar vessels outfitted in British shipyards). The Alabama proceedings are generally acknowledged as
the earliest and perhaps the leading precedent for imposing responsibility on state for actions undertaken
by private parties on or from its territory against interests of another state in apparent violation of territorial
state's legal obligation to prevent misuse of its territory. For American views of international law of the
omission analysis, see RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 74, §207. Given past practice during World Wars
I and II, which has increasingly led belligerents to assert practical control over neutral shipping, both
belligerents in the Gulf War might dispute the existence of a duty not to fire on neutral tankers carrying
the other belligerent's cargo. Even were such activity permissible for regular naval forces, the legitimacy
of such activity by groups such as the militants would still remain at issue. However, this question has
apparently not been raised here, despite a symmetry problem that such groups if viewed as armed bands
should presumably never be able to engage in such activity unless they are either pirates or at least acting
"on behalf of" the Iranian government, which implies that any attack should be considered to be "on behalf
of" Iran.
76. See generally Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 712 (1958). Current international law scholarship treats the armed band problem predominantly in
terms of attribution for purposes of state responsibility. See, e.g., M. GARCA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE AcTs OF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES (1962); Sperduti,
Responsibility ofStatesforActivitiesofPrivateLawPersons, 10 ENCYCLOPEDIAOF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 373 (1987); Christenson, The Doctrine ofAttribution in State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INURmS TO ALIENS (R. Lillich ed. 1983). There is substantial disagreement
concerning the legal treatment of armed bands, both as a technical and a political matter. The issues are
framed as indirect aggression versus the permissibility ofassistanceto self-determination movements, which
are called national liberation movements in socialist international law. See Linnan, supra note 73, at 72
n.67, 73 nn.68-69, 74 n.70.
77. Traditionally, outside of special areas such as piracy, international armed attacks generally have
been conducted by the armed forces of a state. More recently, commentators have raised the question
whether a state that supports persons committing terrorist acts abroad should be held legally responsible
for their acts. See Christenson, supra note 76, at 321, 336; Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibilityfor
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attacks on another state's armed forces may be considered beyond international
law per se, instead being covered by municipal law under protective jurisdic-
tion principles recognized, but not necessarily controlled by international
law;78
In addition to the previously noted complications concerning the nature of
the combatants in the surface engagement, one must also consider the interna-
tional law basis for the Legal Adviser's congressional testimony addressing
Flight 655's overflight of a battle zone. 79 Beyond the international civil avia-
tion law versus self-defense issue of whether the Vincennes could prohibit use
of A59, the more basic problem of freedom of the seas is at stake. The ques-
tion does not involve the high seas per se because the events occurred in the
Strait of Hormuz, but could be analogized to the high seas under comparable
free passage principles given the transit passage regime governing overflight
of straits.80 The Legal Adviser's views implicitly conflict with the ideas of free
passage over international waters that govern recommendation 2.6/1. They also
run counter to the longstanding U.S. position that rights of transit passage exist
on and over international straits, because the Legal Advisor's views might
permit closure of a strait to overflight. However, before the ICJ can reach
these issues, it first has to decide on the challenge to its jurisdiction filed by
the United States.
C. American Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice
On March 4, 1991, the United States.filed a preliminary objection to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the Flight 655 case. The
Iranian response is due no later than December 9, 1991.81 The jurisdictional
stage of the Flight 655 proceedings presents two questions: 1) the likelihood
of success of the U.S. challenge of the ICJ's jurisdiction under the Chicago
and Montreal Conventions; and 2) if the United States loses its jurisdictional
challenge, the probability of its withdrawing or remaining before the ICJ and
litigating on the merits. The jurisdictional challenge involves the conflict
Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 217, 251-75 (1977). See also M.
GARCIA-MoRIA, supra note 76; Sperduti, supra note 76, at 373. American commentators have advanced
the view that permitting the use of its territory as a base for the commission of terrorist acts abroad is
enough to create state responsibility. See Lillich & Paxman, supra, at 258-60 (Texas cattle claims); 8 M.
WHrTEmAN, DIrcsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 749-55 (1967); AMERICAN-MExiCAN CLAIMS COMMISSION,
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE 51 (1948). However, this analysis may go beyond any precedent.
The difference between finding a violation of an international obligation in merely failing to prevent or
punish armed band attacks conducted from a state's territory and the formal attribution of that armed band's
attack to the state, parallels the difference between reparation liability for damages caused and the apparent
commission of an act of aggression against another state with all its attendant consequences.
78. See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 1.
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between the U.S. position that the Vincennes acted in self-defense, and the
Iranian claim that mandatory jurisdiction lies under articles 84 and 85 of the
Chicago Convention and article 14 of the Montreal Convention. It appears that
the United States will win the jurisdictional challenge as to the Montreal
Convention, lose as to the Chicago Convention, but choose to remain before
the ICJ.
Although the ICAO Council has a quasi-judicial function and parties to a
dispute may appeal its judgment, it is not a court and may thus adopt flexible
procedures to determine both the facts and law applicable to the dispute.82
The ICAO investigation called for under the initial Council decision of July
14, 1988, was arguably part of a preliminary quasi-judicial, fact-finding
process. The Council reached a decision in its March 17, 1989 action, after
the U.S. attempt to negotiate a settlement through its offer of ex gratia com-
pensation had failed. Under articles 84 and 85 of the Chicago Convention, a
party to the dispute may appeal a Council decision on issues of law and fact
to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal or to the International Court of Justice, as
successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice named in the Chicago
Convention. Jurisdiction appears compulsory when the interpretation or
application of the Chicago Convention and its annexes is at issue, while in all
other cases both parties must consent to ICJ jurisdiction.83 Thus, jurisdiction
under the Chicago Convention exists in a dispute over the proper relationship
between self-defense and duties concerning aircraft safety and overflight rights
under the Chicago Convention.
Initially, the United States may claim either that a state's assertion of self-
defense is self-judging" or, in the alternative, that the Iranian Application
is inadmissible on the ground that as a judicial body the ICJ is unsuited or
unable to pass judgment on the inherent right of self-defense under article 51
of the U.N. Charter. However, the ICJ's disposition of analogous issues in the
Nicaragua Case85 makes it doubtful that the United States could successfully
rely on such arguments. For this reason, the keystone of U.S. jurisdictional
arguments will probably focus on the proper interpretation of article 89 of the
Chicago Convention, which provides that "[i]n case of war, the provisions of
this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting
States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals."86 At least three plausi-
ble interpretations of this article are possible. According to the first interpreta-
tion, article 89 renders the Convention inoperative, because the Flight 655
82. T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAmNrG IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION 80,
136 (1969).
83. Id. at 143-46.
84. Linnan, supra note 73, at 85-89; see infra notes 402-406 and accompanying text.
85. See 1984 I.C.J. at 429-41 (jurisdiction of ICI and admissibility of application).
86. Chicago Convention, supra note 60, at art. 89.
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incident occurred in the midst of the Iran-Iraq War and the Vincennes was a
neutral warship taking defensive measures. In the alternative, the United States
might argue that article 51 of the U.N. Charter concerning self-defense has
completely preempted article 89 of the Chicago Convention by virtue of article
103 of the U.N. Charter. If article 89 of the Chicago Convention renders the
Convention inapplicable to wartime incidents, then there will be no dispute
recognized by the terms of the Convention, and thus no mandatory appeal of
the ICAO Council decision. However, this interpretation is inconsistent with
the language of article 89, the ICJ's understanding of article 89, and its
understanding of a "dispute" implied in its 1972 judgment Appeal Relating to
the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council. 8 7
The second reading, which Iran might assert in response to the American
jurisdictional arguments, maintains that the language of article 89 does not
contemplate making the entire Chicago Convention inapplicable during war-
time. Instead, this reading construes the wording "shall not affect the freedom
of action of any of the contracting States affected," to concern only the rules
governing territorial airspace. An inquiry into how the Chicago Convention
in the absence of article 89 might restrain belligerents and neutrals reveals that
it established the principle that a state has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory and territorial waters, including the right
to close its airspace to foreign aircraft."8 Were a belligerent entitled to close
its airspace as in peacetime, it could avoid air attacks on its territory. Article
89's mention of neutrals would be necessary, because some claim that the
Chicago Convention regime implies a positive duty to permit some overflight
despite the territorial character of a state's airspace. This would be inconsistent
with the closure of territorial airspace by neutral states to all belligerent aircraft
during wartime. Under this second reading, the freedom of action preserved
to belligerents and neutrals relates specifically to the peacetime territorial
airspace concept and a desire that it not conflict with established wartime
practices such as belligerent bombing of the enemy state and a neutral state's
closure of its airspace. If article 89 addressed only the territorial airspace
regime, it would arguably not apply to Flight 655's downing when viewed as
a maritime incident occurring over international waters. While more consistent
than the first reading with the "freedom of action" language of article 89, this
87. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46.
88. Article 1 of the Chicago Convention appears to grant this right by adopting the sovereignty scheme
of the Paris Convention. Paris Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 173 (never ratified by the United States). See 6 UNPERrECTED TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1776-1976, at 411 (C. Wiktor ed. 1984) [hereinafter 1919 Paris Convention]. See, e.g.,
Goedhuis, Questions of Public International Air Law, 81 REC. DES COURS 201, 209-10 (1952 II). Since
a significant number of states did not join the Paris Convention, the Chicago Convention with its larger
number of state parties established the general rule.
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position fails to explain clearly why only the territorial airspace rules should
be displaced.
The third reading of article 89, which is advocated in this article, presents
problems for both the United States and Iran. Under this reading, article 89
does not render the entire Chicago Convention inapplicable in wartime. Rather,
the Chicago Convention continues in force during wartime, subject to the
caveat that the law of armed conflict take precedence over inconsistent provi-
sions of the Chicago Convention and its annexes. This would entitle Flight 655
to receive the treatment required for noncombatant aircraft under the law of
armed conflict. A violation of the Chicago Convention would occur only if a
downing were impermissible under the law of armed conflict.
From the U.S. perspective, this position is problematic because the ICJ
could assert the equivalent of preliminary jurisdiction to resolve the questions
whether: 1) the downing of a civilian airliner would normally violate the
Chicago Convention or its annexes; and 2) whether the law of armed conflict
would permit the downing of Flight 655 when viewed as a noncombatant
aircraft. For Iran, this approach would force it to abandon the substantive
position underlying its ICI Application, which claims that the legality of Flight
655's downing is governed solely by civil aviation treaty law and not by the
principles of the law of armed conflict. Under this approach, based on the
Chicago Convention, the ICJ would reach a decision on jurisdiction and the
merits largely through an examination of the law of armed conflict.
Turning to the Montreal Convention, the Iranian invocation of this multilat-
eral agreement against the actions of a state's armed forces seems strained. 9
Judging by its final submission to the ICAO Council,9" the Iranian ICJ Appli-
cation relies upon the Montreal Convention in an attempt to criminalize the
Vincennes' alleged breach of international obligations. Mandatory jurisdiction
of the ICJ concerning interpretation or application of the Montreal Convention
is determined by article 14 without regard to the decision of the ICAO Coun-
cil.
Article 14's jurisdictional grant to the ICJ is premised on a disagreement
concerning the Montreal Convention that: 1) cannot be settled through negotia-
tion, 2) for which arbitration of the dispute cannot be organized within six
months, and 3) is referred to the ICJ in conformity "with the Statute of the
Court." Despite U.S.-Iranian negotiations surrounding the U.S. ex gratia offer
of compensation, it is unclear whether the parties included the Montreal
Convention in their negotiations. In addition, unless the ICAO Council pro-
ceedings are characterized as an attempt to arbitrate the dispute, Iran apparent-
89. See, e.g., E. McWHINNEY, THE ILLEGAL DIVERSION OF AIRCRAFT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
45-58 (1975); N. JOYNER, AERIAL HIACKING AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIE 216-29 (1974) (Montreal
Convention as extension of anti-hijacking and sabotage conventions rather than general air safety treaty).
90. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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ly never requested arbitration of any dispute concerning the Montreal Conven-
tion. When released, the private diplomatic record may reveal Iranian efforts
to negotiate and arbitrate the Montreal Convention's coverage of the Flight 655
incident. However, without such a showing, Iran cannot meet article 14's
requirements for ICJ jurisdiction.
Even with evidence of attempted negotiation and arbitration, two further
objections to jurisdiction remain. Article 14's reference to the Statute of the
Court might call into play U.S. reservations, although the ICJ rejected a
similar argument under the Chicago Convention in the 1972 Appeal Relating
to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council.91 Moreover, the nature of the Mon-
treal Convention as an anti-hijacking and sabotage treaty seems to preclude its
application to the acts of armed forces governed by the law of armed conflict
,under article 89 of the Chicago Convention.
Given that the ICJ jurisdiction provisions of both the Chicago and Montreal
Conventions limit jurisdiction to disputes arising under those treaties, it is
possible that without independent jurisdictional grounds, the Iranian claims
concerning air safety and free overflight under the Chicago Convention will
proceed on the merits, while the U.S. jurisdictional challenge will dispose of
the claim under the Montreal Convention. The question remains whether the
United States will remain before the ICJ or will withdraw from the litigation,
as it did in the Nicaragua Case, if any portion of the Iranian ICJ application
proceeds to adjudication on the merits. In responding to reporters' questions
and elaborating on President Bush's 1989 statement that the United States
would appear and litigate the Iranian claims before the ICJ, a State Department
spokesperson indicated that:
Iran is suing under the Chicago and Montreal Conventions in which we agreed to
the submission to the Court of various civil aviation disputes. We will contest Iran's
suits on jurisdictional grounds and on the merits. But we recognize the Court's
authority under these two conventions to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Our
participation is aimed at challenging Iran's assertions. In any event, the Court will
proceed with the case whether we participate or not. By appearing, we will be able
to present our case and protect US interests most effectively.'
The reference to both jurisdictional grounds and the merits apparently
indicates the government's willingness to litigate on the merits should the
jurisdictional challenge fail. Additionally, the U.S. efforts to convince other
nations (chiefly the Soviet Union) to accept the ICJ authority in resolving
certain multilateral and bilateral treaty disputes, as well as practical and
political imperatives given the current Middle East situation and attempts at
rapprochement with Iran, seem to support the idea that the United States will
91. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. at 53, 60,
117 (Indian reservation regarding disputes between Commonwealth countries in India's general declaration
accepting ICJ jurisdiction should take precedence over Chicago Convention's jurisdictional provisions).
92. State Department Briefing, supra note 5.
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contest the case on the merits should its jurisdictional arguments fail. However,
responding to the question whether the United States would reserve the right
to withdraw from the litigation or whether it would acknowledge the ICJ's
authority to award an indemnity, the State Department spokesperson declined
to comment on such "speculative" questions. The interests at stake and the
concerns recited above make it likely that the United States will remain before
the ICJ to contest the merits if its jurisdictional challenge fails.
III. FREEDOM OF THE SEAS AND COMBATANT RIGHTS
Understanding the Flight 655 incident requires an appreciation of its special
character as a maritime incident. Traditional maritime use of force law incor-
porated free passage principles sub silencio. These free passage and overflight
principles have influenced modern civil aviation law and lie concealed in both
states' positions before the ICJ. Historically, the United States has adopted a
broad view of free passage by neutral vessels in international waters, and a
narrow view of belligerent rights, particularly with regard to exclusionary
zones. The downing of Flight 655 presents only the latest instance of a very
old problem: freedom of the seas and reconciliation of the rights of belligerents
and nonbelligerents. Under a broad view, the Vincennes as a neutral warship
was present in the Persian Gulf to protect nonbelligerent oil tankers from
belligerent attacks in connection with the ongoing Iran-Iraq War. Under a
narrow view, the Vincennes was a combatant that shot down a civilian airliner.
This section argues that the United States claim before the ICJ--based on an
expansive notion of combatant rights, a duty to avoid requirement, and a
lawful force analysis--contradicts its historical commitment to freedom of the
seas and ultimately conflicts with its long-term national interests.
A. Traditional Notions of Freedom of the High Seas and the Vincennes'
Character as a Neutral Warship
From their inception, aviation law and the law of aerial warfare93 have
borrowed from the law of the sea.94 The earliest rules governing noncombat-
93. The 1923 Hague Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules adopted maritime concepts. J. SPAIGHT, AIR,
POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 409-10 (3d ed. 1947). During this period, various publicists recognized the
difficulty of determining the law of aerial warfare simply by extending the legal principles governing sea
or land warfare. See, e.g., Sandiford, Evolution du droit de la guerre maritime et adrienne, 68 REC. DES
cous 555, 660-80 (1939-11); Garner, La raglementation internationale de la guerre adrienne, 30 REVUE
GANPRALE DE DRO1T INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 372, 380 (1923). See also J. BAKER & L. McKERNAN,
SELECTED Topics CONNECTED WITH THE LAWS OF WARFARE AS OF AUGUST 1, 1914, at 580-609 (1919),
reprinted in 3 THE INQUIRY HANDBOOKS (1974) (aerial warfare).
94. Civil law of international air and space is largely governed by treaties such as the Chicago
Convention. However, written agreements are rare with regard to aerial warfare and the legal status of
noncombatants. See, e.g., the Agreement Supplementary to the Nyon Arrangement, L.N. Doc.
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ant flights over belligerent forces on the high seas were derived directly from
maritime free passage rules and principles of belligerent engagement.9" Pre-
liminary analysis must focus on: 1) air and maritime law relating to the rights
and duties of civilian aircraft, and 2) the rights and duties of neutral warships
asserting neutral free passage rights during wartime.
9 6
Traditional notions of the high seas regard international waters as "neutral
highways" not subject to the legal control of any one state.97 Nations generally
recognize freedom of the high seas, 9" a right now guaranteed by treaty.9
With limited exceptions, 1"° a state does not have any authority or jurisdiction
to interfere in peacetime with the passage of a foreign vessel on the high
seas.10 The thorny problem is how to reconcile the interests of belligerents
and nonbelligerents in their use of the common maritime arena during wartime.
Under traditional views, belligerent rights to conduct hostilities and neutral
rights to trade on the high seas were coequal. Exceptions to freedom of the
high seas, encompassing unrestricted passage and protection of commerce,
were enunciated in the rules of traditional sea warfare. Free passage on the
high seas could be interrupted under prize law principles of visitation, search,
and capture applicable to belligerent and neutral shipping. This position was
C.409.M.273.1937.VH, reprinted in 31 AM. J. INT'L L. StrPp. 179, 182 (1937) (extends treaty provisions
in naval warfare to include aerial matters). See also 3 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED BY TBE UNITED STATES 2014-15, 2021 (2d ed. 1945); Green, Aerial Considerations in the
Law ofArmed Conflict, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 89 (1980); infra notes 168-180 and accompanying text
(1923 Hague Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules).
95. See J. SPAIGHT, supra note 93, at 399-401. See also J. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFIUCT: A TREATISE ON THE DYNAMICS OF DISPUTES AND WAR LAW 613 (1974).
96. See infra notes 340-68 and accompanying text. The second point relating to the rights and
obligations of neutrals caught up in hostile engagements will be addressed later in further detail.
97. For an introduction to the history of this doctrine, see 1 D. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF THE SEA 1-28 (1982); 1 G. GIDEL, Le droit intenationalpublique de la mer, 125-212 (1932);
P. POTTER, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS IN HISTORY, LAW AND POuTICS 11-96 (1924).
98. See generally 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 97, at 1-28; 1 G. GIDEL, supra note 97, at 213-24;
The United States has been and remains a strong proponent of freedom of the seas. Any U.S. advocacy
for restricting freedom of the seas is the exception rather than the rule.
99. Convention on the High Seas, 1958, 13 U.S.T. -2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82,
[hereinafter 1958 LOS High Seas Convention](constituent agreement under 1958 LOS to which United
States is party); U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Pub. No. E.83.V.5 (1983) [hereinafter
1982 LOS High Seas Convention]; (United States not a party and has not entered into force due to
insufficient number of signatories).
100. The exceptions generally relate to boarding powers on the high seas for enforcing prohibitions
on piracy and slavery.
101. See, e.g., Owners of The Jessie, The Thomas F. Bayard and The Pescawha (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.),
6 R. INT'L ARE. AwARDS 57, 58-59 (1921); Owners, Officers and Men of The Wanderer (Gr. Brit. v.
U.S.), id. at 68, 71-75 (1921); Laughlin McLean (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), id. at 82, 84 (1921). See also
Charterers and Crew of The Kate (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), id. at 77 (1921); Owners of the Cargo of The
Coquitlam (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), id. at 45 (1920).
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implicitly reaffirmed in the United States extension of navy protection to
neutral vessels in the Persian Gulf prior to the Flight 655 incident. 1°2
Traditional prize law categorized vessels by nationality and function.
Enemy merchant ships generally were subject to seizure, but not to unan-
nounced attack, since they were unarmed. Neutral merchant ships benefitted
from the traditional noncombatant treatment of all unarmed vessels, but were
subject, with their cargo, to belligerent seizure only under the recognized
doctrines of nonneutral service, contraband, and blockade. Although disputes
arose among states over the details of this law, 3 neutral vessels and cargos
generally were accorded special protection for both legal and political reasons.
The state of an injured neutral might respond to unwarranted attacks by
invoking sanctions, as the United States did to France and Britain during the
Napoleonic Wars, or by entering the war on the side of an enemy, as the
United States did in the War of 1812.1°4
Under a traditional sea warfare analysis, the Vincennes was a neutral
warship present in the Persian Gulf for the legitimate purpose of protecting
neutral shipping."l5 Faced with "unlawful" belligerent activities, a neutral
102. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. This presumes placement of protection of transit
passage through the Strait of Hormuz on the level of traditional free passage rights on the high seas. This
section will focus on free passage, not transit passage.
103. See, e.g., 1 P. JESSUP & F. DEAK, NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW: THE
ORIGINs (1935).
104. See generally W. P=uIS & A. REEDE, 2 NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW:
THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD (1936); Sherman, Orders in Council and the Law of the Sea, 16 AM. J. INT'L
L. 400, 561 (1922). Older views of freedom of the seas, particularly in wartime, are often characterized
as splitting along political lines of "maritime" and "Continental" powers. See, e.g., P. POTTER, supra note
97, at 171-207.
105. Precedents for such activity date back as far as the First and Second Armed Neutralities of 1780
and 1799 and the French-American Quasi-war of 1798-1800. They are also found in the World War I
stationing of naval gunners on neutral American merchant ships to protect them from submarine attack,
and in the Nyon Agreement from the Spanish Civil War. See, e.g., Kunig, Nyon Agreement (1937), 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (1982).
It might be argued that, in the absence ofa U.N. Security Council determination characterizing either
Iran or Iraq as the "aggressor," the United States legally could maintain a neutral equipoise toward both
belligerents. See, e.g., Note, AirAttacks on Neutral Shipping in the Persian Guf.. The Legality of the Iraqi
Exclusion Zone and Iranian Reprisals,supra note 18, at524-25. However, this assumes that such a Security
Council designation of aggression is a precondition to duties of opposition to aggression attached under
the modem U.N. Charter law. For the presentation of this position as the U.S. view, see UNITED STATES
DEP'T OF THE NAVY, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, para. 232 [hereinafter 1955 LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE],
reprinted in R. TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA (1955); see also 1989 Annotated
Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, at para. 7.2.1. In accordance with U.N. practice, the Security
Council resolutions calling for a cease fire and negotiated resolution to the conflict omitted the designation
of either party as the aggressor. If third party states adhered to neutrality obligations, such as impartiality,
few such problems would arise. For the contemporary notion of nonbelligerence as opposed to the
traditional concept of neutrality, see, e.g., J. KOPFER, DIE NEUTRALITAT IM WANDEL DER ERSCHEINUNGS-
FORMEN MILTARISCHER AuSEINANDERSETZUNGEN (1975); 11 M. WHiTEMAN, supra note 77 at 139-210
(1968); Schindler, Aspects contemporains de la neutralitM, 121 REC. DES COURS 221 (1967-I1), problems
occur whenever nonbelligerents elect to deal preferentially with a belligerent state that may be regarded
objectively as the aggressor state. During the Iran-Iraq War, nonbelligerent Arab Gulf states offered
financial and other aid to Iraq, while those countries sought the protection of neutral status under prize law
for their oil tankers. To the extent merchant vessels either sailing under their flag or carrying their oil to
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state could respond either directly through the immediate use of armed force
or after the fact in the form of a reprisal. 6 The Vincennes' actions did not
constitute an armed reprisal, commonly considered unlawful under U.N.
Charter law,' 7 and the problem is determining the duties governing its im-
mediate use of force. As a preliminary matter, the question can be reduced to
whether under current armed conflict law, the proper rules for the Vincennes'
treatment of noncombatants were those traditionally applicable by belligerents
either to merchant ships or to civil aircraft of neutral or enemy status.' 08 Al-
though the distinction between enemy and neutral noncombatants has largely
disappeared from the rules of land warfare under modern treaty law,"°9 naval
and aerial warfare are still governed largely by customary law."0 Older
precedents do not provide a clear answer but suggest on principle that neutral
warships should treat belligerent merchant shipping and noncombatant aircraft
no worse than belligerents may treat similarly situated neutrals, subject to
recognized exceptions in the law of neutrality. This view is compelled by
export markets were attacked by Iranian forces, the question arises whether those Iranian attacks might
be rationalized as armed reprisals permitted as a matter of customary law against non-belligerents not
adhering to the traditional obligations of neutrals. See Russo, supra note 18. Otherwise, the question may
be posed whether the same partial acts of nonbelligerents should be viewed as hostile acts in a traditional
sense. See Mehr, Neutrality in the Gulf War, 20 OCEAN DEV. INT'L L. 105 (1989).
106. Retaliation might be tempered by the recognition that any use of armed force could signal the
abandonment of neutrality and the assumption of belligerent status. Accordingly, neutral reprisals against
belligerent merchant ships or aircraft are rare.
107. See Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 n.2 (1972).
See also Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in THE CURRENT REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 79-84 (A.
Cassese ed. 1986); RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 74, § 905.
108. During the two World Wars, principles of naval warfare were more often broken than espoused.
As a matter of state practice and customary international law, the extent to which these principles have
retained their force of law or have been replaced by new norms is unclear. See R. TUCKER, INTERNATION-
AL LAW STUDIES, 1955, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 26-32, 181-190 (1955). See also
1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook, supra note 18; 1955 LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 105,
at para. 5.4 to 5.4.2.
109. See Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. When
neutral lives and property were taken or destroyed, this would be treated typically as a case of state
responsibility, involving a duty to protect alien lives. This analysis has been extended implicitly to the
Korean Airlines Flight KE 007 incident. See Cheng, The Destruction of KAL Flight KE 007, and Article
3 bis of the Chicago Convention, in AIRWORTHY: LIBER AMICORUM HONOURiNG PROFESSOR DR. I.H.PH.
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR 71-72 (1985). There is some basis beyond mere formalism for distinguishing
between warfare on land and at sea. Land warfare often involves civilians that do not possess a legal right
of presence, whereas neutral ships caught up in battles still may rely on their independent right to free
passage in international waters.
110. See Protocol I, Art. 49, supra note 109, at 25 (implicitly excludes any coverage of effects of
.armed conflict at sea or in the air"). Levie, supra note 18, at 728-30. Although areas of the traditional
law of naval warfare such as the bombardment of ports may be covered, this does not address the Flight
655 problem involving downing a civilian aircraft over international waters. Other post-U.N. Charter
treaties also have some limited application to naval and aerial warfare, but only in marginal areas such as
protection of hospital ships and medical aircraft. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (general humanitarian precepts);
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, Oct. 21, 1950, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 2 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 97, at 1105.
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notions of reciprocity, the goal of minimizing injury and damage to noncomba-
tants, and the obligation of neutral parties to avoid participation in conflicts.
Under these circumstances and beyond the scope of the 1907 Hague Conven-
tions and successor treaty law, the older customary sea warfare law applicable
to neutrals is a preferred source for principles governing the treatment of
noncombatants."11
B. Military Zones of Exclusion and Abrogation of Freedom of the High Seas
in the Twentieth Century
Reaching back to the Russo-Japanese War of 1902-1904, belligerent
warships generally could not prohibit the passage of neutral merchant ships
through areas of hostile engagement on international waters.1 This resulted
from the absolute right of neutrals to travel the high seas, a right characterized
as coequal to belligerent rights to fight in the same waters. The res nullius
legal character of the high seas implied that no vessel could lay claim to more
sea than its hull occupied."' For purposes of further discussion, this inquiry
111. See generally A. HIGGINs, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES CONCERNINGTHE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR (1909); Moessner, Hague Peace Conferences
of 1899 and 1907, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (1982); Scott, The Work of the
Second Hague Peace Conference, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1908). See also 1907Hague Convention WRelating
to the Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR 71 (A. Roberts & R. Guelffeds. 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF
WAR]; 1907 Hague Convention (VII) Relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into Warships, id. at
79; 1907 Hague Convention (VIII) Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, Id. at
85; 1907 Hague Convention (X) Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in lIme of War, id. at 93;
1907 Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of
Capture in Naval War, id. at 101; 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of
Neutral Powers in Naval War, id. at 109. See also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
112. Under special circumstances, neutral ships might be subject to search. If no cause for further
interference with their passage was discovered, vessels theoretically were free to sail through the armed
conflict.
113. In The Marianna Flora, Justice Story argued that:
Upon the ocean, then, in time of peace, all posses an entire equality. It is the common highway
of all, appropriated to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive
prerogative there... The general maxim in such cases is, sic utere tuo, ut non alienun laedas.
It has been argued, that no ship has a right to approach another at sea; and that every ship
has a right to draw round her a line ofjurisdiction, within which no other is at liberty to intrude.
In short, that she may appropriate so much of the ocean as she may deem necessary for her
protection, and prevent any nearer approach.
This doctrine appears to us novel, and is not supported by any authority. It goes to establish
upon the ocean a territorial jurisdiction, like that which is claimed by all nations within cannon
shot of their shores, in virtue of their general sovereignty. But the latter right is founded upon
the principle of sovereign and permanent appropriation, and has never been successfully asserted
beyond it. Every vessel undoubtedly has a right to the use of so much of the ocean as she
occupies, and as is essential to her own movements. Beyond this, no exclusive right has ever
yet been recognized.
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. [11 Wheat.] 1, 42-44 (1826).
This should be understood in opposition to the competing but disfavored traditional view of freedom of
the seas as based on res communis. Under this view, neutrals could deny belligerents the right to engage
in hostilities at sea. See, e.g., W. SCHOCKING, DER DAUERFRIEDE: KRIEGSAUFSATZE EINES PAZIFISTEN
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refers to any claimed right to exclude neutrals from high seas battle locations
as a "battle zone,"'14 and to claims establishing broad exclusionary areas on
the high seas as a "war zone.""' This analysis must also distinguish interna-
tional waters per se from littoral areas adjoining territorial seas, where a
greater degree of belligerent control might be recognized.
Early twentieth century publicists reconciled the conflict between the
coequal rights of combatants and neutrals by suggesting that neutrals choosing
to sail through belligerent engagements did so at their own peril." 6 The
visible nature of the engagement and the element of voluntary assumption of
risk tipped the scale in favor of belligerent rights. This view is demonstrated
in a letter to. The Times (London) by the British publicist T.E. Holland ad-
dressing neutral rights and the mining problem during the Russo-Japanese War.
[There is] a perpetually recurring conflict between belligerent and neutral interests.
They are, of course, irreconcilable, and the rights of the respective parties can be
defined only by way of compromise. It is beyond doubt that the theoretically neutral
right of ships, whether public or private, to pursue their ordinary routes over the
high seas in time of war, is limited by the right of the belligerents to fight on those
seas a naval battle, the scene of which can be approached by such ships only at their
proper risk and peril. In such a case the neutral has ample warning of the danger
to which he would be exposed did he not alter his intended course. It would,
however, be an entirely different affair if he should find himself implicated in
belligerent war risks, of the existence of which it was impossible for him to be
informed, while pursuing his lawful business in waters over which no nation
pretends to exercise jurisdiction. 1 7
T.E. Holland's view was echoed in international legal commentaries published
immediately after the Russo-Japanese War."' Although, belligerent warships
could not exclude neutral ships from any areas of international waters, neutral
vessels proceeded through areas of hostilities at their own peril, a view that
was premised on ample warning." 9
54 (1917); but see C. MEURER, THE PROGRAM OF THE FREEDOM OF THE SEA: A POLITICAL STUDY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 17 n.5 (L. Frachtenberg trans. 1919), reprinted in 9 THE INQUIRY HANDBOOKS
(1974). The accepted doctrinal view of the high seas in the twentieth century seems to have been that they
have a res nullius character, although the "common heritage of mankind" treatment of seabed resources
under the 1982 LOS Convention admittedly moves closer toward res communis.
114. This characterization parallels the Legal Adviser's wording, .but does not accept his apparent
position on the law. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
115. Following Oppenheim, it is customary to speak of war theaters for purposes of establishing the
legal boundaries for conducting hostilities at sea.
116. See, e.g., infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. Another possible way to resolve the
neutral-belligerent conflict would be to require belligerents temporarily to halt their engagements in the
presence of neutral vessels. However, such a procedure would have restrained belligerents' own right to
freely use the high seas, thereby moving toward a res communis view.
117. The Times (London), May 25, 1904, at 10.
118. See A. HERSHEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMAcY OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
244-45 (1906); F. SMITH & N. SIBLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW As INTERPRETED DURING THE RUSSO-
JAPANESE WAR 296 (1905).
119. Subsequent discussion will cover the parallel issue of whether the neutral party is present at its
own peril since the belligerent warships under a necessity rationale may attack or defend themselves without
hinderance during an actual engagement. Cf. 3 C. HYDE, supra note 94, at 1952-53.
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At the turn of the century, the United States supported a broad interpreta-
tion of the law of neutrality and freedom of the high seas. Accordingly, any
asserted right by a belligerent to interdict passage on the high seas was inimi-
cable to American views. 2 Such a belligerent claim would constitute an
unacceptable attempt to control the high seas on a quasi-territorial basis without
any foundation in customary law.' The traditional law of contraband and
blockade constituted the exception, under which rules the carriage of war
goods and access to a belligerent's ports and coastline could be prohibited to
neutrals. The U.S. view on contraband law and the permissible scope of
blockade reflected the customary law and the 1856 Declaration of Paris."
The United States generally acknowledged a belligerent warship's right to
capture a neutral blockade runner or contraband cargo, but required validation
and adjudication by a prize, court"z and other formal controls.124
The problem of interdicting passage was aggravated in the late nineteenth
century with the advent of underwater contact mines." z These mines had
both offensive and defensive potential, but the legality of their employment was
120. While most violations involved German submarine attacks, the United States, which was neutral
at the time, was careful to protest similar British claims to exclusionary zones on the high seas as unlawfully
restricting neutral commerce and freedom of the seas. See infra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
121. Customary and treaty law provided a basis for controlling activities in maritime areas contiguous
to land, but the asserted control extended to the traditional high seas.
122. See UN=TED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS AND DiscuSSIONS
1905, at 107-13 1 (1906) (including text of Declaration).
123. These controls inhibited wanton destruction of neutral prizes and removed any justification for
simply sinking the blockade runner. See NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DiscussioNs, 1903:
THE UNiTED STATES NAVAL WAR CODE OF 1900, at 88 (1904) [hereinafter 1900 Code] (neutral prizes
could be destroyed only in specified instances of traditional military necessity, art. 50 of the United States
Naval War Code of 1900, but providing in any case for adjudication) . The Naval War Code of 1900 seems
to accept seizure of a contraband-carrying neutral vessel as well as its cargo as common practice; U.S.
acquiescence, however, is historically atypical. Id. at 82, 83.
124. Id. at 125. The United States was also a participant in the International Naval Conference
concerning neutral commerce in times of war, which resulted in the 1909 Declaration of London. See
UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS: THE DECLARATION OF LONDoN
OF FEBRUARY 26, 1909 (1909) (including text of Declaration). The 1909 Declaration of London, a
follow-up to the 1907 Hague Conference, was never ratified by the signatory powers, although its terms
were initially followed during World War 1. Article 17 of the Declaration failed to specify how far out to
sea a blockade could extend, contemplating potential extension onto the high seas. Id. at 49-53. By
contemporary standards, U.S. views regarding neutral rights were not extreme insofar as the doctrine of
continuous voyage seemingly applied to contraband and blockade situations. The continuous voyage
principle was controversial when the Naval War Code was drafted in 1900. See 1900 Naval War Code,
supra, note 123, at 12. Article 44 of the 1900 Naval War Code clarifies its view on blockades. Id. at 85,
87. The destination rules for treatment of contraband under its articles 34-36 may have contemplated
continuous voyage. Id. at 82, 83. This perhaps resulted from the American experience in the Civil and
Spanish-American Wars.
125. The history of mines or torpedoes, as they were originally known, arguably stretches back to
the sixteenth century. See Levie, Mine Warfare and International Law, 62 INTERNATIONAL LAW STuDIES:
READINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1947-1977, at 271 (1980).
However, they only became effective with technical improvements made during the nineteenth century.
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unclear under the traditional law of naval warfare. 1" In theory, mines could
be used legitimately in an offensive capacity under blockade doctrine to close
enemy ports or defensively to hold enemy warships from a belligerent's
coast. 127 Laying mines offensively or defensively in belligerent territorial
waters was accepted,12 ' but other military concerns, particularly the capacity
for long-range guns to bombard coastal targets from beyond the three mile
limit, led belligerents to employ mines in adjacent areas on the high seas.
Mines inflicted controversial losses on neutral shipping during the Russo-Japan-
ese War, but the dispute related to their indiscriminate use, rather than the
proclamation of war zones. The rights of neutral states were restricted by
belligerent assertions of authority to impede neutral shipping on the high
seas."z Moreover, the "blind" nature of mines, capable of sinking merchant
ships without warning, also violated traditional principles of international law.
In the Russo-Japanese War's aftermath, the American view of underwater
mines and blockades continued to stress the rights of neutral shipping. 30
Since blockade doctrine only permitted the confiscation of the blockade running
ship and its cargo, the danger of mines killing noncombatants was troubleso-
me.' Although neutral merchant ships were thought to "enter the field of
hostile operations at their own risk," ' the use of mines for blockade purpos-
es required prior warning of the danger and independent control of the areas
by belligerent warships. Greater liberty was recognized for the use of mines
in territorial waters.
33
The Second Hague Conference followed closely after the Russo-Japanese
War. Its handling of the mining issue should be understood in the context of
many claims that mines interfered with neutral rights to free passage on high
seas during the war. While the 1907 Hague Convention VIII Relative to the
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines134 addressed some aspects
of the new military technology, it neither authorized nor expressly prohibited
126. For a survey of different national practices and relevant international attitudes prior to World
War II, see Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, 33 AM.
J. INT'L L. SuPp. 167, 695-708 (1939) [hereinafter 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights].
127. Under contemporary views, the high seas normally commenced immediately beyond the three
mile boundary of territorial waters controlled by littoral states. A theoretical debate existed over whether
an effective blockade as contemplated by the 1856 Declaration of Paris required the participation of at least
some surface vessels. However, this traditionalist claim was raised more prominently during World War
I and throughout the 1930's in connection with the employment of submarines or aircraft to enforce
blockades.
128. But see infra note 135 (British desire to prohibit commercial blockades at 1907 Hague Confer-
ence).
129. This was accompanied by a general perception that Russia in particular had in effect abandoned
traditional restrictions of sea warfare law on the destruction of neutral prizes. See also infra note 329.
130. See generally UNrrED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, supra note 122.
131. Id. at 152-53.
132. Id. at 149.
133. Id. at 152-53.
134. Supra note 111.
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the planting of mines on the high seas. At the Conference, the British represen-
tative noted this ambivalent attitude toward mining and called for prohibitions
on mines in international waters.'35 Just before World War I, the Institute
of International Law also took the position that laying underwater mines on
the high seas was in violation of international law. 136
The Second Hague Conference encountered broader problems in reconcil-
ing belligerent rights and neutral rights to freedom of the seas. Sharp disputes
remained from the Russo-Japanese War, and the 1907 Second Hague Confer-
ence failed to reach a consensus on the matter. Agreement at the Conference
was limited largely to the noncontroversial aspects of naval warfare, relating
to humanitarian concerns. The Conference attempted to overcome the disputes
through promulgation of Hague Convention XII Relative to the Establishment
of an International Prize Court, which established an international prize court
of appellate jurisdiction specializing in cases involving neutral vessels. Major
navalpowers, however, declined signature pending clarification of international
law principles relating to the high seas. 3 7 As a result, the British government
convened the related London Naval Conference to resolve the matter. This led
to the 1909 Declaration of London, which essentially codified international
prize law. The Declaration's basic philosophy was to separate belligerent from
neutral rights in a manner that allowed incursions on neutral free passage rights
traditionally recognized under substantive law, but required compensation.
Failing ratification by Great Britain, the Declaration of London and effectively
Hague Convention (XII) never entered into force."3 As a result, maritime
warfare is still largely governed by customary law.
British and German war zones in World War I represented the first large
scale denials of free passage to neutral shipping in broad geographic zones on
the high seas.' 39 The American view of the nature and legal character of
these zones changed in the course of the war. Early declarations by Britain and
Germany of war zones covered littoral high seas areas, yet they did not
135. 1939Draft Convention on Neutral Rights, supra note 126, at 698 (speech of Sir Ernest Satow).
Britain took the general position that the use of mines for purpose of a commercial blockade should be
prohibited. See Levie, supra note 125, at 273.
136. Id.
137. A. HIGGINs, supra note 111, at 437-38.
138. See 1 J. GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 19-36 (1920) [hereinafter J.
GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW] (general status of sea warfare law from First Hague Conference through
beginning of World War 1).
139. Such a danger was already perceived during the Spanish-American War, when it was feared that
the United States might lay mines along the blockaded coast of Cuba. Neutral nations would have
considered this to be a violation of the international law of blockade. See E. BENTON, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANIsH-AMERICAN WAR 139 (1908). Whether the United States did not
intend to mine or was dissuaded from doing so cannot be determined, but in any case the mining did not
occur. Levie, supra note 125, at 272.
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conform to the United States views of blockade doctrine."4 In 1917, Germa-
ny expanded earlier zones to include broad areas of the ocean linked to a
declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare.141 Neutral merchant ships
were free to sail through the war zone but only at peril of unannounced attack.
A contemporary American publicist noted the novelty of early British 42
and German143 war zones and their restrictive effect on neutral commerce.
He observed, however, that a belligerent had the right and possibly the duty
to notify neutrals of "actual hostilities" commencing in the area.'" He de-
fined a maritime war zone as "a portion of the sea which on account of its geo-
graphical proximity to one or the other belligerent territories becomes ... the
actual theater of hostilities.""14 He also noted that the waters-within the war
zone remained part of the high seas. "[B]elligerents have no right to appro-
priate any portion of the high seas and to [sic] close them to the navigation of
neutral vessels."'" Belligerent rights with regard to neutral vessels in the
zone were no different from their rights beyond the war zone. 47
Early American views of maritime war zones suggested a nascent contigu-
ity approach, focusing on belligerent territory even if the zones extended over
the high seas. Thus, these zones involved issues of coastal defense and attack,
rather than issues concerning the right to free passage on the high seas. This
analysis of war zones was substantially similar in formulation and justification
to U.S. views in 1905 of underwater mines and blockades, 4 ' but did not
treat war zones purely under blockade doctrine.' 49 These war zones, howev-
er, are different from those discussed here. They are closer in substance to
broad zones of warning in which belligerents may and perhaps must warn
140. See infra note 150. For a mare detailed review of then-contemporary American views of interna-
tional law, see J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW DURING THE WORLD WAR: A STUDY OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE PRIZE COURTS, 1914-1924 (1927) [hereinafter J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW] (1927).
141. See infra note 154. This was justified under the German view by a claim of necessity. See also
3 C. HYDE, supra note 94, at 1948-52; J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW, supra note 140, at 329-54; Garner, Some
Questions of International Law in the European War: War Zones and Submarine Warfare, 9 AM. J. INT'L
L. 594 (1915) [hereinafter War Zones and Submarine Warfare].
142. The British war zones were enforced by minefields. These mines could not be used lawfully with
the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping. See 1907Hague Convention VIliRelative to the Laying
of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, supra note 111, at art. 2.
143. The German war zone was to be enforced by mining the waters and by submarines, in violation
of existing legal principles of sea warfare. See, e.g., Garner, War Zones and Submarine Warfare, supra
note 141, at 596.
144. Id. at 596-97. See also C. HYDE, MARrm LAW 35-40 (1918), reprinted in 8 THE INQUIRY
HANDBOOxS (1971).
145. Garner, War Zones and'Submarine Warfare, supra note 141, at 596.
146. Id. at 597.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
149. In contrast to other nations, the United States did not regard war zones as blockades in the
traditional sense. See Garner, Some Questions of International Law in the European War:'Blockades, 9
AM. J. INT'L L. 818 (1915). Some activities within war zones could technically be analyzed as reprisals.
See Garner, War Zones and Submarine Warfare, supra note 141, at 606.
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neutrals of impending conflicts."' 0 These zones did not have an absolute
exclusionary character for neutrals. Accordingly, the American publicist cited
as a principle "that ought never to be disputed"' 1 the opinion stated at the
1907 Second Hague Conference that "the high seas constitute a 'great interna-
tional highway and that the right of neutrals to navigate those seas should take
precedence of [sic] the transitory rights of belligerents to fight their battles
thereon."'152 This American view was radically different from the German and
British perceptions of war zone declarations as valid methods for cutting off
enemy commerce, a method reminiscent of traditional blockades.
The 1917 German declaration of an expanded war zone, which excluded
neutral shipping by threatening submarine attack, was perceived as a qualita-
tively different challenge to traditional notions of neutral rights. It ultimately
led the United States to enter World War 1.153 While American concerns over
neutral rights prior to entering the War are normally perceived solely as
involving "unlawful" submarine conduct, 54 that conduct was only a means
for the belligerent to establish a geographically broad exclusionary zone on the
high seas. 5 There would have been little reason to enter the War if Ameri-
150. The historical rejection by the U.S. of the assumption of the risk arguments relating to neutrals
in war zones is expressed in the course of the submarine warfare controversy. See, e.g., 3 C. HYDE, supra
note 94, at 2003-21.
151. Garner, War Zones and Submarine Warfare, supra note 141, at 597.
152. Id. (quoting Sir Ernest Satow of British Delegation speaking at Hague sessions in connection with
mining and restraints on freedom of high seas).
153. See 3 C. HYDE, supra note 94, at 2010-13, 2017-18.
154. See id. at 2003-13. This perception is linked in popular conscience with the sinking of the
Lusitania, but it also reflects a more general concern with whether the rules governing surface craft should
apply to submarine warfare.
155. While our investigation has focused largely on American views of the war zone problem with
respect to free passage of transatlantic merchant shipping, the problems of other neutral countries with both
British and German maritime war zones should not pass unnoticed. The establishment of war zones in
littoral international waters seriously impeded fishing. In addition, it had the effect of an illegal blockade
of neutral ports and substantially increased the difficulty and cost of maritime commerce by closing
peacetime high seas shipping routes for intra-European trade. See P. VIGNKs, THE NEuTRAUTY OF
NORWAY IN THE WoRLD WAR (1932); A. VANDENBOSCH, THE NEUTRALrrY OF THE NETHERLANDS
DURING THm WORLD WAR 191-293 (1927). Further, despite the necessity to discount for propaganda, one
should also note the considerable volume of wartime German work on freedom of the seas and claims that
British war zones and other practices violated international law. See, e.g., F. STiER-SoMLO, DiE FRnEarr
DER MEERE UND DAS VOLKERRECHT (1917); W. VAN CALKER, DAs PROBLEM DER MEERESFREIHEIT UND
DIE DEUTSCHE V6LKERRECHTSPOLTIK (1917); H. TRIEPEL, DIE FREIEIrT DER MEERE UND DER KONFrIGE
FRIEDENSSCHLUSBS (1917); H. WEHBERG, DAS SEEKRIEGSRECHT (1915) (HANDBUCH DES V6LKERRECHTS,
F. Stier-Somlo ed., 1915); Gellmann, Meeresfreiheit im Kriege, 2 OSTEREICHISCHE ZErTsCHRIFr FOR
6FNErNuc-Es RECHT 656 (1915-16). See also Hershey, The German Conception of the Freedom of the
Seas, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 207 (1919) (different political attitudes in Germany according to which freedom
of high seas could be obtained prospectively either through a massive increase in naval strength or through
changes in sea warfare law eliminating doctrines such as contraband or blockade). To the extent that these
German proposals contemplated deep changes in maritime law that would have amounted to protection of
private property in sea warfare law equal to that under land warfare law, it seems difficult to fault them.
A similar official American position had led to the U.S. abstention from the 1856 Declaration of Paris
because it did not go far enough. Such positions also resembled in many respects those urged by President
Wilson in the postwar peace process.
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can views of international law had recognized Germany's right to exclude
absolutely neutral merchant ships from such war zones. Upon entering the war,
American conduct provided further evidence of a nascent contiguity exception
for asserting limited belligerent control over, but apparently not absolute
powers of exclusion from, littoral areas of the high seas. The United States
took part in mining the North Sea 56 and created its own coastal defensive
zones extending as far as ten miles out to sea, seven miles beyond the pre-
scribed territorial waters. 57
The first broad use of aviation warfare occurred in World War I, but there
were.few if any incidents involving civilian aircraft and maritime forces.158
Even at that early date, however, it appears that overflight rights were consid-
ered part of freedom of the high seas and free passage rights under customary
law. Neutral aircraft overflight of wartime military operations was immediately
analogized to and treated under older maritime rules regarding the reconcilia-
tion of belligerent and neutral rights. Neutrals ventured into the midst of
belligerent engagements at their own peril. The problem was that questions
had been raised during the War whether neutral vessels should enjoy the same
measure of freedom of the high seas. Neutral aircraft were also troublesome
to maritime military operations, because they might betray belligerent forces'
positions and strengths by engaging in reconnaissance activity analogous to
maritime prize law's nonneutral service. The presence of neutral aircraft
presented practical problems not only in battle, but more broadly during
general wartime operations on the high seas.
The fact that President Wilson's Fourteen Points specifically included
freedom of the high seas demonstrates the importance of the free passage issue
in American eyes in the immediate aftermath of World War I. President
Wilson included freedom of the seas principles in the first three Paris drafts
of what became the Covenant of the League of Nations. 9 This initiative was
156. 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights, supra note 126, at 705.
157. Id. at 696 (33 such areas were established under Executive Orders from 1917-18, prohibiting
nighttime passage and otherwise restricting freedom of all vessels, including neutral merchant ships).
Authority for the president to promulgate defensive airspace zones over U.S. territory, including territorial
waters by Executive Order, was first granted under section 4 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926. Air
Commerce Act § 4, 44 Stat. 570, repealed by Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1401(a)i 72 Stat. 806 (1958). For
details of defensive air zones existing at that time, see UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW SrruATiON AND DOCuMENTs: SITUATION, DOCUMENTs AND COMMENTARY ON RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 604-07 (1956). It appears that those zones not
within the territorial boundaries or waters of the United States were connected with defensive sea zones
and covered U.S. military installations such as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and various islands located in the
Pacific Ocean west of Hawaii.
158. UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SrruATIoNs, 1928, at 68-69
(1929) (citing J. SPAIGHT, supra note 93 at 382, concerning absence of World War I incidents affecting
neutral civilian aircraft).
159. See 1 D. MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 46, 50, 55, 61, 70 (1928). In President
Wilson's first Paris draft, a statement of the principles was suggested as an additional article. See 2 D.
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not, however, solely an American one. For example, Italy submitted a draft
scheme incorporating freedom of the seas principles at the first meeting of the
Preliminary Peace Conference's Commission studying the constitution of the
proposed League of Nations. 161 In the end, however, incorporation of free
passage principles into the Covenant was abandoned for political reasons in
favor of a disarmament solution. 161
Freedom of the high seas and the revision of sea warfare law next arose
at the 1921-1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament,1
6 2
which is best remembered for the resulting naval treaty imposing quantitative
limits on warships. The British delegation submitted a resolution that the
submarine be outlawed as a weapon of war because its use "leads inevitably
to acts which are inconsistent with the laws of war."' 63 This proposal was
defeated because it was perceived as favoring powers, like Great Britain,
which possessed strong surface navies.' 6" However, in its draft Treaty Relat-
ing to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare the Conference
affirmed that submarines were subject to international law's restraints on
surface warships, including the prize law principles of visitation, search and
capture. It stipulated that unlimited commerce-destroying submarine warfare
of the World War I variety would violate international law. 61 War zones
were not mentioned per se, but unlimited submarine warfare was indelibly
linked to the German declarations of war zones. The draft Treaty failed at the
ratification stage, 66 but its submarine provisions were declaratory of existing
customary law. Significantly, the Conference reached no agreements on aerial
MILLER, supra, at 92. Wilson's second and third Paris drafts contemplated an international convention to
determine the rights of belligerents on the high seas, coupled with the idea that strict adherence to the letter
and sense of the convention would be a fundamental covenant to be enforced by the League by denying
offending states access to the high seas. This would have been linked to the idea that unlawful interference
would constitute impairment of a state's political independence under a predecessor of League Covenant
article 10, vestiges of which remain in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
160. Point 4 of Annex 3 to the Minutes of February 3, 1919, reprinted in 1 D. MILLER, supra note
159, at 247. While there was no German participation in designing the League, German academic literature
supported some kind of enforcement of freedom of the seas principles by an international organization.
Limited support also existed in American scholarship for empowering an international organization to
enforce freedom of the high seas against belligerent assertion of rights. See P. POTTER, supra note 97, at
239-44.
161. The initiative apparently failed due to British resistance to any general treatment of sea warfare,
analogous to the failure of the 1907 Second Hague Conference. See P. POTTER, supra note 97, at 240-41.
162. See Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Report of the American Delegation Dated
February 9, 1922, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 159, 178-85 (1922) [hereinafter Armament Limitation Report].
163. Id. at 185.
164. Id. at 186-87.
165. Id. at 187-88. See Treaty Relating to tie Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Feb.
6, 1922, 6 UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE UNrTED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1976, at 395 (1984)
(ratified by Senate and President, but failed in adoption from lack of ratification by foreign governments).
166. France failed to ratify, and unanimity was required for effectiveness. See DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 111, at 147.
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warfare, but provided for a Commission to meet and revise the laws of warfare
to accommodate aircraft and other technological advances.167
The 1923 Hague Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules161 drafted by the Com-
mission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of
Warfare represented the first attempt to resolve the problems presented by
neutral overflight of high seas military operations. 169 It contained two parts:
the 1923 Hague Radio Rules and the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules.
Although never adopted in legally binding form, the rules remain influential
as an early statement of aerial warfare law, and portions of it have become
customary law. It is useful to examine these rules to observe the struggle to
deal with the problems caused by the new aviation technology within the
traditional parameters of customary law, and their effect on the balance of
belligerent and neutral rights.
Article 11 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules provides for general
freedom of air passage outside the jurisdiction of any state, including over the
high seas, but article 30 contains a special rule:
In case a belligerent commanding officer considers that the presence of aircraft is
likely to prejudice the success of the operations in which he is engaged at the
moment, he may prohibit the passing of neutral aircraft in the immediate vicinity
of his forces or may oblige them to follow a particular route. A neutral aircraft
which does not conform to such directions, of which he has had notice issued by
the belligerent commanding officer, may be fired upon. 170
It is important to recognize that the apparent theoretical basis for firing upon
a neutral under article 30 is not one of self-defense, since a non-attacking
neutral aircraft is involved. Article 30 itself was drafted to cover overflight
situations both on land and at sea, but the distinction between the territorial
case and the res nullius character of the high seas comes into play. In the
167. Armament Limitation Report, supra note 162, at 189-90.
168. For a short history of the early problems and sources of air warfare law, see DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 111, at 121-23. For the text of the rules alone, see id. at 123; 17 AM. J.
INT'L L. Supp. 245-60 (1923); 32 AM. J. INT'L L. SutP. 12-56 (1938); Despatch from the First British
Delegate to the International Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Warfare Together with the
General Report of the Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report upon the Revision of the Rules of
Warfare, British Parliamentary Command Paper 2201, Miscellaneous No. 14 (1924); UNITED STATES
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 1924, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH
NOTES AND AN INDEX 96-154 (1926) [hereinafter International Law Documents, 1924]. For the full
proceedings of the Hague Conference, see LA GUERRE AfRIENNE: RAVIsION DES LOIS DE LA GUERRE, LA
HAYE 1922-1923 (1930) [hereinafter Hague Conference Proceedings]. All texts herein from the Hague
Conference Proceedings are the author's translation from the original French; it was not possible to secure
an official English copy of the Conference proceedings. The translated passages are reproduced in the
accompanying footnotes.
169. American international law scholar John Bassett Moore served as Chairman of the Commission.
Concerning the Commission's work, see generally, Garner, Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial
Warfare, 18 AM. J. INT'L L. 56 (1924); Rodgers, The Laws of War Concerning Aviation and Radio, 17
AM. J. INT'L L. 629 (1923).
170. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 111, at 123 (emphasis added). The commentary
to article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules specifies that passage over the high seas is included
in this formulation. INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 1924, supra note 168, at 126.
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maritime case the provision harkens back to the coequal nature of belligerent
and neutral fights to usage of the high seas, and evokes the maritime warfare
principle that imposed a practical limitation on a neutral vessel's right to sail
into the midst of a belligerent engagement. 17 Recognizing that neutrals en-
tered such an area voluntarily and at their own peril after fair warning by the
sight of the combatants, a neutral aircraft should be excludable from a battle
zone only by virtue of its potential interference with one belligerent's right to
attack another. 72 For example, an aircraft might fly through a belligerent's
line of fire and so interfere with its attack. In the maritime situation, at least,
beyond the interference problem article 30's language countenancing intentional
firing upon neutral aircraft inferentially permitted it only for warning purposes,
rather than for the purpose of shooting it down, and only after the neutral "has
had notice issued by the belligerent commanding officer." 73 To the extent
it is patterned on customary law, article 30 presumably would permit aimed
fire to shoot down an aircraft only when it actually interfered, or was about
to interfere, with a hostile engagement.
The sensitivity of belligerent rights to exclude neutral aircraft from high
seas operations is best understood in light of delegate exchanges at the Confer-
ence. In the context of discussing a draft predecessor of article 30, a Dutch
Commission member challenged exclusionary practices affecting neutrals on
or over the high seas indicating:
[T]his article is one of the most important of the entire project. War zones caused
a thousand difficulties during the last war. Up to now, there has been no regular
legal provision permitting belligerents to create maritime war zones. The proposed
article tends to give a right ... which was never recognized in maritime law, as is
demonstrated by the literature on the subject.
Here the Dutch delegate read two pages verbatim from the leading American
work on international law, extreme behavior for an international conference,
but perhaps understandable because it was directed against a draft American
proposal. He continued:
During the war entire oceans were transformed into war zones in the name of
reprisals and now one is prepared to give discretionary powers to military com-
171. There is an element of ambiguity here, since the provision speaks in terms of "the success of
operations in which he is engaged at the moment" rather than combat itself.
172. This essential difference between the underlying rationales of war zones and battle zones has been
recognized, as well as the tendency of combatants for their own purposes to assimilate the two into one
category. See R. TUCKER, supra note 108, at 301 n.43. Whether done consciously or unconsciously this
arguably was the case with the Legal Adviser's congressional testimony.
173. The commentary to article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules addresses the point as
follows:
The rapidity of its flight would enable an aircraft to embarrass the operations of land or sea
forces, or even operations in the air, to an extent which might prove most inconvenient or even
disastrous to a belligerent commander. To protect belligerents from improper intrusions of this
kind, it is necessary to authorize belligerent commanders to warn off the intruders, and, if the
warning is disregarded, to compel their retirement by opening fire.
INTERNATIONAL LAW DocUMENTS, 1924, supra note 168, at 125.
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manders concerning aerial navigation. For all of these reasons, the Dutch delegation
hesitates to consecrate as a right that which neutrals experienced'as an abuse during
the war.
At this point the French delegate indicated that the Dutch expression of
alarm seemed excessive, because the matter did not concern the creation of
war zones but rather the nature of aviation. The provision's inspiration came
from an existing treaty concept that hospital ships could not hamper comba-
tants' movements and that combatants could order them off or order them to
adopt a certain course. The British delegate then called to the Conference's
attention operative language in the draft provision linking the power to restrict
neutral aircraft to the formula "within the immediate vicinity of military
operations," noting that naval experts considered all maritime mined areas to
fall within the operations of the fleet. As a result, military operations should
be defined or replaced by a narrower formulation. The rejection of war zones
and adherence to a narrow battle zone concept was emphasized thereafter by
the Conference president's remarks that the focus was not on zones, but rather
on military operations.
Rather than following the British delegate's suggestion to alter "military
operations" in the text, the war zone problem was addressed in the commen-
tary to article 30 of the Hague Aerial Warfare Rules as follows:
It is easy to see that undue hardship might be occasioned to neutrals if advantage
were taken of [the power to exclude neutral aircraft] so conferred on belligerent
commanding officers and attempts were made to exclude for long or indefinite
periods all neutrals from stipulated areas or to prevent communication between
different countries through the air over the high seas. The present provision only
authorises a commanding officer to warn off aircraft during the duration of the
operations in which he is engaged at the time. The right of neutral aircraft to
circulate in the airspace over the high seas is emphasised by the provisions of
Article 11, which provide that "outside the jurisdiction of any State ... all aircraft
shall have full freedom of passage."
Thus, in demonstrating conscious separation of the war and battle zone
concepts, the exchanges between Conference delegates seemed to assume that
there was no inherent right to order neutrals to avoid an area despite extensive
World War I maritime practices involving the announcement of protected
shipping lanes, the navicert system, and the diversion of vessels for search and
similar purposes. The 1907 Hague Convention (X) treaty provisions to which
the French delegate referred conceptually assimilated hospital ships into the
definition of neutral ships. That treaty regulation substantially paralleled the
customary law view that neutrals were present at their own peril and could not
interfere with the combatants' engagement, while adding the power of belliger-
ents to order detours, a power that was tied effectively to a threatened or
ongoing hostile engagement. In the hospital ship context, however, the regula-
tion was aimed largely at belligerent vessels of a special class. Except for their
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exemption, these special noncombatant belligerent vessels would have been
forced to submit to belligerent commands anyway.
The French delegate's remarks reveal a consciousness of reconnaissance
activities and radio transmissions from neutral aircraft and a fear of espionage
or nonneutral activities. 74 Despite the attempt in article 30 of the 1923
Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare to maintain the traditional balance between
neutral and belligerent rights in overflight of maritime engagements, articles
6 and 7 of the 1923 Hague Radio Rules demonstrate the difficulty of dealing
with these problems within the purview of existing rules. Article 6 characteriz-
es the radio transmission of military intelligence by a neutral vessel or aircraft
on or over the high seas as a "hostile act," assimilating it into the traditional
concept of nonneutral service. Article 7 provides:
In case a belligerent commanding officer considers that the success of the operation
in which he is engaged may be prejudiced by the presence of vessels or aircraft
equipped with radio installations in the immediate vicinity of his armed forces or
by the use of such installations therein, he may order neutral vessels or neutral
aircraft on or over the high seas:
(1) To alter their course to such an extent as will be necessary to prevent their
approaching the armed forces operating under his command; or
(2) Not to make use of their radio transmitting apparatus while in the immediate
vicinity of such forces.
A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft, which does not conform to such direction of
which it has had notice, exposes itself to the risk of being fired upon. It will also
be liable to capture, and may be condemned if the Prize Court considers that the
circumstances justify condemnation. 75
Unlike article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules, article 7 of the
1923 Hague Radio Rules is based on the idea of self-defense or a similar
nonneutral service concept, as witnessed by its condemnation and capture
provisions. Moreover, while article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare
Rules permits restrictions on neutrals only when "the presence of aircraft is
likely to prejudice the success of the operations in which he is engaged at the
moment," article 7 of the 1923 Hague Radio Rules permits broad regulation
of a neutral vessel's or aircraft's passage if a military commander believes "the
success of the operation in which he is engaged may be prejudiced." The
commentary to article 7 attempts to limit its scope:
To avoid undue hardship to neutrals, [exclusion upon notice of] the belligerent
commander is limited to the duration of the operations in which he is engaged at
the time. The article presupposes the actual presence of naval or aerial forces
engaged in operations, and that the measures will not be applicable to widely
extended zones or to zones in which no military action is taking place.'76
174. Hague Conference Proceedings, supra note 169, at 45. The problems of dealing with the
visitation and search of aircraft continue. See, e.g., 1955 LAw OF NAvAL WARFARE, supra note 105, at
5-11 n.21.
175. INrERNATIONAL LAW DOCuMENTs, 1924, supra note 168, at 105.
176. Id. at 104.
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Comparing this language with its equivalent under article 30 of the 1923 Hague
Aerial Warfare Rules reveals a subtle difference conceptually linked to the
Conference exchanges regarding war zones. While the commentary to article
30 apparently addresses the general war zone concerns expressed by the Dutch
delegate, the commentary to article 7 seems more concerned with restricting
the effect on neutral rights in the immediate vicinity of military operations, as
expressed by the Conference president. The distinction is not coincidental.
While the Conference participants apparently desired article 30 to extend
customary law to cover aircraft, they seemed to regard the broader restrictions
in article 7 as an attempt to change customary law. Through these changes,
article 7 threatened to upset the balance between belligerent and neutral rights.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of article 7 of the 1923 Hague Radio
Rules was its presumption that disregard of a belligerent's order to avoid
military operations or follow a specific course should be equated with non-
neutral service. Since nonneutral service under traditional law may change both
neutral and noncombatant status, in one fell swoop it could justify the use of
aimed fire to down an aircraft.'" Moreover, while the customary free pas-
sage principles underlying article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules
are addressed to on-going combat, the bootstrap approach of article 7 of the
1923 Hague Radio Rules would permit aircraft and vessel diversion under
noncombat circumstances. This was a marked departure from traditional free
passage analysis. Previously, absent de minimis navigational concerns, there
was no clear basis beyond prize law for interfering with a neutral vessel's or
aircraft's free passage rights in a noncombat situation. Traditional prize law
had recognized a belligerent warship's authority to fire, and if necessary to
sink, a neutral merchant ship that was attempting to flee its lawful visitation
and search. However, this was not a function of nonneutral service, and the
neutral vessel could always submit to avoid destruction.
177. Since transmitting intelligence is considered as participation in hostilities under article 16 of the
1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules, if a neutral aircraft did so it would lose its noncombatant status. The
commentary to article 7 does not address this point directly, but the commentary to article 6 notes that
"[tihe vessel or aircraft concerned renders itself liable to be fired upon at the moment when the act is
committed and is also liable to capture." INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 1924, supra note 168, at
101-02. The commentary to article 7 largely portrays the problem of neutral aircraft as a matter of
interfering with belligerent radio communications. However, if this were all article 7 need only provide
for neutral radio silence, a neutral aircraft so inclined could simply continue its course and transmit
reconnaissance information after clearing the radio silence area or upon landing. The desired power to
divert neutral aircraftseems to spring more from the impossibility of stopping a neutral aircraft to determine
whether it had rendered nonneutral service, as would have transpired under traditional maritime visitation
and search. In modem hostilities, given more sophisticated reconnaissance possibilities such as radar, high
altitude reconnaissance aircraft, and satellite observation, it seems less likely that belligerents would rely
on information gathered through coincidental neutral overflights. To that extent, the fear of nonneutral
service seems reduced if not eliminated completely. But see Fenrick, supra note 18, at 110-11 (Britain's
fear of Soviet vessels passing reconnaissance information to Argentina was significant factor in its
declaration of 200 mile total exclusion zone during Falklands conflict).
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Article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules was more adept at
maintaining the traditional balance. Its commentary regarding civilian aircraft
expressly notes that it "is not intended to imply any encroachment on the rights
of neutral States," '178 followed by a statement that "[i]t is assumed that no
neutral public or military aircraft would depart so widely from the practice of
States as to attempt to interfere with or intrude upon the operations of a
belligerent State. "179 Article 30 is phrased generally in terms of "operations,"
rather than the terms of customary law, under which a neutral assumed the risk
of destruction in combat only. However, article 30 might still be reconciled
with customary law under a broad concept of competing belligerent and neutral
high seas usage rights.
Article 7 of the 1923 Hague Radio Rules implicitly departed from custom-
ary law in permitting outright exclusion of aircraft, albeit while avoiding broad
geographic application as under a war zone concept. This conclusion is undeni-
able in light of the fact that article 7 also applied to neutral vessels, thus
disturbing the older balance of surface free passage rights between belligerents
and neutrals. Nonetheless, this proposed law retained the risk-shifting approach
of customary maritime law, since prior receipt of notice was required before
firing upon a neutral. It is noteworthy that the commentary to article 7 lacks
a disclaimer of encroachment on the rights of neutral civilian aircraft while
containing one on the neutral public or military aircraft. This presumably
represents a recognition of the potentially graver consequences of a rule
imputing nonneutral service to neutral public aircraft, thus permitting their
downing by aimed fire.
Based on the 1923 Hague Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules, international
law opinion de legeferenda in the 1920s s° acknowledged that under certain
circumstances, involving likely hinderance of ongoing military operations,
belligerent warships could direct neutral aircraft to circumvent a surface battle
zone. This departed from customary law analysis, since under traditional ideas
of neutrality as applied to civilian aircraft a belligerent would have had no right
to prohibit overflight even during combat. Rather, the neutral aircraft might
proceed at its own peril. Under this traditional analysis, a belligerent had the
duty of giving notice and could not fire until its message had been received.
The risk of a failed receipt was assigned to the belligerent.
178. INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS, 1924, supra note 168, at 126.
179. Id. The term "public" aircraftencompassed only nonmilitary government aircraftused for customs
or police service. It remained ambiguous whether neutral civilian aircraft could be excluded absolutely
under a form of the battle zone doctrine. This ambiguity was addressed in article213 of the 1941 Tentative
Instructions for the Navy. See infra notes 199-217 and accompanying text (specifying that neutral public
aircraft must obey belligerent instructions in vicinity of military operations).
180. The prominent participation of American scholars on the Commission ofJurists, and U.S. support
for incorporating the 1923 Hague Rules into a treaty, seems to indicate that these rule represent the
contemporary American international law position.
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Regarding surface passage rights, the United States was a party to the 1930
Treaty of London' and the related 1936 London Protocol, 2 which reaf-
firmed as customary law that submarines were subject to the same rules as
surface warships in dealing with merchant shipping. As a result, unlimited
submarine warfare, including attacks without warning, was deemed unlawful.
By implication, war zones that exposed neutral merchant ships to danger by
presuming that they were hostile shipping were also rejected by the internation-
al community.
Between the World Wars, the most prominent American publicist writing
on the law of maritime warfare found the basis for the British and German war
zones in a contiguity theory of general territorial self-defense still paralleling
views expressed during World War IL" Accordingly, the permissible scope
of the high seas war zone was limited largely to the littoral seas. War zones
could not be established on the high seas at a distance from the belligerent's
territory, and never for offensive purposes. A special exception was made for
defensive measures away from the belligerent's coast, such as minefields
surrounding coaling stations to protect national vessels against "unlawful"
attack, presumably by submarine. Under this view, however, war zones were
evaluated less as an abrogation of freedom of the seas and more as a special
case of necessity or self-defense.l"
American scholarly opinion on neutral shipping and war zones incorporated
the 1939 Harvard Research in International Law Draft Convention on the
Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War."8 5 Article 70
provides that "[a] belligerent may not establish on the high seas outside of a
[blockade zone extending fifty miles from the coast], a barred zone or other
area however described in which it seeks to impose special prohibition,
restriction or regulation upon the passage of neutral vessels." I 6 This "block-
ade zone" was part of a broader concept limiting minelaying to any belliger-
ent's territorial waters and to blockade zones off belligerent coasts. 7 While
181. With the exception of Part IV, the Treaty of London soon expired by its own terms. The 1936
London Protocol was designed to make the Treaty more effective, in part because the Treaty itself was
originally signed by relatively few countries. See infra note 182.
182. Procts-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of
London of April 22, 1930, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. Stup. 137-39 (1937), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWS OF WAR, supra note 111, at 149.
183. See 3 C. HYDE, supra note 94, at 1948-52. In the War's immediate aftermath, Hyde advocated
an even more restrictive view. See C. HYDE, supra note 144, at 35-40.
184. This view did not address the position often found in non-American sources that a reprisal against
"unlawful" prior conduct of another belligerent constituted self-defense, a position the German government
maintained during World War I. De Visscher, Les lois de la guerre et la theorie de la necdssitd, 24 REVUE
GANARALE DE DRGIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 74 (1917).
185. 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights, supra note 126.
186. Id. at 694. Article 70 recognizes a special belligerent power to restrict neutral radio transmissions
in the vicinity of belligerent armed forces, a power directed specifically at the danger of espionage and
nonneutral acts. Id.
187. Id. at art. 1; see also id. at arts. 69, 83.
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"not believed to express any existing rule of law," ' this statement clearly
recognized the general rejection of war zones beyond the littoral seas except
for an arbitrarily defined contiguous zone of fifty miles to accommodate
modern weaponry and limited precedents in that area.8 9
Article 102 of the 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights is best under-
stood as the considered American view de legeferenda of the international law
rule reconciling neutral civilian overflight of a battle zone with military
exigencies related to battle zones. 19° It refined the basic approach of article
30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare and Radio Rules:
Neutral aircraft over the high seas, if warned of the proximity of combat or of
operations immediately preparatory thereto, shall make a reasonable detour to avoid
interference therewith. The commanding officer of the belligerent forces may
indicate the route to be followed and may escort the neutral aircraft around the area
in question. If a neutral aircraft disregards the directions which it receives from the
belligerent, it takes the risk of being fired on but the belligerent is responsible to
the neutral State for any damages resulting from requiring an unreasonable devia-
tion. 191
Since article 102 was applicable only to "combat or ... operations immedi-
ately preparatory thereto," it was closer to customary law ideas than article
30. It contemplated that a neutral civilian aircraft proceeded at its peril only
after having received a belligerent's communication. The onus lay upon the
belligerent to "give effective notice.
While patterned on article 30's adherence to the idea that belligerent and
neutral high seas usage rights were coequal, the 1939 Draft Convention on
Neutral Rights abandoned much of the 1923 Hague Radio Rules' article 7.192
Under a reasonableness analysis, it concluded that beyond permitting belliger-
ents to order diversion it was impossible to prevent a passenger in a neutral
aircraft from noting the positions and strength of combatants, and later passing
this information along to the other belligerent-passenger reconnaissance as
unwitting nonneutral service.
Thus, just prior to World War II, the U.S. view, based on a freedom of
the high seas analysis and customary law, flatly rejected the idea that bellig-
erents could interfere with neutral passage by establishing exclusionary war
188. Id. at 692. The confusing legal status of underwater mines and their history is the apparent reason
for the lack of clarity in the law. See supra notes 126-37 and accompanying text.
189. 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights, supra note 126, at 692-93.
190. This should not be considered a reference to American views of military necessity. By specifically
addressing overflight of battle zones and requiring notice before firing, the drafters could not have intended
that military necessity supersede the rule. If they had so intended, it would not have been necessary to
articulate the rule in the first place.
191. 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights, supra note 126, at 773.
192. The 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare and Radio Rules bifurcated treatment of neutral overflight and
neutral radio use was avoided by treating the use of radio as a problem to be addressed under article 70,
which applies only to neutral vessels and only permits prohibitions on the use of the radio in the vicinity
of belligerents.
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zones on the high seas beyond some ill-defined contiguous zone.193 The
concept was not difficult to apply in the case of defensive zones before a
belligerent's coast, but delimiting offensive zones remained problematic. Their
delimitation seems to have been influenced by vague ideas stemming from
blockade doctrine, even if they were not characterized as blockades, or did not
technically satisfy blockade doctrine requirements. Even within the zone,
general self-defense concerns and blockade doctrine did not justify all actions
against neutral shipping. There was apparently no absolute right even in
contiguous zones to exclude neutral shipping, which might proceed on the high
seas through a contiguous war zone at its own peril, given the danger of mines
and submarines.' 94 Belligerents had a right, and probably an obligation, to
give notice to neutral shipping of the existence of a war zone on the high seas
and to specify safe passage lanes. 195 Freedom of high seas overflight was
recognized under American views and in customary law, but not yet by
treaty.19 In the absence of treaty or extensive precedent, however, the con-
cepts surrounding war zones could only be extended by analogy to overflight
by neutral civilian aircraft.
American rejection of the war zone concept is implicit in the reaffirmation
of a narrow traditional view of blockade law, accompanied by aircraft provi-
sions borrowed from the 1923 Hague Rules, in the Tentative Instructions for
the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare, May
1941,197 which served as the naval warfare law manual during World War
193. It can be argued that the United States had adopted a different or more expansive view concerning
the power of neutrals to assert a zone contiguous to their coastlines in which belligerents should refrain
from hostilities. During the Civil War, the French government as a neutral state asserted that the U.S.S.
Kearsarge could not engage the C.S.S. Alabama in French territorial waters. French warships towed the
C.S.S. Alabama from its berth in a French port to beyond the three mileboundary, where the U.S.S. Kears-
arge-C.S.S. Alabama engagement eventually took place. See 1 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONALLAW
723-24 (1906); 1 F. WHARTON, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 108-09 (1886). This incident, however,
concerned neutral territorial waters and thus did not give rise to a particularly expansive position.
Preceding its entry into World War II, the United States joined with 20 other states in asserting in
the 1939 Declaration of Panama that the neutrals had an inherent right to have the waters "to a reasonable
distance from their coasts" free of hostile acts. See 34 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 17 (1940). This security zone
extended from 300 to 1200 miles out from the coast. See Masterson, The Hemisphere Zone of Security and
the Law, 26 A.B.A. J. 860 (1940).
194. Belligerent rights against neutral shipping in such contiguous war zones might have extended
beyond traditional law's visitation and search, but the exact extent is not relevant here.
195. General proclamation in lieu of individual notice might suffice unless it were clear that a neutral
merchant ship could not have known about the war zone. This assumes that no blockade was claimed,
satisfying the requirements of traditional law.
196. See Cooper, Space Above the Seas, JAG J. 8, 31 (1959), reprinted in EXPLORATIONS IN
AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS BY JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, at 194, 196-97 (I. Vlasic ed.
1968); The Law of the Air and the Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted by the Interna-
tional Law Commission at its Eighth Session, I OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE FIRST UNITED NATIONS ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 64, 67-68 (1958) (prefactory Doc.AIConf.13/4).
197. UNITED STATES NAVY, TENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES
GOvERNING MARITIME AND AERIAL WARFARE arts. 29-37, 213-18 (1944) [hereinafter 1941 TENTATIVE
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY].
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II. Nonetheless, World War II witnessed a substantial repetition of British and
German World War I war zone practices, as well as unrestricted U.S. subma-
rine warfare in the Pacific theater. That these practices did not effectively
change the customary law of sea warfare, however, was demonstrated by the
postwar trials -of Admiral Donitz, the former Commander in Chief of the
German Navy, on charges of waging unrestricted submarine warfare and
violating the 1936 London Protocol by establishing war zones. He was acquit-
ted of charges relating to attacks on British merchant ships, given British
practices that deprived them of traditional protections, such as arming them
and. providing armed convoy escort and instructions to ram submarines. He
was convicted on charges of attacking neutral merchant ships and of establish-
ing war zones. 98
As regards aircraft, immediately prior to World War II the 1923 Hague
Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules were adopted virtually in toto into American
military practice in the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy. 199 Subject
to the caveat that a state's rules of military engagement do not necessarily
represent its views on international law, the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the
Navy arguably diverged from contemporaneous American scholarship and so
deserve closer examination. Acknowledging that they were only intended to
provide guidance in the novel aerial warfare area and were not necessarily
representative of existing law,' ° the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy
followed the 1923 Hague Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules almost literally on
the issues of radio rules, nonneutral service and overflight of naval operations.
As a general matter, the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy adhere
to the 1923 Hague Rules' rejection of any claim to establish war zones.
However, their piecemeal adoption of the 1923 Hague Rules created ambiguity
as to the circumstances under which belligerents might fire upon neutral
aircraft. One ambiguity is introduced by the fact that the notation accompany-
Ing paragraph 44 of the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy refers only
198. On account of allied behavior, the Tribunal refrained from imposing punishment, but affirmed
the continued force of the principles. 22 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATION-
AL MEIrARY TRIBuNAL, NUREMBERG 556-59 (1948).
199. See DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW - THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFICT
AND Am OPERATIONs 4-3 (AF Pamphlet 110-31, Judge Advocate General Activities Nov. 19, 1976)
[hereinafter 1976 Law of Air Warfare].
200. The 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy state:
The following instructions have been prepared in accordance with international law, treaties, conven-
tions, statutes of the United States, and where any specific point is not covered by the above, in
accordance with the policy and attitude of the United States on the subject, due consideration being
given to court decisions, Executive pronouncements, and international practice [The 1923 Hague Radio
and Aerial Warfare Rules have] not been ratified nor [were they] accepted in toto by the United States
or any other first-class power. It is important as representing the first and only officially convened
assembly of international representatives to discuss and report upon rules of aerial warfare.
1941 TENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY, supra note 197, Introduction.
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to article 7 of the 1923 Hague Radio Rules,21' while its paragraph 214 omits
any direct reference to the general overflight provisions in article 30 of the
1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules.2 2 Given the different theoretical bases
of the two Hague provisions and article 7's apparent departure from existing
customary law, one must consider the extent to which the 1941 Tentative
Instructions for the Navy diverge from the overall scheme of the 1923 Hague
Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules and abandon article 30's traditional approach
of balancing belligerent and neutral rights.
In substance, paragraph 214 of the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy
appears largely to adopt the article 30 approach in cases when firing on neutral
civilian aircraft. It refers to the use of "necessary force," while specifying that
an aircraft and crew which unknowingly violate a prohibition to enter a specific
area are not subject to either confiscation or prisoner of war treatment. Para-
graph 214 does not contain the "likely prejudice" language of article 30, nor
is it specifically restricted to ongoing or impending combat operations as was
article 102 of the 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights.t 3 The most
ambiguous point, however, is that, while paragraph 44 retains verbatim the
201. A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft that transmits, when on or over the high seas, information
destined for a belligerent concerning military operations or military forces shall be liable to capture. A
cross-reference to the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy, provides that a neutral vessel is liable to
capture and treatment as though it were an enemy merchant vessel if it transmits information in the interest
of the enemy. Id. at para. 39(d). Paragraph 43(b) states that under normal circumstances, liability to capture
ends with the termination of the voyage of the neutral vessel or the flight of the neutral aircraft, unless
it had enemy character under Paragraph 39. Id. at arts. 39, 43(b). It does not seem, however, that a neutral
aircraft could be fired upon automatically. Paragraph 44 states that:
In case a belligerent commanding officer considers that the success of the operation in which he is
engaged may be prejudiced by the presence of vessels or aircraft equipped with radio installations in
the immediate vicinity of his armed forces or by the use of such installations therein, he may order
neutral vessels or neutral aircraft on or over the high seas:
(a) To alter their course to such an extent as will be necessary to prevent their approaching the
armed forces under his command; or
(b) Not to make use of their radio transmitting apparatus while in the immediate vicinity of such
forces or with specified limits or hours or in regard to specified matters [a cross-reference follows
to the form of a declaration of prohibition];
(c) He may take measures to insure observance of such order;
(d) A neutral vessel or neutral aircraft, which does not conform to such direction of which it has
had notice, exposes itself to the risk of being fired upon. It will also be liable to capture, and
may be condemned if the court considers that the circumstances justify condemnation.
Id. at para. 44.
202. Paragraph 214 states:
A neutral civil aircraft found . . in the immediate vicinity of military operations must obey any order
given it by the belligerent. If it does not obey, it is liable to the use of necessary force. If it enters
such. .. vicinity contrary to prohibition, it is liable to confiscation and its personnel to treatment as
prisoners of war unless its entrance was due to force majeure or was made in ignorance of the
prohibitions.
Id. at para. 214.
203. It may represent more of an implicit military necessity approach. See infra notes 417-30 and
accompanying text. This does not change, however, the exegesis of the "necessary force" language due
to the legal interpretation of military necessity. Military necessity posits choice of a course of action from
among lawful alternatives. Simply invoking military necessity would not resolve the underlying conflict
with free passage principles.
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requirement under article 7 of the 1923 Hague Radio Rules of "receipt" of a
prior order, paragraph 214 speaks in terms of a failure to follow orders. This
approach differs markedly from the analogous provisions of article 30 of the
1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules and of article 102 of the 1939 Draft Con-
vention on Neutral Rights, which assigned the risk of a failure to receive such
orders to the belligerent. One can argue that the cross-reference in paragraph
214 of the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy to paragraph 44 implies
that its receipt rule should still apply to the allocation of the risk of a failure
to receive those orders under paragraph 214. However, by focusing on the
right of the belligerent to use "necessary force" instead of on the belligerent's
duty to warn, paragraph 214 seemingly changed from the traditional approach
that balanced coequal belligerent and neutral rights to an approach that address-
es the question in terms of lawful force. A lawful force analysis abandons the
principle, implicitly preserved under article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial
Warfare Rules and article 102 of the 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights,
that only warning shots are permitted until a neutral aircraft positively inter-
feres with an ongoing engagement between two belligerents.
"Innocent violation" of diversionary orders under paragraph 214 of the
1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy is addressed only in terms of confisca-
bility of the neutral aircraft, assuming that it was not shot down. Inferentially,
the use of necessary force may render uncompensable neutral war losses
resulting from failure to receive an order, insofar as paragraph 214's language
speaks of confiscation, as opposed to condemnation. 2" While unreasonable
beliefs concerning the neutral aircraft's knowledge of the diversionary order
might rebut the assertion that force was "necessary," this leaves open a broad
area of risk allocation under the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy.
Since World War II, American practices in areas involving tension between
military concerns and freedom of the seas, including foreign civil aircraft
overflight, have developed largely outside the context of active hostilities. An
example grounded in national security concerns the formation of the contiguous
United States Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ). Extending 200 to 300
nautical miles over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, these zones were estab-
lished by Executive Order in the 1950s.2'5 Three other postwar practices of
204. Articles 236-39 of the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy address capture of aircraft in the
classic maritime terminology of visitation, search, capture, and condemnation, and mandate judicial
proceedings in the case of "capture." If aircraft were destroyed in an engagement as opposed to being
captured, under the scheme articulated, judicial proceedings do not seem to be mandated as they would
be in the case of the destruction of a neutral "prize." Cf. 1941 TENTATIVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NAVY,
supra note 197, at art. 218 (opposing application of necessary force concept to capture).
205. ADIZ require aircraft to file prior flight plans, to report position and altitude, to identify
themselves in a timely fashion, and, if necessary, within an ADIZ zone, to comply with "special security
instructions." 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.19, 99.7 (1990). While such a zone extends considerably further over the
high seas than the contiguity precedents, perhaps justifiably so given the greater speed and reach of aircraft,
it is not absolutely exclusive in character and fits within a direct territorial defense rationale. See generally
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nations have restricted high seas overflight either temporarily or permanent-
ly.2' These peacetime practices involved warnings to avoid large expanses
of ocean because of nuclear tests on remote islands," 7 missile launches over
UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 51 INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATION AND DOCUMENTS, 1956:
SITUATION, DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE SEA 579 (1957); 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.1-99.41 (1990) (current ADIZ coverage). Canadian air law
recognizes similar zones (CADIZ). See Cooper, supra note 196, at 198-99. More Canadian than American
scholarship has concerned itself with the legality of ADIZ and CADIZ under international law, generally
arguing for their legality under self-defense principles and against their prohibition under article 12 of the
1944 Chicago Convention. See, e.g., J. MURCHISON, THE CONTIGUOUS AiR SPACE ZONE IN INTERNATION-
AL LAW 12-17 (1956); Martial, State Control of the Air Space over the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 30 CAN. B. REV. 245 (1952). But cf. The Law of the Air and the Draft Articles Concerning the Law
of the Sea Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Eighth Session, supra note 196, at 69-71
(noting protests against unilaterally declared restrictive air zones by other countries in contrast to acceptance
of ADIZ and CADIZ). Among American scholarship, the question of their legality has been raised in
connection with modern treaty guarantees of freedom of high seas overflight. See Cooper, supra, at 199.
Some argue for their validity in spite of seemingly absolute treaty language based on the practice of nations
and their reasonableness. See M. MCDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 787 (1962). Modern treaty formulations limit freedom
of high seas overflight so as not to impinge on others' freedom of overflight, which on their face would
support an air traffic safety requirement but not a national security rationale. RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 74, §521. The assertion of the national security concept as the basis for interfering with the innocent
passage of foreign civil aircraft during peacetime in broad high seas zones would be problematic if
traditional American law of the seas principles were applied.
206. During this period, the traditional three mile extent of territorial waters has been expanded in
treaty and customary law concepts to embrace a variety of zones, including expanded territorial waters (up
to twelve nautical miles), a twelve-mile zone contiguous to territorial seas, and an exclusive economic zone
extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra
note 74, § 511; see also id. §§ 512-17. The international law basis for these zones differs between nations.
Both prior to and after the 1982 LOS Convention, the United States asserted the position that zones such
as the 200 mile exclusive economic exploitation zone are recognized under the customary law of the sea
and, while traditional rights of innocent passage existed on and over these portions of the seas, technically
these zones were no longer part of the high seas. Id. § 514(2). The 1982 LOS Convention does not
explicitly designate the exclusive economic zone as part of the high seas. Id. § 514 comment b. The
Convention left unresolved a theoretical dispute between some states claiming that these areas continue to
have high seas character and many coastal states, including the United States, arguing the opposite. In the
American view, a coastal state exercises full sovereignty over its territorial seas and limited policing rights
over the contiguous zone. Id. § 511 comment a. However, most traditional high seas rights, beyond the
economic exploitation of such resources as fishing areas, continue to be recognized in these zones. As the
United States has chosen for political reasons not to enter into the final 1982 LOS Convention, presumably
it is still subject to the customary law regime.
207. During the 1950s, nuclear tests on the Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls caused the United States to
declare expanses ranging from 20,000 to 400,000 square miles of the surrounding Pacific Ocean to be
"warning zones." See McDougal & Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures
for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648, 650-51 (1955). No authority was asserted for excluding air and sea traffic,
but few problems were encountered with the presence of unauthorized aircraft or vessels. Id. at 682. But
see The Diago Fukuryu Maru, 4 M. WHrSEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 550 (1965). In the
1950s, American publicists divided on the question whether such warning zones violated freedom of the
high seas principles. For opposition to these warning zones, see Margolis, The Hydrogen Bomb Experiments
and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1985). But see McDougal & Schlei, supra (argued to uphold
burdens on freedom of high seas attendant to nuclear tests since international law permitted these sorts of
warning zones in connection with national security - based activities even in peacetime). Questions were
raised in preparatory work for the 1958 LOS Convention whether such warning zones could be reconciled
with the proposed treaty recognition of freedom of overflight over the high seas. See The Law of the Air
and the Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted by the International Law Commission at
its Eighth Session, supra note 196, at 69-70. The United States carefully avoided a claim that it might
"'clos[e] off a portion of the seas as a matter of enforceable right.'" 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra, at 550
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oceanic test ranges, z°8 and the usage of smaller high seas areas for militarytraining, such as high seas gunnery ranges.2°9 These practices must be under-
(quoting U.S. delegation paper prepared for 1958 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea). The U.S.
instead maintained that warning zones were predicated on voluntary compliance and observed as a matter
of comity. Id. However, following the adoption of the 1958 LOS High Seas Convention, American
publicists who argued in favor of the tests during the 1950s included them among the practices of nations
supporting the idea that the apparently strong free overflight treaty provisions should not be read too
restrictively because the pra6tice had not been rejected specifically at the 1958 Convention. See M.
MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 205, at 786-87. This position is questionable, however, since a
resolution of the 1958 U.N. Conference recognized that "'there is a serious and genuine apprehension on
the part of many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringement of the freedom of the seas.'" 2
D. O'CONNELL, supra note 122, at 812.
The United States has ratified a treaty banning these forms of nuclear testing. See Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapons- Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T.
1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (1963). However, continued French testing of nuclear devices
has raised the question of exclusionary zones again and has indicated through state practice the probable
illegality of establishing such absolute exclusionary zones beyond territorial waters in peacetime. See Id.
at 812-13. Note, Exclusion of Ships from Non-Terrtorial Weapons Testing Zones, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1040
(1986) (exclusionary issues raised by continued French testing and Greenpeace activity). See also D.
MCTAGGERT & R. HUNTER, GREENPEACE III: JOURNEY INTO THE BOMB (1978) (story of Canadian
Greenpeace activist's voyage into danger zone); Yates, State ResponsibilityforNonwealth Injuries to Aliens
in the Postwar Era, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENs 213, 217
(R. Lillich ed. 1983) (Canada protested seizure and detention of McTaggert's vessel and crew by French
Navy in which injuries occurred). See also Protesters Say French Told Yacht to Shun Atoll, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 2, 1981, at A6, col. 4. France's failure to assert a broader exclusionary zone during the Mururoa
testing is probably a fair indication of its view that, at least in peacetime, it could not impede freedom of
the high seas by excluding vessels beyond its territorial jurisdiction. A parallel conclusion has been reached
for U.S. exclusion of foreign shipping from a missile weapons testing zone (Kwajalein Atoll). Note,
Exclusion of Ships from Non-Territorial Weapons Testing Zones, supra, at 1049-57 (debating whether
exclusionary zone is lawful).
208. Since the 1950s, the United States, in cooperation with Britain and other countries, has maintained
and operated missile testing ranges over large expanses of open ocean. For specification of countries, see
H. REIFF, THE UNITED STATES AND THE TREATY LAW OF THE SEA 368-70 (1950); Note, Exclusion of
Shipsfrom Non-Territorial Weapons Testing Zones, supra note 207, at 1050-51. Where there are launches,
warnings are given for vessels and aircraft to avoid the target areas. See, e.g., id. at 1047-48 (procedures
for Kwajalein Missile Range). The Soviet Union has occasionally claimed temporarily exclusive use of high
seas areas of the Pacific Ocean for rocket testing and has requested third party states, including the United
States, to inform their shipping and aircraft to avoid the designated target area. See M. McDoUoAL & W.
BURKE, supra note 205, at 787. American views following ratification of the 1958 LOS Convention are
evident in the 1960 refusal of President Eisenhower to lodge a protest against the Soviet announcement.
Id. The President declared that the United States had claimed the right to use the high seas for such
scientific experimentation and therefore was not in a position to protest the practice. The U.S. did not take
the attitude that such a zone could be closed absolutely since it had "notified everybody concerned, and
then taken the proper measures to warn away from the areas involved anyone that might be damaged."
Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14,
1960, at 14, col. 1. See also 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 77 at 621-22. Liability for damage to aircraft
ignoring such a danger has not been resolved, although articles II and III of the Convention on the
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects impose strict liability on launching states for
damage to aircraft by a "space object" (defined in article I(d) to include launch vehicles and component
parts). See, e.g., N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW: FROM SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION TO COMMERCIAL
UTILIZATION 158-60 (1977).
209. From time to time nations use areas of the high seas for dangerous military training, such as
bombing and gunnery practice. The Soviet Union and associated states proposed that "[n]o naval or air
ranges or other combat training areas limiting freedom of navigation may be designated on the high seas
near foreign coasts or on international routes." IV Official Records of the First United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doe. No. AIConf.13/C.21L.32, at 124 (1958). The proposal, which was
overwhelmingly defeated, was characterized by its authors as not to apply generally to the open seas. See
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stood against the backdrop of the 1958 LOS Convention and its component
Convention on the High Seas. As the first treaty to specify that rights of free
overflight are included in the freedom of the high seas, the 1958 Convention
of the High Seas characterizes freedom of the high seas generally as a system
of balanced rights as opposed to one of absolute rights.21° A technical ques-
tion thus arises as to whether restrictive practices predating the 1958 Conven-
tion were made impermissible by its freedom of overflight provision which
purports to recognize limitations on free passage only in the reciprocal rights
of other states."' While a reasonableness analysis has been advanced affirm-
ing the survival of these practices, this permissive view is not entirely consis-
tent with the 1958 High Seas Convention's language.2"2
Following World War II, American military views on, the,,treatment of
neutral aircraft in maritime hostilities were articulated in the Navy's 1955 Law
of Naval Warfare.213 Although merely a statement of naval policy ,214 the
1955 Law of Naval Warfare provided guidance concerning international law
in maritime conflict.2"' It is thus important as an official statement of imme-
diate postwar American views of sea warfare law. It's paragraph 421, recog-
nized basic high seas free overflight rights of aircraft, while paragraph 430(b)
provided:
Within the immediate area or vicinity of naval operations, a belligerent may
establish special restrictions (see, for example, [the successor provision to 1941
Tentative Instructions for the Navy paras. 43 & 44 and ultimately Hague Radio
Rules art. 6 & 7]216) upon the activities of neutral vessels and aircraft and may
M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 205, at 786. In the course of discussion, the United States
declared that it did not seek to close areas to shipping, or presumably aircraft, but merely to provide a
warning of the danger. State Department instructions to the U.S. Delegation indicated that the United States
had been careful not to close off portions of the high seas as a matter of enforceable right. Warnings were
predicated on voluntary compliance, a view followed both in British and French practice. See 2 D.
O'CoNNELL, supra note 97, at 809-10.
210. 1958 LOS High Seas Convention, supra note 99, at art. 2. The parallel provision in the 1982
LOS Convention, article 87, contains substantially identical language with regard to free overflight. 1958
LOS High Seas Convention, supra note 99, at art. 87.
211. The technical formulation of rights of overflight as one element of the freedom of the high seas
originated in the 1950s International Law Commission consideration of the status of the high seas under
customary law in preparation for the 1958 LOS Convention. See The Law of the Air and the Draft Articles
Concerning the Law of the Sea Adopted by the International Law Commission at its Eighth Session, supra
note 246; 1958 LOS High Seas Convention, supra, at art. 2; 1982 LOS High Seas Convention, supra, at
art. 75; RESTATEMNT THIRD, supra note 71, § 521.
212. See, e.g., M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 205, at 730-923.
213. Supra note 106.
214. 1955 LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 105, at para. 110 n.1 (functional statement of the
official policy).
215. Id. at para. 100.
216. The reference is to paragraph 520(a) of the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare, which provides:
A neutral merchant vessel or aircraft which, when on or over the high seas, transmits information
destined for a belligerent concerning military operations or military forces is liable to capture.
Within the immediate vicinity of his forces, a belligerent commanding officer may exercise
control over the communications of any neutral merchantvessel or aircraftwhose presence might
otherwise endanger the success of his operations ... A neutral vessel or aircraft which does not
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prohibit altogether such vessels and aircraft from entering the area. Neutral vessels
and aircraft which fail to comply with a belligerent's orders expose themselves to
the risk of being fired upon. Such vessels and aircraft are also liable to capture.217
Although military practice rules articulated under the 1955 Law of Naval
Warfare generally follow those of the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy,
in several respects they differ significantly from a legal point of view. While
inferentially rejecting the war zone concept and recognizing high seas free
passage rights for neutral aircraft, the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare articulates
an apparently absolute rule permitting wartime exclusion of neutral aircraft
from the "immediate area or vicinity of naval operations." Not only is the
entire scheme premised upon a failure to comply with belligerent orders, but
collateral provisions have also dropped the few instances in the 1941 Tentative
Instructions for the Navy that condition the neutral's "at risk" status on receipt
of the belligerent's diversionary order. While the relevant provisions in the
1955 Law of Naval Warfare that parallel the 1941 Tentative Instructions for
the Navy omit the necessary force terminology, their substantive approach was
not changed given the general treatment of force under the military necessity
provisions."' The 1955 Law of Naval Warfare abandoned those free passage
concerns visible in customary law and adopted sub silentio an operational
theory of ship or fleet self-defense. To avoid confusion with the war and battle
zone concept as already under discussion, this inquiry refers to this self-defense
concept, based on concentric zones incorporating different kinds of protective
measures, as the "bubble" theory of self-defense (because the zones reach
above and below the ocean's surface, extending from the protected locus to
a distance determined by the nature of the threat).219
Under the bubble theory, a warship may exclude all vessels and aircraft
within a specific radius and can undertake defensive action against any vessel
or aircraft that trespasses upon the restricted area without permission on the
theory that it displays hostile intent. While the bubble theory clearly states
military policy, its legality is unclear. Applied in a high intensity general
conflict (i.e., in the protection of a carrier battle group in the Norwegian Sea
during a putative U.S.-Soviet conflict, the kind of mission for which the
Vincennes was intended as an Aegis class warship), modern weaponry may
render the battle and bubble zone coincident. However, a situation such as the
conform to a belligerent's control exposes itself to the risk of being fired upon and renders itself
liable to capture.
1955 LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 199, at para. 520(a).
217. Subparagraph 503(d)(7) is cross-referenced, providing that "[n]eutral merchant vessels are in
general liable to capture if performing any of the following acts ... (7) Violating regulations established
by a belligerent within the immediate area of naval operations (see para. 430(b))." Id. at para. 503(d)(7).
218. Id. at para. 220(a).
219. See, e.g., Kassing, Protecting the F~leet, in PROBLEMS OF SEA POWER AS WE APPROAcH TBE
TwENTY-FmST CENTURY 293, 309 (J. George ed. 1978) (concepts of area, local, and point defense).
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Flight 655 incident involves a more limited conflict.' The concept of "tres-
pass" of the bubble implies the territoriality rejected under traditional free
passage principles. Thus, while generally embracing freedom of the high seas
principles, the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare patently lost the traditional linkage
between neutral free passage rights and battle zone overflight.
The language of relevant provisions of the most current statement of U.S.
naval policy, the 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook, is substantially
identical to that of the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare."- For example, para-
graph 7.8 of the 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook addresses belligerent
control of the immediate area of naval operations and, like paragraph 430(b)
of the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare, provides for capture, with destruction in
appropriate cases, if such belligerent regulations are violated.' Once again,
the risk of non-receipt of belligerent warnings rests with the neutral vessel or
aircraft. The annotation for military lawyers states that:
Belligerent control over neutral vessels and aircraft within an immediate area of
naval operations, a limited and transient claim, is based on a belligerent's right to
attack and destroy his enemy, his right to defend himself without suffering from
neutral interference, and his right to ensure the security of his forces.m
Considering our earlier examination of balancing belligerent and neutral usage
rights under customary law, the recited rationales for a right to attack the
enemy and to defend oneself without neutral interference are not problematic.
They are perfectly compatible with traditional views of coequal belligerent and
neutral free passage rights. However, the rationale of ensuring the security of
forces is problematic. This legal assertion of the "bubble" concept goes beyond
early customary law, but maintains that neutral free passage rights may be
abrogated in a battle zone or the immediate vicinity of naval operations. 224
It is this concept's implicit transfer of the risk of nonreceipt of diversionary
warnings that lies at the heart of the Flight 655 situation. In a limited conflict
situation such as the Iran-Iraq War, the problem is created technically by the
imputation of hostile intent to any vessel or aircraft by virtue of its conduct
220. See infra note 526 and accompanying text.
221. See 1989 Annotated Commander's Hanwbook, supra note 18, at para. 7.8, 7.8.1. It recognizes,
however, the trend in belligerent practices to widen interdiction of maritime commerce, thus restricting
free passage rights of neutrals within the narrow confines of traditional blockade doctrine in large scale
armed conflict. This idea is opposed to limited armed conflict, where blockade-based interdiction is "a
useful means to regulate the competing interests of belligerents and neutrals,' by satisfying the traditional
criteria of establishment, notification, effectiveness, limitation, and impartiality. Id. at para. 7.7.5.
Technically, the blockade was to be accomplished largely if not exclusively by the placement of mines.
This raises the traditional question of whether blockades may lawfully exist without a ship's participation.
222. Id. at para. 7.9.
223. Id. at para. 7.8 n.141.
224. See supra note 374 and accompanying text (unidentified aircraft cleared as target at 20 miles
distance).
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in not responding to a warship's hail. The military directives implementing
this characterization of aircraft or vessels as hostile threats are the "rules of
engagement," which in the Vincennes incident are apparently still classi-
fied. 6 The question remains, however, whether the rules of engagement as
military directives comply with the requirements of international law. 7
Since World War II, the United States has been involved in at least four
incidents that impeded high seas passage on national security grounds: the
Cuban Missile Crisis, the mining of Haiphong Harbor, the mining of Nicara-
guan waters in support of the Contras, and the initial economic blockade of
Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait. During the so-called Cuban Quarantine
of 1962, the United States claimed that its warships were entitled to visit and
search foreign ships on the high seas surrounding Cuba to prevent the passage
of nuclear missiles to Cuban launching sites. This claim of right apparently
derived from the questionable traditional idea of peaceful blockade as a use
of force short of war. The action was disputed but never repudiated," 8 since
the Missile Crisis was resolved politically before any serious incidents oc-
curred. At the height of the Vietnam War, the United States mined harbors
in North Vietnam to interdict seaborne supplies and military activities. 9
What is significant about this activity is that the United States, while involved
in a major conflict, felt constrained to limit mining to belligerent territorial
waters, to give general notice of the danger, and to allow neutral shipping a
grace period in which to depart. This self-restraint, along with general attempts
to avoid damage to non-North Vietnamese aircraft and vessels, demonstrates
the U.S. conviction that the precepts of pre-World War II customary and treaty
225. This change may date back to the Spanish Civil War and to the rules of engagement implementing
the Nyon Agreement. See D. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 120-22, 172-73,(1975)
(British rules of engagement). See also Frank, Misperception and Incidents at Sea: The Deutschland and
Leipzig Crises, 43 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 31, 42-44 (Spring 1990).
226. See Parks, supra note 9 (general concept of rules of engagement in light of Flight 655 incident);
Shearer, Rules ofEngagement and the Implementation of the Law ofNaval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & COM. 767 (1988) (references to Stark incident). See also Roach, Rules of Engagement, 14 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 865 (1988). The Department of Defense investigation into the Flight 655 incident
indicated that the primary responsibility of a commanding officer under the applicable Persian Gulf rules
of engagement was "defense of his ship from attack or from threat of imminent attack."DOD Report, supra
note 6 at E-15. The Vincennes properly selected and applied the correct rules of engagement. Id. at E-50.
Based on the information presented to the Vincennes' commanding officer, engagement of the unidentified
aircraft (Flight 655) was "within the parameters of the rules of engagement." Id. See also Nejad v. U.S.,
724 F. Supp. 753, 756 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (dismissal of Flight 655 related wrongful death cases in which
Secretary of Navy invoked state secrets privilege as to rules of engagement under which Vincennes
operated).
227. To the extent the rules of engagement are military orders, they put the individual officers applying
their provisions in a difficult situation, given the generally accepted idea that unlawful orders should not
be followed. Cf. 32 C.F.R. § 700.605 (1990) (U.S. naval regulation mandating compliance with internation-
al law and authorizing disregard of other regulations if necessary to comply with international law).
228. See, e.g., MacChesney, Some Comments on the 'Quarantine' of Cuba, 57 AJ.I.L. 592 (1963);
Wright, The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM. 1. INT'L L. 546 (1963).
229. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 66 AM. 1. INT'L
L. 836, 837-40 (1972); see also C. ROUSSEAU, LE DRorr DES coN s ARms (1983).
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maritime law regarding non-hostile aircraft and shipping should be ob-
served. 0
In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ imputed certain mining activities directly
to the United States."3 While no notice was given of the location of the
mines, allegedly laid to disrupt foreign commerce, all were within Nicaraguan
territorial waters. The United States again specifically avoided any high seas
mining. Initially, U.S. enforcement of the economic blockade of Iraq and
Kuwait declared by the U.N. Security Council on August 6, 1990," also
appeared to raise issues of customary law.3 This situation changed on Au-
gust 25, 1990, when the U.N. Security Council officially sanctioned the use
of armed force by member states to ensure the blockade's efficacy. 4
All of these actions were carried out either in littoral areas or in apparent
reliance on continuous voyage principles, and two of the four maneuvers
avoided the high seas completely. While the free passage principles embedded
in customary law have been abandoned in favor of ship defense under the
bubble theory, they appear to have survived under American views of a
belligerent's power to close international waters to nonbelligerents.
Finally, one must inquire whether the United States' apparent failure to
challenge openly the legality of the maritime war zones declared by the
belligerents in the Iran-Iraq War represented a change in U.S. policy. Implicit
recognition of these zones, which were declared in coastal areas and around
oil-loading facilities in the Gulf, does not seem to represent a change in policy.
These exclusionary zones had a littoral location, or involved artificial islands
and were generally narrow in scope. Thus they fell within U.S. contiguity
ideas. In addition, official U.S. policy in the Iran-Iraq War embraced a broad
view of neutral rights, including free passage claims inconsistent with the war
zone concept.235
Summing up the general development of the exclusion of civilian aircraft
from high seas battle zones, little precedent exists beyond the analogy to the
exclusion of neutral vessels by a belligerent from surface engagements, on the
ground that their presence would interfere directly with belligerent combat
230. See supra note 227.
231. See infra note 565-67 and accompanying text.
232. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S\RES\661, 29 I.L.M. 1325-27 (1990).
233. On August 17, 1990, the United States issued Special Warning No. 80 in its Notice to Mariners
series reciting reliance on collective self-defense and specifying that ships travelling to or from Iraq and
occupied Kuwait might be visited and searched in the Straits of Hormuz and Tiran, or at other choke points.
The U.S. attitude that self-defense permits this high seas interference differs from the classical prize law
view, which distinguished clearly between impeding high seas passage under the law of war and the law
of peace.
234. This authorization altered the formal justification for U.S. naval actions from a claim of assisting
the government in Kuwait in its policy of collective self-defense to one of enforcing Security Council
measures. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665, 29 I.L.M. 1329-30 (1990).
235. See supra notes 18 and accompanying text.
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operations. Prior to World War I, the concepts of freedom of the seas and
neutral rights mandated rejection of such a rule. Instead, the balance between
coequal belligerent and neutral high seas usage rights was struck so that any
neutral vessel intruding into a belligerent engagement did so at its own risk.
Beginning in World War I, however, the neutral vessel rule that provided the
analogy was disputed, and the special character of aircraft was stressed in the
aftermath of the War. In the interwar period, the asserted new permissive
practice of excluding neutral vessels or aircraft from high seas battle zones was
actively challenged in treaty discussions,"5 but portions of the 1923 Hague
Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules seemed to suggest a departure from principles
of customary law.
Under the 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights, collective American
scholarly opinion appeared once again to be consistent with the traditional
customary law view. Neutral aircraft could be ordered to avoid combat opera-
tions, but an aircraft was not present at its own peril unless it had received a
warning that it should avoid the battle zone. The risk of unsuccessful or
ineffective communication lay with the combatant, and the scope of this risk
should be appreciated, given that modern skies were even then increasingly
filled with civilian aircraft using international transit routes.
From the viewpoint of U.S. practice, the 1941 Tentative Instructions for
the Navy as the U.S. Navy's defacto law of sea warfare manual during World
War II applied much of the 1923 Hague Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules,
while changing its focus from reconciliation of competing belligerent and
neutral high seas usage rights to a lawful force analysis. Following World War
II, the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare and the 1989 Annotated Commander's
Handbook continued to reject the concept of war zones. Following a lawful
force analysis, however, they now espouse a seemingly absolute right of
belligerents to exclude neutral aircraft and vessels from military operations
zones under the bubble theory. Accordingly, the risk of failure to receive the
diversionary order rests with the neutral aircraft or vessel. 7 This view lies
at the heart of the Legal Adviser's congressional testimony in which he applied
a lawful force analysis. 8
Postwar U.S. practice concerning peacetime military warning or danger
zones has involved the same general freedom of the high seas issues that drove
the analysis of the rights of neutrals between the World Wars. Beyond defense-
236. See supra notes 174 and accompanying text.
237. Also, one should note that U.S. practice, as articulated under the lawful force analysis, under-
stands the law of war as a discrete body of legal principles applicable to the course of armed conflict,
untouched by modern international law's general restrictions on the use of force. 1955 LAW OF NAVAL
WAu. , supra note 105, at para. 110, n. 3; 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook, supra note 18,
para. 7.2.1. To this extent, its principles are applicable to armed conflict only once it has been determined
that general restraints on the use of armed force under the U.N. Charter and related law have been satisfied.
238. DEP'T ST. BuLL., No. 2139, Oct. 1988, at 58-59, reprinted in Agora, supra note 69, at 321.
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-based claims to assert limited restrictions in contiguous areas, there is no
general claim of right under international law to establish prohibited, or even
substantially restricted, zones on or over the open seas. Instead, where U.S.
activities temporarily have created dangers on the open sea, the United States
has chosen to warn vessels and aircraft to avoid the danger zone without laying
claim to an absolute right to exclude them. Compliance with diversionary order
is characterized as voluntary. Based on limited experience, the United States
does not appear to consider aircraft and vessels to be present at their own risk.
In the few instances involving pending or active hostilities, the United States
has purported largely to follow the spirit, if not the letter, of blockade doc-
trine, 9 and has restricted mining and similar activities affecting neutral ship-
ping to contiguous, mostly territorial waters.
Looking beyond American views, it is unclear how much of the older
customary law applicable to neutral aircraft overflight has survived. To the
extent states' views can be read between the lines in recommendation 2.6/-
1,° on which Iran relies in its ICJ Application, and in criticisms of other
recent examples of high seas exclusionary zones -- such as declared by Great
Britain and Argentina in the Falklands conflict241 -- some states would assert
that the applicable international law principles governing neutral overflight of
belligerent operations derive more from free passage than from use of force
rules.242 On its face, recommendation 2.6/1 might be treated as addressing
only peacetime military uses of the high sea, in which case it differs little from
American views. However, given perennially unsettled conditions in the
Middle East and recommendation 2.6/1's issuance shortly after the original
U.S. Navy warning of potential defensive action, it seems directed at wartime
conditions and specifically the Iran-Iraq War. To the extent recommendation
2.6/1 is evidence of the currently accepted law of armed conflict and neutral
free passage rights as read into the Chicago Convention under article 89, the
naval operations bubble theory has become questionable at least as applied
239. This was not the case with the Cuban Quarantine, where the United States admitted that the
activity was not a blockadeperse, which would imply that hostilities had commenced. Therefore the right
to impede free passage was based on concepts of peaceful blockade or quarantine. See supra, note 235.
240. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text and infra note 243.
241. See Fenrick, supra note 18, at 109-11; Levie, supra note 18, at736-38. See also Craig, Falklands
Operations II: Fighting by the Rules, 37 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 23, 23-25 (May-June 1984) (British view
of exclusion zones justified as self-defense under U.N. Charter art..51).
242. Recommendation 2.611 was accompanied at the Third Middle East Regional Air Navigation
Meeting by some indications under related recommendation2.6/8 that the ICAO members present (including
the United States) viewed overflight restrictions in high seas areas, even for military purposes, as possibly
infringing upon annex 2 to the Chicago Convention. Similarly, prior to the Flight 655 incident the creation
of Iranian and Iraqi exclusion zones in the heavily traveled international waters of the Persian Gulf was
criticized as impermissible. See Fenrick, supra note 18, at 121, 125 (applying reasonableness analysis).
The U.N. Security Council also viewed attacks as a violation of free passage rights. Id. at 120-21. The
Soviet Union condemned Britain's 200-mile total exclusion zone surrounding the Falklands at the height
of that conflict, claiming that the act violated the 1958 LOS Convention by arbitrarily closing wide areas
of the sea to nonbelligerent shipping and aircraft. Id. at 111.
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during a limited conflict in the absence of notice to nonbelligerent civil air-
craft.
In the Flight 655 incident the question arises whether general American
interests are well-served in abandoning free passage rights for a lawful force
analysis. Unfortunately, the Legal Adviser's congressional testimony showed
little sensitivity to these free passage concerns or the interests at stake in ideas
of war or battle zones versus the "bubble" concept. The experience of the Vin-
cennes captures the tension between free passage principles and combatant
rights in its dual role as both a combatant and a neutral warship asserting free
passage rights. If the Vincennes as a combatant could disregard free passage
principles and close the seas to Flight 655, it is unclear where to draw the line
under international law for belligerents closing the seas to nonbelligerent oil
tankers in the Persian Gulf.243 Are free passage rights for nonbelligerent oil
tankers more important than nonresponsibility for putative self-defense? To the
extent hostilities in a post-Cold War world tend toward regional conflicts such
as the Iran-Iraq War, and as international commerce grows in importance, the
United States should find that its long-term interests are better served by
supporting free passage principles rather than an expansive view of combatant
rights. In view of a changing world, the lawful force analysis espoused in the
1955 Law of Naval Warfare and the 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook
requires reevaluation.
IV. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION LAW: OVERFLIGHT AND AIR SAFETY
Beyond jurisdictional aspects already discussed, three aspects of civil
aviation treaty law might be applied to the Flight 655 incident to determine
what duties, if any, the Vincennes violated. The first involves the question of
free overflight rights, already noted in connection with recommendation 2.6/1
and maritime free passage principles as qualified by article 89 of the Chicago
Convention. The free passage concept, rooted in maritime principles, affects
the regulation of aircraft operation. Second, the Chicago Convention and its
Annexes directly govern aircraft operation over international waters, which
raises the question whether Iran can be faulted for Flight 655's operation if
it complied with the Convention. Finally, the ICJ must confront the apparent
Iranian position that an air safety duty exists that absolutely prohibits firing
upon civil airliners.
The regulatory framework for international civil aviation exists under the
Chicago Convention and is administered by the ICAO as the rule-making body.
At the time of the Chicago Convention's adoption, the principle of free over-
flight of the high seas was recognized in customary law, but not under treaty
243. See supra note 228.
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law.4 The scope of free passage principles in territorial waters and interna-
tional straits was also disputed.2 45 Although the 1958 LOS High Seas Con-
vention codified freedom of overflight for the first time, it merely defined
which waters constituted the high seas, thereby leaving unchanged the Chicago
Convention's regulatory structure for flights.2'
Although states may restrict and regulate overflight of their own territories
for reasons including military necessity or public safety,247 only the so-called
Rules of the Air, contained in annex 2 to the Chicago Convention,24 are
mandatory over the high seas.249 The Rules of the Air also apply in areas
beyond the high seas unless specifically displaced by states' regulation of their
own airspace.1 0 The extent of the territorial seas was three miles under
customary law when the Chicago Convention and the 1958 LOS. High Seas
Convention (1958 LOS Convention), to which the United States is a party,
were signed in 1944 and 1958, respectively. Both negatively define where the
high seas, and thus mandatory coverage of the Rules of the Air, begin. Howev-
er, the limit of territorial seas has been extended to twelve miles under both
the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention) and
under modern customary law. In international straits, the 1982 LOS specifical-
ly limits sovereign rights over territorial seas and provides for an unrestricted
right of transit passage for shipping and aircraft." l
244. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 196, at 198. Already the 1919 Paris Convention viewed airspace
above the high seas as subject to free passage and airspace above a state's territory and adjacent territorial
waters as subject to the state's exclusive sovereignty. Paris Convention, supra note 89. See 1 G. GimEL,
supra note 97, at 516-17. However, relatively few states were signatories to the Convention. Although not
a signatory, the United States signed the 1928 Havana Convention on Commercial Aviation, which
contained analogous language in its article 1. Convention Between the United States and Other American
Republics, Feb. 20, 1928, T.S. No. 840 (1931).
245. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 196, at 200-01.
246. See The Law of the Air and the Draft Articles Concerning the Law of the Sea adopted by the
International Law Commission at its Eighth Session, supra note 83, at 80-85.
247. Id.
248. See INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS: RULES OF
THE AIR, ANNEX 2 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (8th ed. July 1986)
[hereinafter ANNEX 2 TO THE CIECAGO CONVENTION]. Only the mandatory provisions of annex 2 are
viewed as compulsory law, while ICAO "recommendations" made in pursuance of the treaty may be
voluntarily adopted by the individual states. T. BiJERGENTHAL, supra note 82, at 80-85.
249. See Chicago Convention, supra note 60, at art. 12.
250. Id.
251. See Milde, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Possible Implications for
Intemational Air Law, 8 ANNALS OF AIR & SPACE L. 167, 175-88 (1983). The U.S. failure to ratify the
1982 LOS Convention raises the question whether it enjoys the benefit of the Convention's novel "transit
passage" concept, which is a compromise between traditional narrower innocent passage and broader free
transit views, or whether the older innocent passage principles of the 1958 LOS Convention and the Corfu
Channel Case should apply to it. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 75, § 513(3). Beyond this lies the
peculiar question of whether U.S. naval activities, such as those of the Vincennes, fall within the definition
of "transit passage." Even if they do not, by analogy to the Corfu Channel Case, they may not violate
Iranian sovereignty and U.N. Charter article 2(4) to the extent they were specifically intended to counter
Iranian attempts to cut off free transit rights of merchant shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. While
the Iranian ICJ Application did not explicitly raise the issue, the question may arise during an analysis of
the lawfulness of the Vincennes' employment of force under U.N. Charter provisions. See Caminus, The
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Although the Flight 655 incident occurred within the Strait of Hormuz, the
plane's flight path prior to its downing was within Iran's territorial seas. The
Vincennes and Montgomery were also within the twelve mile zone because of
their proximity to the Iranian islands of Queshm and Hengham. Under article
39(3) of the 1982 LOS Convention, aircraft overflying international straits are
subject only to the mandatory coverage of annex 2."5 Given that the 1982
LOS has not been ratified by enough states to enter into force, the regulatory
jurisdiction of littoral states remains unclear within the airspace above those
portions of international straits which are considered part of their territorial
waters. On the one hand, the official U.S. position is that the transit passage
regime has become customary law. As a result, airspace over international
straits arguably should not fall within the jurisdiction of littoral states and thus
only annex 2's mandatory rules should apply 53 On the other hand, disre-
garding any disputes regarding whether the transit passage regime is a part of
customary law, article 39(3) of the 1982 LOS Convention was in derogation
of the Chicago Convention, which recognizes the regulatory jurisdiction of
littoral states as linked to their territorial sovereignty and thus territorial
waters. '. It is questionable whether available evidence of state practice is
legally sufficient to conclude that, with regard to aviation operations, custom-
ary law has displaced air treaty law under the Chicago Convention. The
resolution of this question will determine whether Iran even had the authority
under international law to promulgate generally applicable civil aviation
operation rules for the airspace in question.
Article 3 bis, cited in the Iranian ICJ Application, implicitly reuses the
question whether an absolute duty not to fire upon civilian airliners existed.
Following the 1983 downing by Soviet air defense forces of Flight KE
007,5 efforts to amend the Chicago Conventione 6 resulted in an extraordi-
Legal Regime of Straits in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 205 REc. DES COuRS
9 (1987-V) (special role of international law designed to secure rights of passage through international straits
for all ships and aircraft); see also Reisman, The Regime of Straits and National Security: An Appraisal
of International Law Making, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 48 (1980) (U.S. military interests in preserving free
passage through international straits); Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77 (1980) (possible interpretation of 1982 LOS to
preserve adequate free passage rights).
252. See Caminos, supra note 251, at 158-63.
253. This undercuts the idea of an obligation on the part of Iran to issue special operating regulations
to aircraft overflying the Strait of Hormuz, which was implicit in the views expressed by the Legal Adviser
in his congressional testimony. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
254. An additional complication arises because under the 1958 LOS Convention innocent passage was
literally applied only to surface vessels. See, e.g., Caminos, supra note 251, at 58-61. For our purposes,
it suffices to note that this placed relatively more importance on the continued application of the provisions
of the Chicago Convention. As a result, transit passage could arguably become part of customary law under
freedom of the seas principles while at the same time the applicable operational air regulatory jurisdiction
under the Chicago Convention would remain unchanged.
255. See Destruction of Korean Air Lines Flight 007, 30 Dec. 1983, ICAO: Action with Regard to
the Downing of the Korean Airlines Aircraft, 23 I.L.M. 864 (1984); Documents Concerning the Korean
Air Lines Incident, 2 I.L.M. 1109 (1983). During World War II, a number of civilian airliners were shot
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nary session of the ICAO Assembly which unanimously approved article 3 bis.
Article 3 bis has not yet received a sufficient number of ratifications to become
treaty law, but there is an issue whether it simply codified existing law. 2- 7
Article 3 bis contains the following material clauses:
The contracting States recognize that every State must refrain from resorting to the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight and that, in case of interception, the
lives of persons on board and the safety of aircraft must not be endangered. This
provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations
of States set forth in the Charter of the United Nations."
Commentators have identified problems relating to the proper interpretation
of article 3 bis,s 9 caused in part because it was aimed too literally at the
then recent Flight KE 007 tragedy.26 However, it has been argued that it
is declaratory of existing customary law."6 If a principle of customary inter-
national civil aviation law establishes absolute liability for shooting down civil
airliners -- even when they trespass on prohibited military areas within a state's
territory and arguendo are engaged in reconnaissance activity262 -- presum-
ably it would also encompass overflights of international waters and thus could,
subject to the effect of article 89 of the Chicago Convention, also apply to the
Flight 655 incident.
down, including neutral aircraft over international waters. See J. SPAiGHT supra note 95, at 403-08. See
also Hughes, Aerial Intrusions by CivilAirliners and the Use of Force, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 603 (1980);
Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law, 47 Am. J. INT'L
L. 559 (1953). See generally J. BENTZMN, DER UNERLAUBTEEm'FLUG VON LUFrFAlRZEUGENINFREMDES
STAATSGEIET IN FRIEDENSZErrEN UND SEINE RECHTSFOLGEN (1982) (extensive catalogue of peacetime
incidents from end of World War II through 1980).
256. See 23 I.L.M. 705 (1984) [hereinafter Art. 3 bis] (protocol and text of art. 3 bis). See generally
International Civil Aviation Organization, Plenary Meetings, Resolutions and Minutes, ICAO Doc. 9437,
A25-Res., P. Min. [hereinafter ICAC Extraordinary Assembly]; International Civil Aviation Organization,
Executive Committee, Report, Minutes and Document, ICAO Doc. 9438, A25-EX.
257. As of April 30, 1991, the Legal Bureau of the ICAO Secretariat in Montreal had received 61
of the 102 ratifications of ICAO member states necessary to approve this amendment. Telephone interview
with Legal Bureau (Apr. 30, 1991). The United States had not yet ratified article 3 bis to date.
258. Art. 3 bis, supra note 256, at 706.
259. See Cheng, supra note 111, at 49.
260. Article 3 bis apparently prohibits shooting-down an aircraft overflying a state's territory "without
authority or if there are reasonable grounds to conclude that it is being used for any purpose inconsistent
with the aims of this Convention." Art. 3 bis, supra note 256, at paras. (b)-(d). This language seemingly
addresses the Soviet argument that KE 007 was engaged in espionage. Commentators have interpreted this
language broadly as applying to "any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention." See Cheng,
supra note 109, at 68. By reserving the issue under U.N. Charter provisions, the delegates clearly intended
to apply articles 2(4) and 51 of the Charter to the lawful use of armed force and self-defense. See generally
Linnan, supra note 74, at 57. Commentators have viewed the issues not as a problem of self-defense but
rather as a question of the protection and treatment of foreigners within a state's territory. Cheng, supra
note 109, at 70-72.
261. See sources supra note 258 and infra note 270.
262. In the Flight KE 007 incident, the Soviet Union claimed that the airline had been engaged in
espionage and that the flight's departure time had been delayed to coincide with certain satellite positions
and that the flight itself was on a mission coordinated with other agencies. However, the ICAO investigato-
ry report rejected these claims as unsupported by evidence. See Report of the ICAO Facofnding Commis-
sion, attachment to State Letter LE 4/19.4-83/130 (Dec. 1983), 23 I.L.M. 865, 894 (1984).
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While the "recognition" language of the first clause of article 3 bis may
indicate that the ICAO Assembly viewed it as merely declaratory of existing
customary law, this seems doubtful based upon the proceedings and the history
of the provision's prior drafts.263 Furthermore, even if declaratory of existing
customary law, through the reservation of "rights and obligations of States set
forth in the United Nations Charter," article 3 bis recognizes a qualification
on that customary law. It is clear from the proceedings that the delegates had
in mind articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter concerning the lawful use of
armed force and principles of self-defense. 2" This is consistent with the
interpretation of article 89 of the Chicago Convention2 because article 89
is phrased in pre-U.N. Charter terminology while modern law analyzes the
use of armed force in terms of its legality under the U.N. Charter.
The limited commentary on article 3 bis to date has viewed the issues
involved in the downing of a civilian airliner not as a true self-defense prob-
lem, but rather as a question of the protection and treatment of foreigners
within a state's territory. As a result, the applicable international law standards
focus on the protection of alien lives. 2" However, simply asserting that these
principles should govern without examining the underlying scope of the
self-defense and necessity dispute seemingly ignores the fact that the delegates
were primarily concerned about the principles of self-defense and the lawful
263. Cheng, supra note 109, at 59-61, 63-67; Richard, KAL 007: The Legal Fallout, 9 ANNAtS Ait
& SPACE L. 147, 154 (1984). But see Milde, Interception of Civil Aircraft vs. Misuse of Civil Aviation
(Background ofAmendment 27 to Annex 2), 11 ANNALs OF Am & SPACE L. 105, 125-27 (1986) (ICAO
Legal Bureau has taken position that art. 3 bis is merely declaratory of customary law). While written
between the World Wars and prior to the Chicago Convention, the 1923 Hague Rules for Radio and Aerial
Warfare allowed belligerents to fire upon and capture neutral civilian aircraft. See supra notes 168-80 and
accompanying text. While no precedent existed for forcing innocent neutral aircraft to circumvent
belligerent military operations, there is a long tradition of capture of neutral merchant vessels by belligerents
on account of 'non-neutral" activities. The question remains open whether and how much of the traditional
law of war should be transposed to present situations. In addition, the permitted transfer by analogy from
the law of sea warfare to air warfare is debatable.
264. See generally Linnan, supra note 74, at 68-77 (differing views of legality of armed force under
relevant U.N. Charter provisions).
265. See supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
266. See Cheng, supra note 109, at 70-72. Cheng's rejection of the self-defense rationale was based
on its open-endedness and possibility of "endless abuses.* Id. at 73. See also Lowenfeld, supra note 4,
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use of force.267 In the context of Flight 655, such an approach also fails to
take into account article 89.
Following the 1984 drafting of proposed article 3 bis, in 1986 the ICAO
Council promulgated amendment 27 to the mandatory Rules of the Air."
Still colored by the Flight KE 007 incident, the literal language and history
of amendment 27 focused on the interception of foreign civil aircraft by
military aircraft. While the term "interception" is ambiguous and while amend-
ment 27 may not extend to the Flight 655 incident without a tortured interpre-
tation of the term "aircraft" to include the Vincennes' anti-aircraft missiles, 9
amendment 27 purports to cover the activities of intercepting military aircraft
by requiring under section 3.8.1 that such interceptions comply with "appropri-
ate regulations and- administrative directives issued by contracting States in
compliance with the [Chicago Convention]" having "due regard for the safety
of navigation of civil aircraft. "270
After extended debate, the "due regard" language attempted to reconcile
state views with respect to whether the Chicago Convention permitted the
regulation of intercepting military aircraft. 7' Although the language adopted
may encompass self-defense principles apparently recognized under article 3
bis, the United States and the Soviet Union consider amendment 27 ultra vires
and therefore merely as a special recommendation rather than a mandatory part
of annex 2 .2fl The United States argues that the Chicago Convention in its
267. The peculiar situation of a warship under attack on the high seas raises the issue whether any
actions undertaken in its defense are within the ambit of U.N. Charter art. 51. See, e.g., DIE GRENZEN
DES V6LKERRECHTLICHEN GEWALTVERBOTS 124, 125 (proceedings of the 1985 meeting of the Deutsche
Gesellschaft fir V61kerrecht 1986) (comments of Schindler and Hailbronner in open discussion following
presentation of papers); but see id. at 147 (Frowein responding to Schindler and Hailbronner in expressing
opinion that article 51 applies to such incidents and even to ship's self-defense within an international strait).
Conversely, under another view of international law, the question arises whether U.N. Charter article 2(4)
restrains a state from using any amount of armed force within its own borders when a civilian aircraft enters
a state's airspace without authority. See e.g., id. at 148, 152 (comments of Frowein and Hailbronner that
downing foreign aircraft over state's territory should be violation of fundamental human rights law and
proportionality principles). See also J. BENTZEN, supra note 255. Based upon the limited evidence of state
practice before the ICAO and ICJ, it appears that states treat both under U.N. Charter articles 2(4) and
51. This article proposes to apply a self-defense analysis both to attacks on neutral innocent ships in
international waters and to the downing of civilian airlines over a state's territory.
268. See generally Milde, supra note 251 (background of amendment 27).
269. The relevant portion of article 3 bis is subject to the express qualifier that it "shall not be
interpreted as modifying in any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the
United Nations." Art. 3 bis, supra note 256, at 706.
270. ANNEX 2 TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION, supra note 248, at 13.
271. See Milde, supra note 251, at 108-22. The United States essentially took the position that amend-
ment 27 was an attempt by the ICAO Council to make binding international law outside the normal treaty
process of the ICAO Council's legislative function. It considered this beyond the ICAO's jurisdiction.
272. Milde, supra note 251, at 120. The ICAO Secretary General was informed by the Acting U.S.
Representative on July 21, 1986 that:
[Tihe United States of America does not accept any provision of Annex 2 or any other Annex,
as constituting a Standard or Recommended Practice applicable to State aircraft. In accordance
with Article 3(a) of the [Chicago Convention], the Convention and its Annexes are not applicable
to State aircraft. Insofar as any provision of Annex 2 addresses the operation or control of State
307
Yale Journal of International Law
current form specifically excludes application to state aircraft and cannot
purport to regulate them even when intercepting foreign civil aircraft.2n
Beyond formalism, the clear concern lies in an extension of the issues sur-
rounding proposed article 3 bis with regard to principles of self-defense and
necessity under international law.274
V. PRIMARY OBLIGATIONS RESTRAINING THE USE OF ARMED FORCE
International law governing the use of armed force and its consequences
is fragmented.275 The historical categories ofjus ad bellum (the law of going
to war) andjus in bello (the law of the conduct of war) have been transformed
by modern prohibitions on the use of force, subject to limited exceptions, such
as self-defense under article 51 of the U.N. Charter and collective actions
taken under the authority of a U.N. organ.276 The conduct of hostilities is
now governed by a mixture of the older customary law of warfare and modern
treaty-based humanitarian law, while the law of armed conflict presents special
problems in the context of naval warfare and ship defense.2'
Resolution of the. Flight 655 incident requires close attention to several
areas of this fragmented body of law. Section A below discusses modern
restraints on the use of armed force under the U.N. Charter. Section B applies
precedents involving the mistaken use of armed force to develop the nature of
the primary duty applicable to its use. Section C discusses doctrinal approaches
to the mistake problem, including traditional ideas of noncompensable war
damages to determine whether, as a legal matter, the downing of Flight 655
should be deemed incidental to the Vincennes' surface engagement or should
be treated separately. This inquiry concludes that the downing of Flight 655
was not incidental to the speedboat engagement as a matter of law and that
doctrinal approaches to mistake at the level of primary obligation do not excuse
the Vincennes' actions. It also concludes that the duty incumbent on the
aircraft, the United States of America considers such provision to be in the nature of a Special
Recommendation of the Council, advisory only.
Id. at 121-22 (reprint of official letter).
273. If proposed article 3 bis were ratified, it would apply to state aircraft.
274. The ICAO records concerning the Flight KE 007 incident and the text of proposed article 3 bits
are disregarded in an editorial note in annex 2 to the Chicago Convention. ANNEX 2 TO THE CHICAGO
CONVENTION, supra note 248, at 38. The note states that "'every State must refrain from resorting to the
use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight.'" Id. The ICAO Assembly unanimously recognized this view
in its 1984 adoption of proposed article 3 his. The editorial note leaves the impression that the duty is
absolute, omitting the qualifier that it is subject to states' rights under the appropriate U.N. Charter
provisions. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
275. See generally Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modem International Law, 36 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 283 (1987).
276. The most recent example is the military action against Iraq. See S.C. Res. 670, U.N. Dec.
S/RES/670, 29 I.L.M. 1334-36 (1990).
277. See, e.g., Ronzitti, The Right of Self-Defense and the Law of Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 571 (1988).
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Vincennes in connection with the use of force was not due care, but rather a
higher standard requiring the use of force to be justified in fact.
A. Modem Restraints on War: U.N. Charter Issues and the Flight 655 Incident
Any inquiry into restraints on the unilateral use of armed force entails the
interpretation of the inherent right of self-defense under article 51 of the U.N.
Charter. Article 51 is subject to different interpretations, due to conflicting
national views of the international law concept of self-defense.27 For the
purposes of this inquiry, the divergent views of self-defense may be reduced
to a contest between the "textualist interpretation" of articles 51 and 2(4),
which claims that any use of armed force is unlawful unless it involves "self-
defense" or occurs under a U.N. organ's authority, and the "customary law
approach" to these articles. The "customary law approach" holds that article
51 was intended to preserve some restrictive idea of self-defense under custom-
ary law (as opposed to articulating entirely new law), whereas for the textualist
approach "self-defense" is a term of art, linked to the "armed attack" language
of article 51 and modern non-Anglo-American doctrinal views of self-defense.
The Legal Adviser's apparent view of the speedboat attack as an "arned band"
attack is significant because as a doctrinal matter, textualist interpretations
exclude the use of force against armed bands from "self-defense" under article
51 because it either does not constitute an "armed attack," or on the theory
that such actions not attributable to a state are governed by necessity principles
not justifying the use of force under modern law.279
If the speedboat attack were not attributable to Iran, or did not constitute
armed attack under the textualist approach, under such an approach the Vin-
cennes' use of force would lie outside the international law self-defense concept
278. The ICJ has the opportunity in deciding the Flight 655 case to resolve these conflicts implicit
in, but not clearly addressed by, the recent Nicaragua Case. See generally Linnan, supra note 73 (setting
forth competing views chiefly in terms of textualist interpretations versus those that attempt to preserve
a restrictive version of customary law). This does not imply that this or any other ICJ decision should be
taken as having binding character beyond the particular case given articles 38(d) and 59 of the Statute of
the Court. 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993. The Vincennes' presence within the 12 mile limit of Iranian territorial
seas when it shot down Flight 655 raises two additional distinct issues: 1) whether by using force the
Vincennes' went beyond its rights under a transit passage regime; and 2) the extent to which traditional
necessity and similar self-defense principles can be reconciled with the status of the waters in which the
Vincennes was located. Although these problems are important issues as a matter of international law and
naval policy, they are beyond the scope of this article.
279. For recent conflicting national views of international law, see Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Second Session, [1980] 2 Y.B. INrT'L L. CoMM'N. 33, U.N. Doc.
AICN.4ISER.AlAdd.1 (1980) (Part 2). See Barboza, Necessity (Revisited) in International Law, in ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHs 27 (J. Makarczyk ed. 1984); Salmon,
Faut-il codifier l'dtat de n cessita en droit international?, id. at 235.
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and thus would be arguably unlawful (unless the entire armed band problem
could be considered under municipal law)."'0
This inquiry adopts the position that self-defense under article 51 should
incorporate a restrictive idea of customary law under a narrow self-preserva-
tion rationale,2"' and rejects the idea that the status of the speedboats or an
overly narrow reading of armed attack should alone determine the right of the
Vincennes to use armed force in its own defense. Self-defense in modern terms
is a relatively new international law concept, however, so views concerning
any "mistaken" self-defense concept exist in precedents largely in inchoate
form. Beyond the UN Charter's general restraints on the use of armed force,
Chicago Convention article 89 compels examination of the law of armed
conflict.
B. The Law of Armed Conflict and Primary Obligation
While mistakes in the use of force are not uncommon in armed conflict,
applicable international law precedents are rare. Here the nature of the Flight
655 incident as a maritime incident is significant. The few prior maritime
precedents are inconsistent, but the older ones are consistent with a view that
only a duty of due care attaches to the use of armed force.282 On the other
280. Fewjurists would seriously question the Vincennes'ability under municipal law to lawfully return
the speedboats' fire if attacked. A restrictive reading of article 51 of the U.N. Charter by itself would not
justify an act of self-defense by the Vincennes against armed band attacks. In order to justify such an act,
choice of law problems must be confronted. For example, municipal self-defense law could be applied,
using an effects analysis that could focus on the American vessel's nationality. Cf The S.S. Lotus Case
(Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (application of Turkish penal laws to French officer of French
vessel for death of Turkish nationals on Turkish vessel involved in collision with French vessel); 18
U.S.C.A. § 2331 (1990) (municipal law jurisdiction extended over "terrorist acts" outside United States
based solely on American nationality of victims, reversing previous bias toward territoriality), The
alternative source of law might be special municipal law principles of protectivejurisdiction, which would
focus on the Vincennes' character as a government warship.
Municipal law could also apply to a determination of whether the downing of Flight 655 was a case
of mistake. This approach, however, raises the problem that it is difficult ex ante to distinguish between
an actual attack (i.e., a speedboat attack) from innocent activity mistaken for an attack (as when Flight 655
was mistaken for an attacking Iranian F-14). Without prejudging whether a mistaken apprehension of attack
should be analyzed in municipal law under strict liability rules, or under an objectively or subjectively based
negligence standard, from a purely municipal law point of view it may be appropriate to apply the most
forgiving subjective standard in light of the overriding purposes of protective jurisdiction. Consigning the
question to municipal law does not therefore provide adequate assurance of an acceptable resolution.
One possible alternative might be to assert that humanitarian principles and international human rights
law effectively constrain any municipal law resolution. However, beyond the fact that such rights are not
universally recognized and that there is no consensus concerning their specific content, a focus on victims
provides no guidance unless used simply as a pretext for importing self-defense or necessity limitations
under another name.
281. As opposed to older, broader ideas of self-preservation. See Linnan, supra note 73, at 58.
282. See infra notes 348-61 and accompanying text (discussion of The Marianna Flora and The
Palmyra).
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hand, more modem land-based precedents appear to require that the use of
armed force actually be justified.2
The implicit comparison of the land-based mistaken use of force precedents
with the maritime precedents may be interpreted in one of two ways. On the
one hand, they may represent a distinct rule differentiating between land and
sea cases (bearing in mind that the Flight 655 incident involves aviation law,
but would be regarded as a maritime case under traditional principles). On the
other hand, they may be treated as general armed conflict precedents evidenc-
ing progressive development in duties applicable to the use of armed force
under modern law. Under the latter view, older maritime precedents requiring
only due care in the use of force arguably have been superseded by more
recent land-based precedents requiring that the use of force actually be justified
(see Figure 2).
Restraints on Use of Force
Due Care Absolute Standard
(maritime law) (land-based law)




To the extent the Flight 655 incident involves a duty cognizable under the laws
of armed conflict, and assuming the existence of a good faith reasonable
mistake, any result reached by the ICJ will depend on whether it accepts the
existence of special rules for maritime cases, as opposed to modern develop-
ment in armed conflict law. The reasonableness analysis commonly advanced
by American jurists in terms of both the law of the sea and the use of force
would favor a due care standard and a specific maritime rule.2 This inquiry
concludes, however, that the due care standard is inapplicable in the context
of the Vincennes' mistake.
283. See infra notes 376-408 and accompanying text (discussion of the Waima, Mazuia, the Greco-
Bulgarian Frontier, and Mukden Incidents).
284. See, e.g., M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 205, at 730-923; M. McDouGAL & F.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION 231-32 (1961); McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Seas, 20 NAVAL WAR C. REV.
19 (Dec. 1967).
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1. Maritime Approaches to Misapprehension of Attack or Mistaken Self-
Defense
Two older high seas misapprehension of attack incidents are particularly
relevant to an assessment of the Flight 655 incident: the 1826 Supreme Court
prize case of The Marianna Flora," and the 1904 Dogger Bank Incident286
involving the Russian fleet and British trawlers. These incidents predate
modem limitations on the use of force, but are couched in terms of
self-defense and involve otherwise unlawful actions. They are representative
of different approaches under traditional sea law to attacks on nonbelligerents
that modern law would view as mistaken self-defense.
The 1904 Dogger Bank Incident is interesting not least of all due to its
visceral resemblance to the downing of Flight 655. Early in the Russo-Japanese
War, elements of the Russian Baltic Fleet were dispatched to the Far East.
Rumors were rife that the fleet would be attacked in European waters by
hostile torpedo boats.287 Following third party sightings of unidentified torpe-
do boats off Norway and in anticipation of a night attack, during the afternoon
preceding the incident the Russian fleet commander issued special orders
permitting each ship to fire if attacked by torpedo boats. The subsequent
Commission Report notes that "[t]hese precautions seemed to be justified by
the numerous reports [from Russian officials concerning] hostile attempts to
be feared, which in all likelihood would take the form of attacks by torpedo
boats." '288 As the Russian fleet progressed through the North Sea in a state
of heightened readiness, a transport fell behind due to mechanical problems.
In mid-evening and under conditions of low visibility, the transport apparently
mistook a merchant ship and other vessels for lurking torpedo boats, opened
fire on them, and radioed ahead that it was under attack. The fleet commander
then signalled all ships to redouble their vigilance. 8 9 Shortly after midnight
leading elements of the Russian fleet crossed a high seas area being fished by
285. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826) (Story, J.).
286. Also referred to in older commentary as the North Sea or Hull Incident. See Finding of the
International Commission of Inquiry Organized UnderArticle 9of the Conventionfor the Pacific Settlement
ofInternationalDisputes, ofJuly 29, 1899,2 AM. J. INT'L L. 929 (1908) [hereinafter Commission Report];
Dogger Bank Incident (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 403-412 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1916). See
also Lebow, Accidents and Crises: The Dogger Bank Affair, 31 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 66 (1978); R. DE
LA PENHA, LA COMMISSION INTERNATIONALE D'ENQUATE SUR L'INCIDENT ANGLO-RUSSE DE LA MER DU
NORD (1906); A. HERSHEY, supra note 118, at 217-45; F. SMrrH & N. SIBLEY, supra note 118, at 275-319
(list of arguably analogous international incidents); R. GABoRTrr, QUESTIONS DE NEUTRALITA MARITIME
SOULEVtES PAR LA GUERRE RUSSO-JAPONAISE 34-37 (1906); Mandelstam, La commission internationale
d'enquete sur l'incident de lamer du nord, 12 REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROrT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE 351
(1905).
287. See, e.g., E. POLITOvSKY, FROM LIBAU TO TSUSHIMA: A NARRATIVE OF THE VOYAGE OF
ADMIRAL ROJDESTVENSKY'S FLEET TO EASTERN SEAS, INCLUDING A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE DOGGER
BANK INCIDENT 3-4, 6, 9-16 (F. Godfrey trans. 1906) (Russian naval officer's diary and correspondence).
288. Commission Report, supra note 286, at 931.
289. Id. at 932.
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a fleet of neutral English trawlers and inspected them under searchlights
without incident. At approximately 1:00 a.m., the final division of the Russian
fleet entered the same area. One trawler fired a rocket as a fishing signal,
which was mistaken for an attack signal by watch officers on the flagship's
bridge.290 Russian lookouts then saw dark shapes on the water. A spotlight
was thrown on one distant shape, and the lookouts reportedly saw a torpedo
boat bearing down on the flagship at high speed. The fleet commander then
gave the order to open fire. He soon realized that at least some of the vessels
were harmless fishing boats and ordered his ships not to fire on trawlers, but
by then numerous warships were firing at shapes in the dark. Ten to twelve
minutes passed before all firing ceased. The Russian gunfire sank one fishing
vessel and damaged several others, killing and wounding several fisherman.
Still fearing attack, the Russian fleet proceeded without making any investiga-
tion or effort at rescue.21
These facts are similar to those of the Flight 655 incident. The Dogger
Bank Incident's generalized fears about torpedo boat attack parallels fears of
air attack voiced by the Vincennes' crew following the U.S. S. Stark incident.
The comparison extends as far as "scenario fulfillment," a theory suggested
by Navy psychiatric experts in the course of the official Department of Defense
investigation as the explanation for the misinterpretation of objective data by
Vincennes CIC personnel. In the Dogger Bank Incident, a torpedo or mine
attack was expected due to intelligence reports. A trailing ship incorrectly
reported itself to be under attack in a generally tense situation, raising the
fleet's expectations of attack yet higher. Russian watch officers then mistook
a fishing signal rocket for an attack signal. The problem was further com-
pounded when the lookouts mistook a spotlit trawler for a torpedo boat on a
high speed run at the flagship. 2 Prior intelligence reports also told the Vin-
cennes to expect Iranian military action on the Fourth of July weekend.
Furthermore, an F-14 transponder signal was mistakenly attributed to Flight
655 upon takeoff from its Iranian airfield. This mistake was then exacerbated
by the misinterpretation of objective data by Vincennes CIC personnel who
believed that approaching Flight 655 was diving in a manner like an attacking
F-14. Both incidents demonstrate that under the high stress of anticipated
combat a tendency toward good faith misinterpretation of events (extending
to mistaken perception of objective facts) is possible, if not to be expected. In
turn, communication of this misinformation within military command structures
heightens the sense of danger as mistakes feed on themselves. In both cases
290. Id. at 933-34.
291. Id. at 934-35.
292. The matter was never resolved with certainty, but,the Inquiry Commission also examined the
possibility that the perceived torpedo boat was actually a Russian warship viewed end-on at a distance under
nighttime conditions and poor visibility. Id. at 934.
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the commanding officer believed in good faith that his vessel was under
imminent danger of attack and consequently gave the order to open fire in what
amounted to anticipatory self-defense. In the course of the inquiry Russia
argued that in fact torpedo boats had been mixed in among the trawlers, but
this assertion was rejected by all members of the Inquiry Commission except
its Russian member.293 Thus, in the view of the Inquiry Commission's major-
ity, the Dogger Bank Incident was a pure wartime mistaken self-defense case
on the high seas, resulting in the loss of neutral ships and civilian lives.
The Inquiry Commission's role in addressing questions of responsibility
and blame was closer in some respects to an international tribunal than that
of a simple fact-finding commission.294 Under the related Agreement of
Submission, the Inquiry Commission was charged with determining "where
the responsibility lies and the degree of blame attaching [to individuals]" for
the English losses suffered.s The character of the inquiry into individual
blame was, under the circumstances, more in the nature of a professional
disciplinary investigation than one to establish civil or criminal liability.29
The Commission Report addressed responsibility and blame questions separate-
ly. A majority of the Inquiry Commission concluded that responsibility lay
with the Russian fleet commander who opened fire on what he thought was
a torpedo boat on a high speed run.297 There had been no torpedo boats
present and the fishing fleet had not committed any hostile act so "the opening
293. Id. at 934-35.
294. See F. ANDERSON &A. HERSHEY, HANDBOOK FOR THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE, ASIA,
AND AFRICA 1870-1914, at 297 (1918), citing A. HERSHEY, supra note 118, at 240-41.
295. Commission Report, supra note 286, at 931. See A. HERSHEY, supra note 118, at 218-33; R.
DE LA PENHA, supra note 286, at 49-100 (development of place of responsibility and blame concepts as
recorded in diplomatic exchanges).
296. The official French text and English translation of the Agreement of Submission requested that
the Inquiry Commission determine both issues of responsabilitM and the Russian fleet commander's degrM
de bldme, which have different connotations. See Dogger Bank Incident (Gr. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct.
Rep. (Scott) 411, 614 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1916). French responsabilitd in a legal context carries a direct sense
of monetary indemnity, while bldme connotes the disciplinary or administrative concept of bkMmage (as
opposed to the morally based cuipabilite). The French original of the Commission Report does employ
responsabiliti. Id. at 612. But it does not employ the term bldme in conjunction with the Inquiry Commis-
sion's findings, indicating that "leur apprdciation ... ne sont dans leur esprit de nature h jeter aucune
d6consideration sur la valeur militaire ni sur les sentiments d'humanit6." Id. at 613. It also indicates that
he Russian fleet commander's conduct was morally acceptable and militarily proper (i.e., nonnegligent from
a professional point of view). These distinctions are lost in the more ambiguous English terms of "responsi-
bility" and "blame." Based on the drafting history of the Agreement of Submission, "responsibility" may
have been originally intended to mean moral responsibility for the trawlers' sinking, but was eventually
changed to a more limited definition requiring ultimate causation when considering the factual dispute over
the presence of torpedo boats. Responsibility does not in any case appear to have necessarily entailed
indemnity, because Russia might have simply chosen to punish miscreant officers, and because indemnity
was agreed to as a basic condition for entering into the Agreement of Submission itself.
297. Commission Report, supra note 286, at 934.
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of fire by [the Russian fleet commander] was not justifiable."298 The Inquiry
Commission did not, however, assess individual blame.
The interplay between the Inquiry Commission's separate conclusions on
individual blame and responsibility merit close attention. The international
panel of military experts (drawn from admirals of the American, Austrian,
British, French and Russian navies) indicated that the Russian commanding
officer was not subject to individual blame, a conclusion premised as much
on the idea that accidents under stress of anticipated combat were to be
expected as on the idea that the Russian commander had not known that the
firing was directed against neutral fishing vessels (and had attempted to halt
firing at any trawlers as soon as he discovered fishing vessels were present).
The Commission Report specifically states that nothing in the incident "cast
any discredit upon the military qualities [of the Russian fleet commander or
his squadron personnel]," 99 thus implying that the independent tribunal did
not consider the Russian conduct to be negligent. While contemporary com-
mentators criticized the decision on the grounds that military experts were
unsuitable judges of the legal concept of responsibility, 3" the decision of the
admirals simply reflected military professionals' customary allowance for
mistake during the high stress of anticipated combat. The Commission thus
functioned as a jury of peers expressing their professional opinion on a ques-
tion of negligence in lieu of discharging a judicial function." 1 The Inquiry
Commission was convened in large part on account of irreconcilable factual
disagreements between Britain and Russia.3" The Russian member argued
that torpedo boats actually had been present among the trawlers, and as a result
298. Id. at 935. The commissioners also criticized the duration of firing, but unanimously concluded
that in the face of continuing uncertainty about the danger of attack there was sufficient justification for
the Russian fleet's failure to stop. Id. at 396. The duration of firing, under the circumstances, was caused
by general night-time battle confusion and preexisting orders that each ship could fire independently on
attacking torpedo boats.
299. Id. at 936.
300. See, e.g., Mandelstam, supra note 286, at 410-11. Mandelstam's generic criticism of military
professionals sitting in judgment on questions of sea warfare law is telling, because as a junior Russian
jurist he personally participated in the Inquiry.
301. Mandelstam describes the Inquiry Commission's activities as resembling in part those of the
investigating judge and in part those of the jury. Id. at 405-08. This combination is problematic because
if the investigation were viewed as quasi-criminal, it would violate the principle of continental inquisitorial
procedure that fact-gathering and fact-finding bodies must be separated. Other contemporary commentators
seem to have missed this "jury" aspect completely, indicating only that as non-jurists, the Inquiry Commis-
sion members were ill-trained to form any opinion on the legal question of responsibility.
302. The dispute was aggravated by the fact that the Russian fleet remained incommunicado for several
days while underway toward the Far East. British public opinion was outraged upon hearing that Russian
ships directed fire at unarmed fishing vessels (traditionilly recognized to be exempt even from capture in
time of war). The Russian fleet commander then communicated his version of events, claiming that the
fishing vessels intentionally lent cover to a torpedo boat attack. It is understandable that both sides
articulated a good faith belief regarding what actually happened. The-Russian claim was seen as a
particularly cynical attempt to avoid disciplining any Russian officer, following what was either a casus
belli, if intentional, or at the very least an example of gross incompetence. For a description of contempo-
rary events, see R. DE LA PENHA, supra note 286, at 51-54.
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belligerent Russia should not be held responsible for neutral English losses.
On the other hand, the majority believed that no torpedo boats were present,
and so concluded that "the opening of fire. . . was not justifiable."3" Thus
neutral losses occurring in the course of a true engagement between belliger-
ents are considered inevitable accidents of war if they result from belligerent
forces firing at each other. By contrast, the Russian ships' good faith misap-
prehension of attack (whether or not it occurred within the scope of engage-
ment) did not absolve belligerent Russia from responsibility for damage to
neutral merchant vessels mistaken for the enemy.
The Inquiry Commission's opinion did not clearly state whether mistake
could never exonerate responsibility (an absolute rule), or whether only
reasonable mistake could exonerate responsibility. Nonetheless it appears the
Inquiry Commission followed an absolute rule that the existence of a mistaken
apprehension of attack would not exonerate responsibility. 4 Both the
French"'5 and English texts of the Commission Report state that opening fire
on the trawlers was not "justifiable" (as opposed to not justified)."e The
Commission Report acknowledged that the Russian fleet commander made a
good faith mistake and thus was not individually blameworthy, but still as-
signed responsibility to him. It would be difficult to imagine more compelling
circumstances for finding a "reasonable" mistake in light of the perceived
threat and chain of events. 7 The only language in the Commission Report
questioning whether the mistake was reasonable was the statement that the
Russian fleet commander's precautions "seemed to be justified" by numerous
reports that a torpedo boat attack seemed likely, coupled with third party
sightings of unidentified torpedo boats off the Norwegian coast."08 This
choice of words may reflect skepticism regarding the reasonableness of torpedo
boat attacks in the North Sea."m The otherwise reasonable military measures
303. Commission Report, supra note 286, at 935. These differing views of the facts sharply juxtapose
the differences in analysis under scope of engagement and misapprehension of attack.
304. Butsee 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONALLAW AS APPLIEDDY INTERNATIONALCOURTS
AND TRIBUNALs 639 (1957) (Russian fleet commander's mistake was not reasonable, and hence case and
Inquiry Commission's findings essentially involved putting polite diplomatic face on payment of indemnity
for negligence). Schwarzenberger leaves open the possibility of nonresponsibility for a reasonable mistake
only in theory. His argument ignores the import of the Inquiry Commission's findings and illogically
postulates an elaborate conspiracy involving the coordination of senior naval officers from several different
countries as members of the Inquiry Commission.
305. See Dogger Bank Incident (Or. Brit. v. Russ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 607, 612 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1916).
306. See id.; see also Commission Report, supra note 286, at 935.
307. The unintentional discharge of a weapon by what is perceived as an attacking vessel might be
the exception. Such a possible mistaken discharge case was mentioned in The Marianna Flora, but was
rejected there on the facts. See infra notes 320-28 and accompanying text.
308. Commission Report, supra note 286, at 931.
309. Contemporary publicistsquestioned the possibility, indicatingthatth entireDoggerBankincident
would be unbelievable had it not occurred. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 111, at 9. See also J. WHITE, THE
DIPLOMACY OF THE Russo-JAPANESE WAR 181-82 (1964); E. PoLITOVSKY, supra note 287, at 4.
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based on the initial (unreasonable) fear of attack might render the mistaken
self-defense at the end of the causal chain unreasonable. The Inquiry Commis-
sion affirmed the commander's "military qualities,131 0 but did not state that
his actions were not negligent on the basis of professional military standards;
it specifically found him responsible for the English losses.311 The Commis-
sion Report thus narrowly interpreted "mistaken self-defense" under the
customary law of sea warfare, placing great weight on the obligations owed
neutral merchant ships.31
The second significant maritime precedent, The Marianna Flora, dates to
a time when piracy was common and was recognized as a violation of the law
of nations. Foreign merchant ships were not subject to high seas visitation or
capture by the warships of another, nation during peacetime. 13 Nonetheless,
pirate vessels sailed under no flag's protection. Pirate vessels were subject to
capture by the warships of all nations at any time.314 The Marianna Flora
case involved mutual mistake on the part of an armed Portuguese merchant
ship of the same name and the American warship Alligator. Passing on the
high seas, each thought the other ship was a pirate vessel. A short naval
engagement ensued, characterized as self-defense on each side. The Alligator
subdued The Marianna Flora without loss of life or damage to either vessel,
and then communicated with its captain. The American commanding officer,
dissatisfied with the explanation that The Marianna Flora's original attack was
the product of a mistaken belief, seized The Marianna Flora and brought it
310. Commission Report, supra note 286, at 936.
311. Contemporary commentators discussing the Inquiry Commission and its Commission Report
characterized the entire incident in a manner not flattering to the Russian officers: "[tihere can be little
doubt that the firing was due to a state of panic among the Russian officers of the fleet, induced by a fear
or belief that they were in great danger of attack by Japanese torpedo boats." F. ANDERSON & A.
HERSHEY, supra note 294, at 297.
312. The issue is unresolved, and seems to be the import of the Legal Advisor's statements that Iran
was at fault by permitting Flight 655 to overfly the dangerous Persian Gulf. See supra notes 73-81 and
accompanying text.
313. The vessel's home state would view violation of this noninterference rule not only as the unlawful
seizure of a private vessel, but also as an affront to the state itself. The rule was strictly observed under
normal circumstances because a state's reservation of sole jurisdiction over vessels of its own nationality
was an assertion of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Sovereign immunity and agency rules might bar state
responsibility, yet the captain of a warship that unjustifiably interfered with a foreign vessel could be held
personally liable for damages before an admiralty court in peacetime or a prize court in wartime. The
agency problem of imputing a state official's intent to the state itself in connection with an internationally
unlawful act underlies early attempts to state an objective theory of state responsibility. See infra notes 472-
74.
314. For example, using its powers under article I, section 8 of the Constitution, Congress in 1819
outlawed "piratical aggression," and directed the Navy to seize and condemn pirate vessels. Act of March
3, 1819, ch. 77, 2 Stat. 510 (1819) ("An act to protect the commerce of the United States, and punish the
crime of piracy"). Piracy on the high seas therefore violated both municipal law as well as international
law. An American warship's power to seize and condemn a foreign vessel during peacetime for alleged
piracy depended on municipal law. However, since such a seizure would constitute interference on the high
seas with a non-American vessel, it would normally only conform to international law if the non-American
vessel were ultimately found to have actually engaged in piracy.
Yale Journal of International Law
to Boston for condemnation. The municipal law condemnation side of the libel
was dismissed quickly in the lower courts, 315 but a counterclaim by The
Marianna Flora for internationally unlawful attack and seizure was pursued.
By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the libel had been amended
to include under defenses separate charges of "hostile aggression" in violation
of the law of nations and "piratical aggression" in violation of the municipal
anti-piracy statute.
Justice Story, writing for the Court, separately analyzed the attack on The
Marianna Flora and its subsequent seizure. He indicated that the misidentifica-
tion underlying The Marianna Flora's act of anticipatory self-defense was
unreasonable. Nonetheless, the act did not constitute either "piratical aggres-
sion" or an act of "hostile aggression" sufficient to justify condemnation of the
vessel.316 Justice Story reached these conclusions by first analyzing the sei-
zure in terms of the American commander's quandary in evaluating The
Marianna Flora's attack on the Alligator. 17 The captain's exercise of discre-
tion in detaining the foreign vessel was reasonable, as his act was in good faith
and not an act of "gross negligence or malignity ... [or] a wanton abuse of
power," '318 which would otherwise justify a damage award. The Court ac-
knowledged that it specifically followed the analogy from prize law under the
law of war, which denied liability for wrongful capture of merchant ships if
"probable cause" existed for the seizure. 1 9 The Court arguably drew upon
a general maritime law of nations rule rejecting normal practices limiting
belligerent authority beyond the examination of documents.2 2
In terms of the modern concepts self-defense and mistake, the Alligator's
use of force was justifiable in self-defense and in response to The Marianna
Flora's unreasonable misapprehension of attack. Although the Alligator was
not authorized under international law to seize The Marianna Flora following
the naval engagement, recovery of damages would be precluded if the legal
injury resulted from the military commander's reasonable but mistaken view
of the situation. In the absence of gross negligence, responsibility for damages
would not attach. However, the applicability of these principles might be
limited because both vessels survived attack without damage or loss of life,
315. The Marianna Flora's mistaken albeit intentional attack did not constitute "piratical aggression,"
on grounds that the requisite subjective intent was absent, and that an otherwise mistaken attack without
loss of life or damage was not piracy. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 39.
316. Justice Story considered the concept of "hostile aggression" under the law of nations in a fashion
that minimized its importance in the case itself, while preserving its existence for a return to prominence
in The Palmyra. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 17 (1827).
317. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 44-54. Analysis under contemporary precedents, in contrast, limits
belligerent authority over neutral shipping under wartime circumstances to the examination of a neutral
ship's papers.
318. Id at 52.
319. Id. at 54.
320. See infra notes 331-60 and accompanying text.
Vol. 16:245, 1991
Iran Air Flight 655
and the damages sought were essentially for the short period of time during
which The Marianna Flora was unlawfully detained. Thus, the rule of the case
might be limited to situations involving only de minimis damage to property
and/or no loss of life.32'
The Dogger Bank Incident and The Marianna Flora both involve the
mistaken use of force with apparently inconsistent outcomes. The Commission
Report failed to excuse a reasonable mistake in the Dogger Bank Incident,
while the Marshall Court reached the opposite result in The Marianna Flora.
Although early commentators opined that the Dogger Bank result was influ-
enced by a contemporary land-based precedent,3" both cases were resolved
by balancing competing self-defense and free passage interests, yet were fit
into different maritime rules. The Marianna Flora was essentially resolved by
analogy to the probable cause concept under prize law, while the Dogger Bank
Incident was treated as belligerent appropriation on the high seas, foreshadow-
ing neutrals' problems with war zones and similar practices in World War
I.3 As the U.S. apparently plans to assert a lawful force analysis in the
321. But cf. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (crew members of The Palmyra were killed
in engagement, but deaths may have been subject to rules permitting sinking if capture resisted). See infra
notes 348-356 and accompanying text. If, however, the analogy to the law of capture were extended, it
should make no difference whether The Marianna Flora had been sunk. This conclusion follows from those
prize law cases where seizure of a vessel is unwarranted but occurs on probable cause, and the captured
vessel is subsequently lost (i.e., in a storm on the way to port where a prize court would have freed the
vessel, but denied damages to it for the reasonable but mistaken seizure). Under these circumstances no
damages are payable, but that rule itself is merely an extension of bailment principles. See infra note 327.
Further, in declining to Lphold an indemnity award against The Alligator by a lower court (as the Portu-
guese vessel's own conduct was unreasonable), Justice Story cited English admiralty precedent for the
proposition that damages beyond restitution need not be awarded in cases articulating novel rules. 24 U.S.
(11 Wheat.) 1, 55-56 (citing Lord Stowell's opinion in Le Louis, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (Adm. 1817)).
322. See F. SMrrH & N. SIBLEY, supra note 118, at 313-14. Since the Waima Incident and arbitration
involving France and Great Britain had apparently received newspaper coverage, the French and English
members of the Dogger Bank Incident Inquiry Commission most probably had some knowledge of the
precedent (although they were naval officers and not international jurists). The senior English legal adviser
or accessor, himself a distinguished jurist who had served as an international arbitrator, almost certainly
was familiar with the precedent. While it probably will never be known, under the circumstances, it seems
very likely that the Waima Incident precedent was familiar to Inquiry'participants whether or not it
influenced the outcome of the Dogger Bank Incident. Id.
323. Contemporary newspaper reports and British parliamentary declarations imputed to the Russian
Baltic Fleet commander statements to the effect that any vessel approaching his fleet too closely would be
immediately sunk. See A. HERSHEY, supra note 118, at 227, 227-28 n.20. If true, this would expose any
and all neutral shipping on the Fleet's voyage to the Far East to belligerent war risks in violation of
traditional rules of sea warfare. While these allegations probably go too far, they may have some basis
in fact to the extent they are addressed to the problem of permissible use of false flags in naval warfare
and fears expressed that a small enemy vessel carrying torpedoes and camouflaged under a neutral flag
might approach a warship under this ruse and sink it. See R. DE LA PENHA, supra note 286, at 187-93.
Since the rules of naval warfare permit the use of false flags subject only to the condition that a belligerent
must show its true colors before firing, fear was expressed at the time that a concealed enemy might come
within point-blank range before running up his belligerent flag and firing torpedoes. To the extent the
Russian fleet feared torpedo boat attack, this might have come as easily under ruse as cover of darkness.
See also A. HERSHEY, supra note 118, at 243. Contemporary evaluations of Russia's general legal position
on these issues were particularly harsh, but they were phrased in terms of the traditional free passage rights
of neutral ships in wartime as opposed to concerns generally about the use of force.
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Flight 655 proceedings unfettered by free passage concerns, this inquiry turns
to a closer examination of the mistaken self-defense precedents, beginning with
maritime precedents developing the prize law analogy relied upon in The
Marianna Flora opinion, and then through land-based precedents.
2. Maritime Precedents: Due Care Under Prize Law and Quasi-War Prece-
dents
The closest analogy to the Flight 655 incident might be found in the older
precedents reconciling freedom of the seas and belligerent authority in the
treatment of neutral shipping during times of war?24 Neutral rights and bel-
ligerent authority have traditionally existed in an uneasy tension,3" in which
a belligerent's unjustified interference with neutral shipping could give rise to
a right of indemnity cognizable before a prize court.326 Under traditional sea
324. Freedom of the seas precedents attract the attention of commentators writing on self-defense,
but they are more often than not misunderstood or mischaracterized due to their peculiar status as maritime
cases. See, e.g., 2ourek, La notion de legitime defense en droit international (Dix-septigme Commission),
in 56 ANNUAIRE DE L'iNsTrrUT DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 1, 21 (1975) [hereinafter Zourek, Legitime
defense]; J. ZOUREK, L'INTERDICTION DE L'EMPLOI DE LA FORCE EN DRorr INTERNATIONAL 100 (1974)
[hereinafter J. ZoUREK, L'INTERDIcrION]. Zourek lumps together The Marianna Flora, The Virginius and
The Mary Lowell and states generally that they contain a rule of self-defense not recognized in international
law, citing as authority the eminent French commentator and sea law expert Gidel. See 1 G. GIDEL, supra
note 97 at 348-55. Gidel, however, fails to mention The Marianna Flora and articulates a probable cause
rule. As a technical matter, The Virginius and The Mary Lowell are necessity cases involving alleged
assistance to insurgents, and are based on the issue of a state's power to enforce laws by boarding a foreign-
flagged vessel on the high seas during peacetime. Zourek and other commentators neglect the idea that
freedom of the high seas underlies these decisions, as well as the fact that The Marianna Flora is distin-
guishable and sets forth a different rule from The Virginius or The Mary Lowell. See Linan, supra note
73, at 86-87.
325. For commentary discussing this issue, see C. COLOMaOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
SEA 753-825 (6th ed. 1967); J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW, supra note 140; J. HALL, THE LAW OF NAVAL
WARFARE (1914); H. MARTIN & J. BAKER, LAWS OF MARITIME WARFARE AFFECTING RIGHTS AND
DUTIES OF BELLGERENTS AS EXISTING ON AUGUST 1, 1914 (1918), reprinted in 8 THE INQUIRY HAND-
BOOKS (1974); C. ROUSSEAU, supra note 229, at 276-353, 465-508 (1983); G. SCHRAMM, DAS PRISEN-
RECHT IN SEIR NEUESTEN GESTALT (1913); H. WEHBERG, supra note 155; Higgins, Le droit de visite
et de capture dans la guerre maritime, 11 REC. DES COURS 65 (1926-I); Smith, Le ddveloppement moderne
des lois de la guerre maritime, 63 REc. DES COURS 603 (1938-1).
326. Jurisdictional and choice of law issues plague prize law doctrine. Jurisdiction to award damages
has generally been recognized by Anglo-American prize courts, but the question of jurisdiction has been
more problematic for continental prize courts. See, e.g., J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW, supra note 140, at 648-49
(1927). Here another complication must be acknowledged: whether prize law as applied by municipal prize
courts should be considered international or municipal law. In Great Britain and the United States; prize
law is considered international law applied by national tribunals. See C. COLOMBOS, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF PRIZE 18-21 (2d ed. 1940); The Rapid, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 155, 162 (1814); see also The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900); The SchoonerAdeline and Cargo, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 284 (1815).
On the other hand, continental prize courts are typically ad hoc tribunals that may be staffed in part by
special judges, and in many countries are thought to only apply municipal law in the form of prize
ordinances. See C. ROUSSEAU, supra note 229, at 326-43 (German and Italian views of prize law as
municipal law). However, while municipal prize law in continental countries normally follows national
views of international law, a municipal prize court judgment in violation of international law principles
would itselfconstitutean international law violation. Thus, national prize codes must incorporate a provision
requiring a "reasonable ground" for capture similar to a "probable cause" requirement. See, e.g., J.
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warfare law, belligerents have had the right to visit and search neutral mer-
chant ships on the high seas to determine their neutral character, the particulars
of their voyage (i.e., whether they visited an enemy port under blockade),
whether they carried contraband cargo or enemy personnel, or whether they
were engaged in nonneutral service, causing them to take on enemy character
and subjecting the entire ship to seizure.327 In the nineteenth century, beyond
visitation and search, a belligerent normally could restrain a neutral merchant
ship's rights of free passage only by formal capture of the vessel for the above
reasons.328 If capture were justified, condemnation by a prize court should
GARNER, PRIZE LAW, supra note 140, at 649-52 ("ausreichende Grnde" required under art. 8 of German
Prisenordnung of Sept. 1909). Thus probable cause rules can be characterized as a general international
law principle even in decisions of municipal prize courts purporting to apply only municipal law.
327. The early nineteenth century law of high seas capture Fus bell) was concerned chiefly with
questions of the nationality of a ship and its cargo during periodic wars. Because private enemy property
could be seized lawfully, the neutral character and service of a vessel were decisive. The law of visitation,
search and capture was premised on a system of inquiry at sea, under circumstances where merchant ships
often sailed under false pretenses to avoid seizure by vessels of different nations. Naval vessels and
privateers responded in kind by flying false flags, and on occasion impersonating enemy officers during
visitation and search. See, e.g., The Eleanor, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 345 (1817). Probable cause for seizure
consisted largely of the discovery of inconsistent documentation or some other concrete indication that the
master's statements regarding the ship, cargo, and voyage were inaccurate. Additional Note on the
Principles and Practice in Prize Causes, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) app. note 1, at 8-9 (1817). Probable cause
was also subject to a determination of degree of suspicion, because a prize court might award restitution
of a captured ship, but could also order restitution of the captor's costs and expenses. See e.g., The
Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 372-73 (1824); The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. 510, 535-37 (1898).
Under these limitations a vessel's capture could be declared and a prize crew charged to take it into a prize
court for adjudication. Capture did not normally transfer property rights in the vessel or its cargo, however,
and the captor was considered a bailor for purposes of the inward voyage. The captor was not responsible
for loss of the vessel as long as the prize crew exercised ordinary diligence in navigation (i.e., absent
negligence there was no responsibility for its loss in a storm or to subsequent capture by third parties).
See The George, 10 F. Cas. 201, 204 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 5,328) (Story, J.). Under these circum-
stances, the probable cause rules were not too draconian in their application because the incorrectly captured
vessel was almost invariably either available for restitution, or was lost to causes consideredforce majeure
in any case. Subsidiary rules of maritime law compelled captors to send a captured vessel in for prize court
adjudication. If the captors sold the ship without reason or delayed in seeking out a prize court, they might
later forfeit the prize and be liable for damages.
328. The legal concept of capture is central in the case law, but it was neither decisive in all cases
nor consistently applied by the Marshall Court. For example, in The Eleanor, the Court faced a claim for
a warship's responsibility for the sinking of a merchant ship during visitation and search in inclement
weather. The Eleanor, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 345 (1817). The American warship had engaged in the ruse
of sending a boarding party to the American merchant ship masquerading as British officers, presumably
to determine whether the merchant ship was trading with the enemy. The master of the merchant ship with
his first mate transferred with its ship's papers to the warship, leaving the merchant ship without its own
competent officers. The ruse worked too well, because when the merchant ship threatened to sink the
American crew refused to obey the orders of the boarding party in the belief that they were British officers
(who presumably were going to seize the vessel anyway). The ship then sank while in the possession of
the American warship, but prior to capture. After a somewhat confused examination of the warship's
putative duty to install a competent prize crew (under bailment-negligence principles, which duty would
presumably attach only following capture), the Court chose to resolve this difficult case on the theory that
the master of the merchant ship himself was responsible for the sinking because, when ordered to the
warship with "a mate," he chose his first mate, thereby removing the only other ship's officer capable of
controlling the crew and working against the admittedly avoidable sinking of the vessel. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)
345, 360-61.
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follow, but cases arose where grounds for seizure of the vessel or a captor's
subsequent conduct were found legally insufficient. Therefore, the captured
vessel would be released or its value paid in damages. Beyond restitution of
the vessel, however, the issue remained whether an additional indemnity should
be paid for the wrongful detention of the vessel and its crew. Responsibility
for damages did not arise on the captor's part despite the objective wrong
suffered by the detained vessel if there had been probable cause for the capture
(under the theory that such interference was a minor inconvenience to be
tolerated in war)329 and minimum standards of prize conduct were followed
thereafter. 3 Probable cause principles arguably evidence a general concept
of the traditional maritime law of nations proscribing only a warship's threat
or use of force if it were an unreasonable violation of a foreign-flagged private
vessel's free passage rights. 3 ' The traditional international law duty incum-
A similar stretching of the legal sense of capture occurred in The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11
Wheat.) 1 (1826). The Court relied heavily on The Alligator's lawful *capture" of The Marianna Flora
following a mutual mistake, as both ships believed they were defending themselves against pirate attack.
The Court opined that counsel did not present any case in which capture was deemed lawful, but that the
subsequent bringing in of a captured vessel into prize court was grounds for indemnity (an important basis
for applying the probable cause rule to a mistake of law situation). The Court used "capture" as ajus belll
term of art, however, and as this was a pirate case, the more proper approach arguably was to resolve the
case under the rule concerning faulty maritime seizures under municipal law, under which liability could
exist despite probable cause. Furthermore, even ajus belli capture included the voyage into the prize court
against the will of the merchant ship's master as part of the "capture." Under American views, title to the
detained ship did not pass until the prize court adjudication itself. See, e.g., Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 1, 32 (1801) (title in context of recapture problem). Thus, the Court's reliance on counsels' failure
to produce countervailing precedent was illusory, as it relied on a confusion of the plain English sense of
"capture" as applied to The Alligator's subduing of The Marianna Flora (arguably considered a "seizure"
in municipal law usage) with the legal meaning of "capture" under jus belli. Given the experience in
maritime law of various of the Marshall Court, it seems likely that at least some of them were aware of
these analytical frailties.
329. This was an express rule ofjus belli high seas international law, because a different rule applied
to responsibility for maritime seizures within a state's jurisdiction (i.e., in its ports or coastal waters, or
of a ship sailing under its flag) under municipal revenue or similar laws. Under maritime law a party seized
a vessel at its own risk, and probable cause or other exculpatory conditions only applied to excuse an
incorrect seizure if so provided by statute. See, e.g., The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 362, 372-76 (1824).
330. Sufficiency of probable cause to warrant excuse from indemnity under prize law has traditionally
been found where circumstances exist that would warrant a reasonable suspicion that a neutral merchant
vessel is engaged in prohibited trade. See, e.g., The George, 10 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No.
5,328) (Story, J.). The case law distinguishes degrees of captor suspicion and sufficiency of evidence
offered in rebuttal for purposes of avoiding the payment of indemnity for a vessel's capture. Inadequate
evidence required the captor to pay the captured vessel's costs and expenses in a prize condemnation suit,
while sufficient evidence left both parties to bear their own costs and expenses, and strong evidence making
restitution of a captured vessel or its cargo contingent on payment of the captor's costs and expenses.
Requiring strong probable cause to justify the use of armed force translates into a rule requiring a relatively
high degree of diligence. See id. at 204. At a minimum, policy and logic also commend a high diligence
standard in connection with the use of armed force, given the constant potential of a tragic mistake with
attendant risks to international peace.
331. This caution is advised in any attempt to broadly extend such a principle under the law of peace
as nineteenth century views in particular hotly contested the authority of a foreign warship in peacetime
to stop a domestic vessel on the high seas as in the case of The Virginius. Piracy was recognized as an
exception to this rule, on the reasoning that by common consent of nations any vessel engaging in piracy
would be deemed to have forfeited the ability to claim the protection of its flag. See, e.g., A. RUBIN, TH
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bent on a belligerent warship thus was not an absolute prohibition on interfer-
ence with neutral vessels' right of passage on the high seas.332
There is some indication beyond prize law per se that warships asserting
neutral rights in the face of belligerent encroachment or otherwise in circum-
stances of "hostile aggression" were subject to international law duties analo-
gous to those incumbent on belligerents.33 This provided the basis for the
Vincennes' activities protecting nonbelligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf.
To the extent this law incorporates prize law's probable cause concept, a
neutral warship's international law duties opposing putative hostile aggression
might be limited to a reasonableness standard of due care. Exculpation of a
warship's reasonable mistake would thus be embedded in the duty itself if the
duty related to the use of armed force is seen to be one only of due care.
Due to a felicitous coincidence of jurisdiction and history, the Marshall
Court left a rich legacy of prize cases and international law jurisprudence
covering maritime seizure and freedom of the seas, shaped from the perspec-
tive of a traditionally neutral maritime power.33 ' Early Supreme Court prize
LAW OF PIRACY 19-20, 83-84, 109-10 (1988) (63 U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies);
1982 LOS Convention, supra note 100, at arts. 103-05. This permitted the possibility of a reasonable
mistake. The Marianna Flora, for example, arose on the basis of a mistaken belief by the commanding
officer of The Alligator that The Marianna Flora was guilty of "piratical aggression." The other area of
the nineteenth century version of international crime involving this problem was the slave trade, but the
United States consistently took the position that even here without a treaty agreement a warship could not
board a foreign flagged vessel it suspected was engaged in the slave trade. See, e.g., H. WHEATON,
ENQUIRY INTO THE VALIDITY OF THE BRITISH CLAIM TO A RIGHT OF VISITATION AND SEARCH OF
AMERICAN VESSELS SUSPECTED TO BE ENGAGED IN THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE (1842); Le Louis, 165
Eng. Rep. 1464 (Adm. 1817) (Lord Stowell, J.) (foreign vessel allegedly engaged in slave trade would
not be subject to visitation by British warships unless such a right was recognized by treaty). The "probable
cause" idea was not broadly applied under the law of peace, but was strong enough under the law of sea
warfare that Justice Story (himself an authority on admiralty law) considered the analogy most convincing
in the few cases where it might be entertained under the law of peace. At the same time, at least one
modern continental publicist has apparently mistaken the deep roots of piracy and slave trade exceptions
now enshrined in art. 23 of the 1958 LOS Convention and art. 106 of the 1982 LOS Convention, as he
views them as evidence of changes in state responsibility. See Rauschning, Verantwortlichkeitder Staaten
fir valkerrechts widriges Verhalten, STAATENVERANTWORTLICH KErr 7, 49-50, 56, 62 (Conference of
Deutsche Gesellschaft fulr V61kerrecht 1984). His views were not representative of continental publicists
and were criticized. See id. at 79 (Frowein), 98 (Ziegler), 104-05 (Rudolf). Rauschning appeared to
articulate a "reasonableness" analysis of the variety common in American scholarship. See supra, note 291.
332. Elected branches of the U.S. government have occasionally asserted the position that, due to the
sanctity of private property, neutral property should be subject to absolutely no interference on the high
seas, including the traditionally recognized rights of visit and search. Because this principle was not
adopted, the United States originally did not join in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which specifically
regulated neutrality in the maritime sphere. See C. SAVAGE, POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD
MARITIME COMMERCE IN WAR 119-21 (1934); Quigley, The American Attitude Toward Capture at Sea,
11 AM. J. INT'L. L. 820 (1917). See also Knauth, Prize LawReconsidered, 46 COLuM. L. REV. 69 (1946).
This historical position is instructive due to its general rejection by most other countries.
333. See infra notes 355-64 and accompanying text.
334. See, e.g., B. ZIEGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL: A STUDY OF FnT
PRINCIPLES 12 (1939). While Chief Justice Marshall entertained his own views and wrote many prize law
opinions, Justice Story's prize law opinions are more important to this inquiry, as Justice Story was a
recognized authority on admiralty and prize law and wrote both the Marianna Flora and The Palmyra
decisions.
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cases recognized the classicjus belli probable cause for capture rules, but did
not stop there. 35 The breadth of the Marshall Court's use of the probable
cause concept is striking and visible in decisions arising out of the so-called
French American quasi-war of 1798-1800. This dispute grew out of French
treatment of neutral American vessels and cargos during European hostilities
following the French Revolution and the abortive XYZ Affair (1797-98).," 6
Congress chose not to declare war, but authorized seizure of armed French
vessels found on the high seas off the American coast. Thus, in Talbot v.
Seeman,337 Chief Justice Marshall found probably cause justifying the seizure
of The Amelia, a neutral merchant vessel armed for trade in the East In-
dies.338 Marshall expressly recognized the special character of this so-called
quasi-war (referring to it as a "partial war" as opposed to a "general war"),
but indicated that under the law of nations the probable cause seizure rules also
applied in this context.339
Later cases arising under municipal legislation aimed at limiting American
trade with France further recognized the applicability of the probable cause
principle.3" In Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy34' and Maley v.
Shattuck,342 Chief Justice Marshall again applied the probable cause concept
to seizures of neutral ships under municipal legislation aimed specifically at
fraudulent transshipment of American goods and transfer of American vessels
to a neutral nationality to avoid the bar on commerce with France.3 43 The
335. See, e.g., Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 2, 28-29 (1807); Del Col v. Arnold, 3 U.S.
(3 Dallas) 333, 334 (1796).
336. Much of the dispute as a technical matter of prize law centered on the French claim to determine
a ship's character according to the nationality of its cargo, a claim that confused ideas of nonneutral service
with ideas relating to seizure of enemy property. This departed from late 18th century practice under which
the nationality of a vessel and its cargo were considered separately when determining what was subject
to belligerent condemnation. Belligerents could condemn only the enemy cargo in a neutral vessel, absent
some kind of fraudulent concealment. The French position should be understood in conjunction with a
further claim, considered by many contemporary jurists to be in violation of the law of nations (and
subsequently narrowed by French prize courts themselves), that a cargo consisting only partially of
belligerent goods or contraband determined the character of the entire cargo. In practical terms this
potentially subjected a neutral ship to condemnation for carrying any belligerent cargo. See Carrington v.
The Merchants' Insurance Co., 33 U.S. (8 Peters) 495, 519-20 (1834). The crux of the dispute in American
eyes was the depredations committed against neutral American vessels by French privateers. The treatment
of neutral shipping was only resolved in 1856, when it was addressed directly in the Declaration of Paris.
337. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 31-32 (1801).
338. Id. at31-32. In this case TheAmelia and the American warship were both neutrals. The American
warship was not acting as a belligerent, but rather was asserting neutral rights in much the same sense as
the Vincennes, which was in the Persian Gulf to protect neutral shipping.
339. Id.
340. For discussion of the French incidents, see G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF
POWER: JOHN MARSHALL 1801-15, at 407-37 (1981); French Indemnity, 1803, in 5 J. MOORE, INTERNA-
TIONAL ADJUDICATIONS (MODERN SERIES) 149-210; French Indemnity, 1831, id. at 309-30.
341. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
342. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (1806).
343. Marshall noted but did not address the issue in Little v. Barreme. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (statute allowed specific conduct in question, even if conducted by American
vessel).
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Schooner Charming Betsy involved the seizure of a neutral vessel recaptured
from French privateers, while Shattuck involved liability for a neutral vessel
wrongfully captured in the misapprehension of its master's French nationality.
Both cases involved the determination of the vessels' neutral character in
light of the fact that each vessel was of American origin and had recently been
sold to an American-born naturalized subject of neutral Denmark.3" The
Supreme Court ignored counsels' arguments that the legislation's municipal
character rendered the probable cause concept inapplicable. Instead, the Court
applied the logic of Talbot v. Seeman and extended the application of the
probable cause concept beyond the context of war to the French-American
dispute. The significance of this approach can only truly be appreciated in
comparison to Justice Story's opinion in The Apollon, in which the Court
clearly distinguished between the applicability of the probable cause concept
to an international law seizure jus belli and to a municipal law seizure for
violation of revenue laws. 45
It is against this background that the applicability of the probable cause
concept to seizure of suspected pirate vessels first arose in The Marianna
Flora.3' The reasonable mistake of the Alligator's commanding officer in
seizing the Marianna Flora was specifically not decided as ajus belli case. The
Marianna Flora has different roots from Talbot v. Seeman and the related
French-American dispute cases, which arguably (but mistakenly) could be
distinguished as jus belli precedents simply involving an undeclared war.347
Rather, The Marianna Flora was decided by Justice Story as a novel case
concerning freedom of the high seas in peacetime. His opinion went beyond
piracy per se by addressing not only "piratical aggression," but also the
broader issue of maritime "hostile aggression" under the law of nations.
Justice Story formally recapitulated the Marshall Court's systematic view
of the applicability of the probable cause concept in The Palmyra.34' Decided
one year after The Marianna Flora, The Palmyra also arose under municipal
344. A somewhat delusory argument was made in Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy that the ship
might also have been considered an armed French vessel. The Court ignored this argument as it was
premised essentially on the presence of a few small sidearms or cutlasses.. Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 76-77, 121. The ship's owner was the same individual in Schooner Charming
Betsy and Maley v. Shattuck, a naturalized Danish merchant residing on a Danish possession in the
Caribbean.
345. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 372-76 (1824).
346. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826).
347. This approach would then confront Chief Justice Marshall's characterization of a conflict as a
.partial" rather than a "general" war, a characterizationthat allowed him to apply to an assertion of neutral
rights the probable cause rules permissible under the law of war. See Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
1, 31-32 (1801). As a formal matter, Congress chose not to declare war. Talbot was also not a case
compelledby Americanviews of the dualism-monism question, under which Congress has the constitutional
power to bind American courts to apply municipal law even where it might violate international law
obligations. For the Court's acknowledgement of this power, see The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.)
1, 40 (1826). Marshall specifically discussed the American measures as a matter of the law of nations.
348. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
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law directing U.S. naval vessels to take action against piracy. The Palmyra
presented different facts, as the case involved an American warship that had
fired first and was not acting in self-defense.3 49 The Court was thus unable
to reason, as it had in The Marianna Flora, that because the original seizure
was unquestionably lawful, probable cause excused taking the vessel in for
adjudication.
At this time, the same basic prize law principles applied to private armed
vessels (privateers) operating under a valid letter of marque as were applied
to public warships. While a true privateer lawfully enjoyed substantially the
same prize law rights of visitation, search and capture as a public warship, that
identical behavior would be considered piracy if pursued by an armed private
vessel not operating under the sanction of a sovereign's letter of marque. The
Palmyra, a Spanish privateer, was captured on the high seas by the U.S.
warship Grampus, following complaints by American merchant vessels alleging
that The Palmyra had stopped and boarded them. The Palmyra was taken in
for adjudication under the condemnation provisions of the anti-piracy legisla-
tion."' The lower courts acquitted The Palmyra on the piracy charge, and
ordered the payment of an indemnity for its seizure."'
The Supreme Court opinion described irregularities in The Palmyra's
conduct of searches, and found that it had been proven below that its crew was
guilty of plunder on the American merchant vessels. However, together with
significant irregularities on the face of the Spanish letter of marque under
which privateer status was claimed, this merely constituted probable cause.
The heart of The Palmyra opinion concerned whether the probable cause
concept could be used to excuse the Grampus' conduct in light of apparently
conflicting rules under The Apollon and The Marianna Flora decisions. Oppos-
ing counsel argued under The Appollon that probable cause excused indemnity
only under the laws of sea warfare for belligerent warships' mistaken seizures,
or under the municipal seizure rule to the extent recognized by statute and
within national jurisdiction, against the position that under The Marianna Flora
349. Justice Story noted a lack of detail in the record surrounding the exact circumstances of The
Palmyra's capture. As a result, he assumed that the American warship must have attempted visitation and
search on suspicion of piracy at which point the Spanish vessel refused to be boarded and the engagement
began. He found that the warship would have the right to fire on a vessel resisting lawful visitation and
search. There is something of a logical leap in this approach, because while the right jus belli to fire on
neutral merchant vessels attempting escape was well-recognized, firing on vessels eluding visitation and
search on suspicion of piracy was not a well-recognized right. See The Maria, 165 E.R. 199, 207-09 (1799)
(Lord Stowell, J.). For whatever reason, Justice Story placed little emphasis on the resistance element in
comparison to the self-defense element in The Marianna Flora. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 50-54.
350. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 8 (1827).
351. See id. at 2-3. The lower courts split on the decision. The District Court heard the condemnation
in admiralty, restored The Palmyra to its master, but denied damages against The Grampus, while the
Circuit Court affirmed restitution of The Palmyra and awarded damages for its seizure. By the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, The Palmyra, as an apparently duly-patented privateer, had been seized
on the high seas in contravention of the law of nations, and an indemnity had been ordered paid.
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the probable cause concept extended beyond the laws of sea warfare. Signifi-
cantly, The Palmyra went beyond The Marianna Flora on its facts.
Justice Story could have distinguished The Marianna Flora on its own
terms, either on the basis that award of an indemnity was inappropriate in a
precedent articulating a novel rule, or because it involved neither loss of life
nor significant damage to either vessel. Instead, Justice Story denied that The
Apollon's categories were exclusive, or that an indemnity should be awarded
to The Palmyra where probable cause existed.352 He referred to general
principles of maritime tort law as well as the basis of "quasi-belligerent
rights."3 53 Apparently employing capture's technical sense under the jus belli
law of nations, Justice Story opined that The Marianna Flora held "that
probable cause was a sufficient excuse for a capture under circumstances of
hostile aggression at sea."354 The "hostile aggression" language itself is im-
portant, because in The Marianna Flora the parties and the Court carefully
distinguished between "piratical aggression" as a municipal law statutory
concept and "hostile aggression" as an international law concept. As in The
Marianna Flora, Justice Story called upon jus belli capture law in support of
his decision, but used it only as an analogy, thus not limiting the holding to
the law of war.355
By discussing the issue in terms of hostile aggression on the high seas in
lieu of piracy, Justice Story's opinion addressed the probable cause concept
in terms of general principles of international law.356 His view of excusing
high seas capture with the existence of probable cause is also linked to prece-
dents arising out of the French-American quasi-war of 1798-1800. These
352. Id. at 17.
353. Id.
354. Id. "Capture" under the law of naval warfare technically encompassed not only taking possession
of a vessel on the high seas, but also transport of it for prize court adjudication. Justice Story, however,
relied on a plain meaning definition of "capture" in The Marianna Flora, a definition that arose from his
distinction between taking possession of a vessel in self-defense from the act of transport for adjudication.
24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 50, 54 (1826). Justice Story cannot have intended to use "capture" here in the
ordinary sense because, as a product of the peculiar self-defense posture of The Marianna Flora, taking
possession of The Marianna Flora on the high seas was itself simply part of lawful self-defense. Justice
Story could not excuse liability for a breach of the law of nations, because the valid exercise of the right
of self-defense excluded the possibility that The Alligator itself illegally boarded The Marianna Flora. The
issue was not the lawfulness of the post-engagement visitation and search, but rather the lawfulness of the
subsequent act of transporting the vessel for adjudication. "Capture" is also arguably misused here in the
sense that it was customary in maritime legal terminology to refer to "capture" as jus belli and "seizure"
under mere municipal law, as Justice Story does elsewhere in the opinion. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 17
(1827). Given that Justice Story authored both The Marianna Flora and The Palmyra decisions and was
a recognized authority on admiralty and prize law, it seems likely that any ambiguities of terminology
serving to extend the law were conscious. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the failure to award
indemnity in The Marianna Flora appeared to rely on the character of the case as precedent enunciating
a new rule.
355. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 18 (1827).
356. Justice Story did not treat the case as a piracy problem either under international or municipal
law. See A. RUBIN supra note 331.
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precedents recognized a neutral's power to use armed force to protect itself
against a belligerent's unlawful encroachment on freedom of the high seas,
This was the Vincennes' explicit mission in the Persian Gulf -- to protect
neutral shipping from belligerent attack. Justice Story indicated that in cases
involving probable cause of "hostile aggression," probable cause would excuse
indemnity when nonbelligerent rights were at issue. 57 Thus, if The Palmyra
is still good law, a reasonable mistake on the part of the Vincennes should not
amount to a breach of its obligations under international law, assuming those
obligations are determined by the law of armed conflict at sea.
The Marshall Court jurisprudence recognizes that a neutral warship's
international law duties in opposing putative hostile aggression are limited to
a standard of due care or diligence, and so indemnity rights presumably would
therefore not exist for resulting injury when due diligence was exercised.35
This view dates back to an era when freedom of the high seas was otherwise
vehemently asserted. As such, it should be understood both to specify limits
on free passage rights and to specify the duty incumbent upon public war-
ships?59 While this discussion of the probable cause principle has drawn on
the decisions of a municipal court, support could be sought equally, if less
systematically, from state practice and other sources. 60 The Marianna Flora
and The Palmyra may well figure in U.S. arguments before the ICJ in the
Flight 655 proceedings.36' The ICJ would be mistaken to discount such authori-
357. Justice Story's opinion in The Marianna Flora recognized that hostile aggression in the context
of mistaken self-defense should be given special treatment. 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40 (1826).
358. This is probably a high standard, if judged by Justice Story's remark that The Palmyra was a
case of "strong" probable cause. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 18 (1827). While Justice Story does not discuss
the law of capture under jus belli beyond noting the analogy, underjus belli differing degrees of probable
cause affected whether a captor's costs and expenses should be repaid by the vessel wrongfully captured.
See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
359. Justice Story contemplaed in The Palmyra decision that the probable cause/due care rule would
apply to armed public vessels, reserving the question of its availability to armed private vessels, which
might encompass both privateers and armed merchant vessels. The latter distinction is not important except
to the extent that it indicates that this is a state responsibility problem and not simply a matter of marine
tort law.
360. The probable cause concept was included in article 23 of the 1958 LOS High Seas Convention.
See supra note 100, at art.23; 1982 LOS Convention, supra note 100, at art. 106. Further, The Carthage
provides an example of the use of probable cause in international arbitration. The Carthage Case (Fr. v.
Italy), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at 329-40 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1913). The Carthage dates from the classic era
of sea warfare law and is one of the few voluntary international law arbitrations individually addressing
sufficiency of suspicion for wartime high seas capture of a neutral vessel. The decision recognized the
probable cause concept under prize law as both justiciable and as part of customary international law. For
the related French-Italian international arbitration, see The Manouba Case (Fr. v. Italy), id. at 341-53 (prize
law is part of customary international law). For a more detailed discussion, see Scelle, Die Fdlle "Car-
thage,' "Manouba," Tavigliano" in franzosischer Auffassung, 1 JAH UCH DES VdLYERRECHTS 544
(1913).
361. Given that TheMarianna Flora serves as a self-defense "hostile aggression" precedent, its validity
could continue under U.N. Charter article 51. The Pa/myra and other cases concerning protection of neutral
rights also serve as precedent for self-defense in the face of hostile aggression, allowing this entire corpus
to be reconciled with provisions of the United Nations Charter.
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ty solely on the basis that the precedents stem from an American
court.
3 6 2
Thus far this inquiry has treated probable cause as a concept that delimited
permissible interference with free passage on the high seas under circumstances
where restitution of a seized neutral vessel was the norm and loss of life the
exception. Even following The Palmyra, it remains questionable whether the
traditional rule was ever considered generally applicable to the outright de-
struction of an unarmed vessel with serious loss of innocent life. 63 While
high seas destruction of captured neutral vessels was not totally unknown under
traditional maritime practice,3"4 the destruction of neutral prizes following
the 1856 Declaration of Paris was condoned only in cases of extraordinary
necessity, and was still challenged as absolutely impermissible by many states
(particularly by the United States, insofar as it periodically supported absolute
protection of private property on the high seas). However, the traditional
maritime practices supporting this view of probable cause began to break down
even as legal regulation of armed conflict gained broad acceptance. 5
The practice of unlimited submarine and mine warfare in declared war
zones during World War I hastened this decline of traditional maritime practic-
es. These new types of weapons enabled belligerents to sink neutral ships in
order to destroy their contraband cargoes, leaving owners of innocent cargo
with a separate claim. 66 Modern naval warfare's concentration on total inter-
362. However, at least one foreign commentator has claimed that The Marianna Flora was wrongly
decided and represents a peculiarly American view. See Zourek, Legitime defense, supra note 324, at 21.
363. Justice Story indicated in dictum that had the fire by the armed private vessel The Marianna Flora
resulted in deaths, it might have been subject to liability for the individual delicts, but would not be subject
to condemnation. He based this opinion on the theory that its misapprehension of attack rendered the injury
a less serious violation of international law. 24 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 40 (1826). In some ways this dictum
may be inconsistent with The Palmyra, but it conforms more closely to the basic pattern of then contem-
porary prize law, in which a prize court normally could restore a wrongfully captured vessel or the
proceeds from its sale in restitution, with further indemnity being substantially punitive in nature and
directed against costs and injury caused by a vessel's capture. Cf. Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13
Howard) 498, 517-18 (1851) (probable cause becomes material only after restitution is ordered and
additional damages are claimed for the injury and expenses sustained from seizure and detention).
364. For views expressed in connection with the first apparent systematic large scale sinkings at the
beginning of the twentieth century in the Russo-Japanese War, see A. HERSHEY, supra note 118, at 136-59;
C. LEROUX, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PENDANT LA GUERRE MARITIME RUSsO-JAPONAISE 145-62(1911);
F. SMITH & N. SIBLEY, supra note 118, at 164-90; S. TAKAHASI, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO THE
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR WITH THE DECISIONS OF THE JAPANESE PRIZE COURTS 310-36 (1908). See also
F. SMITH, THE DESTRUCTION OF MERCHANT SHIPS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 70-101 (1917) (post-
Russo-Japanese War developments in form of 1909 London Naval Declaration and early World War I
practices).
365. A specific exception was made under the 1909 London Declaration for military necessity, altering
the traditional view that sinking a neutral ship was per se illegal. See 3 C. HYDE, supra note 94, at
2030-36.
366. See, e.g., C. COLOMBOS, supra note 325, at 273-76; J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW, supra note 140,
at 656-60. Analogous questions arose during World War I concerning the question of indemnification for
neutral vessels that had been ordered without cause by belligerent warships to detour to a specified port
for visitation and search. See Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial
War (1909), reprinted in 33 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 175, 588-89 (1939) (commentary to art. 61). In fact,
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diction of commerce to destroy an enemy's capacity to wage war has also
affected neutral shipping. State practice seems to subject neutral ships to the
threat of sinking in situations combining military necessity and probable cause.
Given the nature of submarine warfare, the element of military necessity was
usually present, shifting the focus of the modern debate concerning permissible
acts to issues of defining declared war zones and unlimited submarine war-
fare. 67 While national naval manuals might advise special caution or require
military necessity before sinking a neutral prize,36 in a practical sense the
parameters of traditional capture rules now delimit permissible destruction.
Whether or not desirable and subject to the argument that traditional principles
of sea warfare law still apply the development of modern warfare arguably has
transformed the probable cause concept into a rule of permissible destruction.
3. Land-Based Precedents: An Absolute Duty Under Modern Principles of
Armed Conflict
Land-based mistaken use of force precedents are more recent than their
maritime law corollaries. From the ICJ's perspective, however, the law of
armed conflict under article 89 of the Chicago Convention presents the ques-
tion whether these precedents articulate a general law of armed conflict
applicable to incidents occurring at sea. The latest land-based precedents were
decided under restrictions on the use of armed force articulated during the
League of Nations period, directly comparable to legal principles based on the
U.N. Charter.
Four pre-World War II land-based incidents are relevant to mistaken
apprehension of attack or preemptive attack in mistaken self-defense: the 1893
Waima Incident involving French attack on an encampment of British colonial
forces mistaken for a marauding tribe;369 the 1914 Mazuia Incident involving
German attack on a neutral Portuguese colonial outpost; 7 ' the 1925 Greco-
Bulgarian Frontier Incident involving a territorial incursion into Bulgaria
belligerent practice in ordering deviation for vessel searches predates World War I, as does precedent for
indemnification if there is no colorable ground for deviation. See id. at 577-85. World War I saw
wide-spread employment of the practice. This diversion, not characterized as a capture, was necessary to
the implementation of recognized rights of visitation and search due to danger from the enemy along with
the increasing impracticality of examining an entire ship's cargo at sea as vessels grew in size. Such a
detour could be a costly and time-consuming endeavor carried out without any prior indication of violation
of neutral obligations.
367. See, e.g., Fenrick, supra note 18, at 96-109: Levie, supra note 18, at 736-39 (including
roundtable commentary on Levie paper).
368. See, e.g., 1955 LAw OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 105, § 503(e).
369. See94 BRrr. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1900-1901, at 37 (1904) (arbitral convention between Great
Britain and France); 95 BRr. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERs 1901-1902, at 136 (1905) (arbitral award).
370. Dommages Colonies Portugaises (Port. v. Germ.) 2 R. INT'L ARB. AwARDS 1013, 1017-19
(1928) [hereinafter Mazuia Incident].
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following the killing of two border guards;3 71 and the 1931 Mukden Incident
involving Japanese military attacks in Manchuria. 3" They bridge the gap
from the earlier law of mistaken attack, as the decisions in the earlier Waima
and Mazuia Incidents are couched in those terms, whereas the decisions in the
Greco-Bulgarian Frontier and Mukden Incidents both involved the League of
Nations. 3 While the concept of probable cause in maritime law might limit
the use of armed force only to a duty of due care, these land-based precedents
support an absolute duty limiting the use of force, under which even a reason-
able mistake is no excuse.
The 1893 Waima Incident involved a clash between French and British
forces, who unbeknownst to each other were both engaged in punitive expedi-
tions against the same marauding tribe along the Sierra Leone border.374 The
French commander, leading a force of 1,230 Africans came upon the British
encampment of 650 colonial police and Indian troops at night and apparently
mistook the British officers in white campaign dress for Arabs commanding
a raiding force. 7 As the French force silently approached, British sentinels
fired to rouse the sleeping British troops and a pitched battle ensued. Three
British officers and numerous other troops were killed or wounded. 6 When
the French and British governments failed to reach agreement on the amount
payable in reparation, the matter was consigned by bilateral convention to
arbitration by a Belgian diplomat.
Responsibility for the Waima Incident was arguably conceded ex ante by
France, because the bilateral arbitration agreement only assigned to the arbitra-
tor the task of fixing the amount of indemn'ty.3 T The arbitrator indicated
371. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Incidents on the Frontier Between Bulgaria and
Greece, League of Nations Doe. C.727.M.270 (1925), reprinted in id. at 196-210; Report to the Seventh
Assembly of the League on the Work of the Council, on the Work of the Secretariat and on the Measures
Taken to Execute the Decisions ofthe Assembly, League of Nations Doc. A.6. (1926), reprinted in LEAGUE
OF NATIONS O.J. SPEC. SUPF. 44, 152, 179-84 (1926) [hereinafter Seventh Assembly Report]. For a
description and analysis of the incident, see generally J. BARROS, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE
GREAT POwERS: THE GREEK-BULGARIAN INCIDENT,, 1925 (1970).
372. See, e.g., C. LIANG, THE SINISTER FACE OF THE MUKDEN INCIDENT 10-44 (1969); Hiroharu,
The Manchurian Incident, 1931, and Toshihiko, The Extension of Hostilities, 1931-1932, in JAPAN ERUPTS:
THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE AND THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT, 1928-1932 139-230, 241-335 (J.
Morley ed. 1984); T. YOSHIHASHI, CONSPIRACY AT MUKDEN: THE RISE OF THE JAPANESE MILITARY 1-6,
151-218 (1963).
373. For the relevant League of Nations actions, see Minutes of the Thirty-Sixth (Extraordinary)
Session of the Council, October 26-30, 1925, 6 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1695-1718, at 7 (1925); Thirty-
Seventh Session of the Council, December 7-16, 1925, 7 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 108-18, 172-77 (1926).
374. See sources cited supra note 369. See also F. SMrrH & N. SIBLEY, supra note 118, at 312-14
(providing factual detail not found in arbitral award).
375. F. SMITH & N. SIBLEY, supra note 118, at 312-13.
376. As indicated by early twentieth century commentators discussing the Waima Incident and The
Marianna Flora in the context of precedents for the Dogger Bank Incident, the Waima Incident does
substantially represent a land-based twin of The Marianna Flora's mutually mistaken self-defense. See,
e.g., A. HERSHEY, supra note 118, at 2441-42 n.59; F. SMIH & N. SIBLEY, supra note 118, at 314.
377. 94 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 37 (1900-01).
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that the French commander had acted in good faith,37 and noted that territo-
rial principles were not at stake, since the incident occurred in an area where
the boundaries between British and French colonial territory were not yet
fixed." Despite the fact that France apparently conceded responsibility
through acceptance of the terms of the arbitration agreement, the arbitrator
considered the exculpating mistake problem independently,38° and articulated
reasons for awarding an indemnity in terms of responsibility principles.
France claimed that any indemnity obligation should be limited to the value
of the annuities owed to the families of the two deceased military officers,
apparently the only compensation mandated by British law. However, the
arbitrator found that municipal law treatment of the losses incurred was not
material,381 and instead indicated that by finding France responsible for the
incident it was liable for all British injuries. As a result, France's indemnity
obligation included compensation for all casualties, whether struck by French
or British fire, because they would not have occurred but for the mistaken
French attack.3" In short, once past the issue whether the entire incident
should be considered as a noncompensable, fortuitous event in legal terms, the
arbitrator found France liable for all British injuries arising out of the incident.
This result, preceding the Dogger Bank Incident, seems essentially inconsistent
with The Marianna Flora line of precedent. 3
The Mazuia Incident, which also resulted in liability for mistaken self-
defense, arose in connection with August 1914 rumors in the colonial territory
of German East Africa (present day Tanzania) that hitherto neutral Portugal
had declared war on Germany.3 The governor of German East Africa de-
378. 95 BRT. & FOREIGN Sr. PAPERS 138 (1901-02). The reasonableness of the officer's conduct
is open to interpretation, because the French commander himself was mortally wounded in the attack and
the arbitrator's finding evaluated the factual circumstances as follows:
Dans leur ensemble, les circonstances autorisent . penser que, sans prdvoir la prdsence possible
d'une troupe Anglaise, l'officier Frangais, dont ]a bonne foi n'est pas contest6e, a cede avant
tous h ]a preoccupation d'atteindre et de disperser les bandes de [the marauding tribe] qui par
leurjonction pouvaient menacer la sdcurit6 des possessions Frangaises.
Id. Regarding the French claim that British sentinels had fired first (in lieu of first inquiring who constituted
the large body of men coming upon the British encampment), the arbitrator simply indicated that in the
face of an apparent enemy the sentinels could fire to wake their sleeping troops.
379. Id. at 137.
380. After setting forth the facts and party positions, the arbitrator stated that:
Nous concluons de cet expos6 que, dans l'appreciation des rdsponsabilitds, une certaine part doit 6tre faite
un malheureux concours de circonstances qui a amen6 une rencontre entre deux expditions opdrant h
l'insuit l'une de l'autre contre un ennemi commun; mais si la rdsponsabilit6 du Gouvernment Frangais est
att~nude par ce fait, la rdparation n'en doit pas moins se rdgler dans un large esprit d'dquit6.
94 Brr. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 138 (1900-01).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 138-39.
383. The Marianna Flora might be distinguished on the grounds that it ended fortuitously without death
or injury, but this fails to account for succeeding precedent such as The Palmyra. This inconsistency
supports the conclusion that the substantive outcome of arbitration in the Waima Incident may have
influenced that in the Dogger Bank Incident.
384. Mazuia Incident, supra note 370.
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manded a clarification from Portuguese authorities in colonial Mozambique,
pending receipt of which German frontier outposts were ordered to refrain
from hostile action. However, the restraint order did not reach a small German
outpost at Sasabara, located close to the Portuguese outpost at Mazuia, being
separated only by the river forming the border between the two colonies. The
commander at Sasabara believed his post to be threatened by imminent Portu-
guese attack and ordered a preemptive attack, which succeeded in capturing
the Portuguese post at Mazuia. The Portuguese commander and one civilian
were killed, arms and ammunition were seized, and the post was put to the
torch. 85
In post-World War I arbitration, Germany did not contest basic responsibil-
ity for the incident, and the arbitration was limited to an amount of indemnity
based on responsibility "admitted in principle."38 6 Nonetheless, the arbitral
findings specifically included language discussing responsibility in terms of
mistaken anticipatory self-defense. 3 7 As the arbitration applied principles
of customary international law, it would have precluded responsibility if
mistaken self-defense did not constitute a violation of a primary international
law obligation. 3" The arbitrator may also have believed the mistake unrea-
sonable, however, and thus not reached the question of exoneration for reason-
able mistake.3 9
The 1925 Greco-Bulgarian Frontier Incident also addressed mistaken self-
defense in the context of an unlawful territorial incursion. The situation
evolved out of a minor border incident at a remote frontier post, in which a
Greek border sentry was shot and soon thereafter a Greek officer was also shot
while advancing under a flag of truce to recover the sentry's body.3' The
Greek frontier post was evacuated as a result of the continued firing, and word
of the initial incident was sent to political authorities on both sides of the
border. The Bulgarian government initially did not consider the matter to be
very serious, given the history of minor frontier incidents in the Balkans. As
385. The German colonial government acknowledged the mistake at the time, and opened a criminal
investigation against the Sasabara commander under municipal law. The investigation was terminated with
a finding of no criminal liability, however, and Portugal declined to accept a German offer of restitution
of arms and ammunition. The arbitral findings declared the termination "non-lieu," without specifying the
grounds. Id. Presumably the mistake of fact (whether Portugal was in fact at war with Germany) must have
excused the commander under municipal law, for there is no other visible explanation for the failure to
prosecute the unjustified killing of two individuals and to compensate for the substantial property damage.
386. Id. at 1017.
387. Id. ("Se croyant menace d'une attaque portugaise [the German commander of Sasabara] voulut
la prdvenir.")
388. Id. at 1016.
389. The significance of the holding on state responsibility remains a subject of debate. See 2 G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 304, at 31 (Mazuia Incident as evidence that there is no concept of
mistaken self-defense under international law). But see R. GAoRrr, supra note 286, at 34-39 (in apparent
analogy to municipal criminal law self-defense principles, asserted in analyzing Dogger Bank Incident that
mistaken self-defense should excuse responsibility).
390. See Seventh Assembly Report, supra note 371, at 182; J. BARRoS, supra note 371, at 2 n.3.
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a result of confusion on the Greek side, however, military communications
between the frontier and Athens incorrectly indicated that Bulgarian troops in
battalion strength had crossed into Greek territory and established positions
in the mountainous terrain. 91
As firing continued at the border the next day, the Greek government
vociferously asserted that Bulgarian troops continued to occupy Greek territory
in force.3" The crisis escalated quickly with the dispatch of two Greek army
corps into Bulgaria on a broad front, penetrating to a depth of several kilome-
ters.393 Within days of the initial incident Bulgaria appealed to the League of
Nations, claiming that Greece was in violation of articles 10 and I 1 of the
League Covenant.394
Following a cease-fire, the League of Nations empaneled a Commission
of Inquiry.39s The Commission concluded that the entire incident originated
in a quarrel between individual Greek and Bulgarian sentries. The mistaken
information of a Bulgarian invasion caused the Greek retaliation, which was
meant to be a "policing operation" without intent to permanently acquire
Bulgarian territory. 396
The British Foreign Secretary, as rapporteur in the dispute, presented the
Inquiry Commission's Report to the League Council, opposing Greece's
significant military response to the minor nature of the frontier incident:
[E]ven if [the information concerning battalion strength Bulgarian entrenchments
just inside Greek territory] had been accurate, the Greek Government would not
have been justified in directing the military operations which it caused to be
undertaken ... We believe that all the Members of the Council will share our view
in favor of the broad principle that where territory is violated without sufficient
cause reparation is due, even if at the time of the occurrence it was believed by the
party committing the act of violation that circumstances justified the action.397
The Council adopted the Commission's Report and required Greece to pay an
indemnity. The Report did not allow the Greek government's good faith
mistaken belief in a Bulgarian invasion and its non-premeditated commitment
391. Id.
392. Id. at 11-13.
393. Accounts differ, but the largest claims involved a 30 kilometer front with penetration to a depth
of 10 kilometers, and bombardment of at least one civilian town beyond the occupied territory. Id. at 18.
As Bulgaria was essentially demilitarizedunder the Treaty of Neuilly, it was no military match for Greece.
As a result, the Bulgarian government ordered its troops to withdraw from the border areas and to avoid
engagements with the advancing Greek troops, and made repeated offers to submit the entire incident to
an impartial inquiry. Id. at 19.
394. Covenant of the League of Nations, I Hudson 1, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. Sutp. 128 (1919).
395. Greek troops evacuated Bulgarian territory ten days after the shooting began. J. BARRos, supra
note 371, at 84. See also I. BRowNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 140-41
(1963) [hereinafter I. BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE].
396. I. BROWNUE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 395, at 141.
397. 6 LEAuE OF NATIONS O.J. 173 (1926) (Council Meeting of December 14, 1925), reprinted in
Seventh Assembly Report, supra note 371, at 184. The repetition of this statement in the context of a report
to the Assembly on the Council's activities provides evidence of contemporaries' consciousness of its
importance as the enunciation of a general principle.
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of military forces to exonerate violation of restrictions on the use of force.
While military miscommunicationof a Bulgarian invasion, compounded by the
failure of Greek governmental authorities to confirm the rumor, may have
rendered Greece's misapprehension of attack "unreasonable," the Report's
statement of principle was couched in absolute terms. No .mistake, even a
reasonable one, would exonerate unlawful territorial incursion. The Greco-
Bulgarian Frontier Incident is a single precedent, but it evidences state practice
of broader acceptance concerning the misapprehension of attack and the
violation of primary international law obligations relating to the use of
force. 98
The League of Nations also refused to permit a claim of mistaken self-
defense to exonerate violations of the Covenant's restraints on the use of force
in the 1931 Mukden Incident, which unleashed events that resulted in the
Japanese control of Manchuria? 99 In response to the apparent bombing of
Japanese-owned rail lines, local Japanese army units present in China under
foreign treaty rights attacked a Chinese garrison at nearby Mukden and occu-
pied the city, asserting that the occupation was necessary to protect Japanese
nationals and property. China appealed to the League of Nations and claimed
that Japanese actions violated article 10 of the League Covenant. The League's
Investigatory Commission evaluated the Japanese claim that its army's behavior
in the immediate aftermath of the apparent bombing constituted self-defense.
The Commission's Report, eventually adopted by the League Assembly,
rejected the Japanese claim. It noted, however, that the Japanese officers acting
on the spot "may have thought they were acting in self-defense."'  The
League went beyond the analysis in the Greco-Bulgarian Frontier Incident,
which was limited to an assessment of misunderstandings at the governmental
level, to reach the mistaken beliefs of individual officers as in the Dogger
Bank, Waima and Mazuia Incidents under prior law."°0
398. Greece paid reparations. One commentator has noted that the BritishForeign Secretary's statement
to the Council made no mention of "faute or negligence as a requirement although this would seem to be
a condition of responsibility if general concepts of law are to be relied upon." I. BROWNLIE, USE OF
FORCE, supra note 395, at 141.
399. See C. LIANG supra note 372; Hirohara, supra note 372. See also, M. CAMERON, T. MAHONEY
& G. McREYNOLDS, CHINA, JAPAN AND THE POWERS: A HISTORY OF THE MODERN FAR EAST 449-55
(2d ed. 1960).
400. See D. BOWETT, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 32-33 (1958). With the benefit of the
Tokyo War Crimes Trials 1946-1948 and access to archives, it now seems that even the original mysterious
explosion damaging the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden was a planned provocation of an officers'
clique within the Japanese Kwangtung Army. The killing of three Chinese soldiers from adjacent barracks
as the purported bombers and occupation of Mukden to forestall anti-Japanese activity were therefore
factually not acts of good faith mistaken self-defense.
401. Precedent in this area is not limited to misapprehension of attack and mistaken self-defense
concepts. Additional precedent involves mistaken belligerent attack on neutral vessels or territory in the
midst of hostilities. For mistaken bombings of neutrals during the First and Second World Wars, see A.
VANDENBOSCH, supra note 155, at 81 (Dutch territory); J. GARNER, PRIZE LAW, supra note 140, at 472-
73, 477; 'Force Majeure' and 'Fortuitous Event' as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Survey of
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C. Special Difficulties of Mistake Analysis: Broad Self-Judging Views, Antici-
patory Self-Defense, Military Necessity, and Force Majeure
The special concerns of mistake analysis require treatment of several
distinct legal issues intertwined in a practical sense. First, the claim is often
advanced in connection with a natural law-based self-preservation view that
a state's good faith claim of self-defense is not open to any examination
because a state's right of self-preservation would be imperfect if subject to
another's potential review. Second, a related question exists whether anticipa-
tory self-defense has survived under U.N. Charter restrictions and whether
"mistaken" self-defense qualifies at all as self-defense for purposes of the
lawful use of force. Third, questions may be raised whether the concept of
"military necessity" as a subcategory of general necessity principles under
international law overcomes apparent limitations of the self-defense concept.
Fourth, under older views war itself was considered force majeure and all
related losses noncompensable, raising questions when under modern law such
destruction should be deemed a noncompensable war loss. These four issues
are intertwined in the Flight 655 incident: 1) if anticipatory self-defense were
unlawful, the Vincennes would have been prevented from firing on Flight 655;
2) if the United States claim of self-defense is not open to examination by other
states, its good faith claim of self-defense in the Flight 655 incident should
preclude review by the ICJ; 3) even were the self-defense concept subject to
irestraint, a broad view of military necessity might overcome its apparent
limitations; and 4) regardless of any apparent breach of a primary obligation
State Practice, International JudicialDecisions and Doctrine, [19781 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 61, 66-71,
U.N. Doc. AICN.41315/part 2/1978 [hereinafter Force Majeure Report], at 126 (San Marino territory);
id. at 125-26 (Yugoslavian territory). Incidents involving mistaken belligerent attacks on neutral warships
also provide examples, particularly those that occurred in connection with Japanese military operations
surrounding Nanking's capture in the so-called Sino-Japanese Incident of 1937. See generally M. BRcE,
THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE SINO-JAPANESE INCIDENT 1937-1941 (1973); H. DAREY, TBE PANAY
INCIDENT: PRELUDE TO PEARL HARBOR (1969); M. Kolnwos, THE PANAY INCIDENT: PRELUDE TO WAR
(1967); Bouchard, Accidents and Crises: Panay, Liberty and Stark, 41 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 87 (Fall
1988). The most recent examples include the, 1967 Israeli high seas attack on the U.S.S. Liberty, and the
1987 Iraqi high seas attack on the U.S.S. Stark. See Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law-Claims Settlement Agreements, 75 AM. J. INT'L. L. 363, 368 (1981) (final
settlement of claim achieved in 1980); Agreement on Compensation in the U.S.S. Stark Incident, 28 LL.M.
644 (1989). These examples did not solely involve the mistaken use of force, because neutral governments
believed that the attacks were either intentional or in gross disregard of the protection owed to neutrals.
The incidents were usually resolved on the diplomatic level, following expressions of regret, payment of
a compensatory indemnity calculated solely on the basis of death or personal injury and property damage,
and provision of assurances that such incidents would not be repeated. The volatile political nature and
negotiated outcome of many of these incidents makes it difficult to assign legal precedential value to them
with any degree of certainty. Any indemnities paid were arguably of an ex gratia nature to smooth over
political conflict, rather than to discharge a legal obligation. In many cases the character of the indemnity
negotiated was not stipulated as a legal matter, although in at least one of the World War II cases of
mistaken bombing of neutral territory, it appears the neutral government agreed that the payments were
a gratia.
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on the Vincennes part, responsibility would not lie if Flight 655's downing
were characterized as an accident of war covered by force majeure.
1. Self-Preservation and the Problem of Self-Judging Claims
American views of the international law self-defense concept undoubtedly
stand under strong natural law influence. This view of an "inherent" right,
reaching back to Grotius and beyond,' posits that the right of self-preserva-
tion is paramount. Under a broad view of necessity, it puts the state fighting
for its continued existence beyond otherwise binding international law re-
straints. However, such a system has never been effective in state practice
because it is fundamentally inconsistent with the idea of sovereign equality.
If one state had an absolute right of self-preservation, other states would
perforce hive a corresponding obligation to suffer any and all of its acts that
otherwise objectively violate their rights.' Such a system breaks down as
soon as reciprocity is asserted.'
American views of self-defense under international law follow the Caroline
precedent, involving an 1837 British attack carried out on U.S. territory
against the steamship transport of Canadian insurgents. In a famous diplomatic
exchange, Secretary of State Webster articulated the rule that self-defense was
permissible only if the elements of proportionality, necessity and immediacy
were satisfied.' 5 Webster's assertion of limitations on claimed British rights
402. H. GROTIuS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 172-173 (1646) (Carnegie Endowment trans. 1925).
Grotius may be regarded as its modem source, but in fact its roots go back through the doctrine of just
war to ancient authors. See Zourek, Legitime defense, supra note 324, at 10-17.
403. There has been little support for modem attempts to articulate the claim that a state is legally
required to submit to the illegal acts of a second state claiming necessity. See, e.g., Zourek, Legitime
defense, supra note 324, at 67 (criticizing Strupp).
404. Continental commentators also have suggested a hierarchy of rights in which one state's
self-preservation concerns overcome other states' lesser rights, but this jurisprudential approach has
generally been rejected. See de Visscher, supra note 184, at 87-93. The hierarchy-of-values approach is
preserved in some continental views of justification and excuse under municipal criminal law. See, e.g.,
H. JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS 317 (4th ed. 1988) (noting Kollisionstheorie); P. BOCKEL-
MANN, HEGELS NOTsTANSLEHRE 21-69 (1935). This analogy does not hold for international law at least
with regard to the use of force. The depth of its rejection becomes clear when it is considered that the
original background for article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant and its successor in article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter included the World War I violation of neutral Belgium's territorial integrity, which was
claimed by much of contemporary German scholarship to be less important than Germany's interest in
attacking France through Belgium. See de Visscher, supra, at 184.
405. The British incursion on U.S. territory would be permissible only if it could show:
[N]ecessity of self-defense, instant overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of
deliberation. It shall be for [Britain] to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada, even supposing
the necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories of The United States at all, did nothing
unreasonable or excessive, since the act, justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that
necessity, and kept clearly within it.
Letter of Secretary of State Webster to British Envoy Fox, April 24, 1841, 29 BRir. & FOREIGN ST.
PAPERS, 1840-1841, at 1129, 1138 (1857). See also Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 82 (1938).
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make the entire proceeding inconsistent with the extreme position that mere
assertion of core self-preservation interests automatically frees a state from
otherwise binding international law obligations. That view, which holds that
American views of international law unreservedly support a state's claimed sole
ability to judge its own self-defense measures, is incorrect.4°6 Furthermore,
the ICI's apparent rejection of such arguments in the Nicaragua Case makes
it doubtful that they would meet with success in the Flight 655 proceedings.
2. The Legality of Anticipatory Self-Defense
The issue whether a warship in the Vincennes' situation can legally act in
anticipatory self-defense is usually framed in terms of the question whether it
is constrained to absorb an enemy's first blow or whether it can act to preempt
an attack.' Whether or not an attack will occur is a matter of conjecture
until the attacker's weapons are launched. The practical consequence of waiting
for their launch may be to force absorption of the first blow. However, given
the speed and destructive range of even modest weapons, modern technology
forces an anticipatory response. This dilemma is commonly addressed either
through a broad legal definition of attack, pushing its commencement back into
the preparatory stages, or on an operational level by drawing inferences about
an aircraft's or a vessel's intentions as "hostile" or "friendly" based upon its
behavior short of launching weapons. 4°5 On the other hand, misapprehension
of attack cases are essentially foreclosed to the extent an attacker actually must
first fire before self-defense becomes lawful.
The Caroline precedent is commonly accepted as authority for the legality
of anticipatory self-defense under American views of international law. Howev-
er, this precedent has been called into question under certain views of modern
international law's restraints on the use of armed force, commonly as a result
of a narrow textual analysis of U.N. Charter article 51, which is linked to a
special doctrinal gloss on the self-defense concept itself.1 Once the possibil-
ity of anticipatory self-defense is admitted, it becomes relatively easy in many
cases to meet subsidiary requirements for self-defense such as proportionality,
necessity, and immediacy under the Caroline test.
406. See Linman, supra note 73, at 85-89.
407. See, e.g., Bunn, International Law and the Use of Force in Peacetime: Do U.S. Ships Have to
Take the First Hit?, 39 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 69 (May-June 1986).
408. Under a threat analysis and disregarding line-drawing issues such as whether switching on
targeting radar already constitutes weapons use, this would not present a substantial mistake problem despite
the fact that the peremptory act of self-defense may have taken place early enough so that it remains unclear
whether the aircraft would have launched weapons.
409. See Linnan, supra note 73, at 68-74 (discussing debate).
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Although the character and proper interpretation of U.N. Charter article
51 is the subject of sharp debate,41° anticipatory self-defense should be al-
lowed under the Charter to the extent it was permissible under the customary
law in force at the time of its adoption. This follows from the view that article
51 is essentially a procedural provision relating to regional security arrange-
ments rather than an independent locus of textual interpretation for the self-
defense concept. 41 Evidence of the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense
under customary law is to be found in judgments of the war crimes tribunals
in the wake of World War II. For example, the Nuremberg tribunal accepted
the existence of anticipatory self-defense in theory, as it considered defense
arguments that self-defense excused the German invasion of neutral Norway
to forestall its impending British military occupation.41 2 The Netherlands'
claim of anticipatory self-defense also was recognized at the Tokyo trials when
it declared war against Japan in the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor in
anticipation of attack, but in advance of Japanese hostile action against Dutch
territory. 41
3
The fact that anticipatory self-defense is normally lawful does not entail
the conclusion that a misapprehension of attack case must necessarily fit under
that rule. Mistaken self-defense should not be considered self-defense for
purposes of justifying the use of armed force under modern ideas restricting
its employment.4"4 This is true for several reasons. First, viewed under the
Caroline test criteria, the element of necessity will always be lacking. Second,
older precedents implicitly reject the concept of putative self-defense.415
Third, the rejection of this approach is maintained under modern law's restric-
tions on the use of force.416 However, it is important to note that putative
self-defense under a good faith mistake is generically unsuited to categorization
as an act of aggression on the level of either individual military personnel or
of a state. It is debatable whether the aggression concept generally incorporates
an intent element, but its positive absence under these circumstances seems
decisive. With a view toward maintaining international peace, the exercise of
putative self-defense with resulting injury is generally better resolved under
410. Commentators disagree whether article 51 permits anticipatory self-defense. Compare I.
BROWNLIE, USE OF FORCE, supra note 395, at 495 (armed force is only lawful in response to armed attack)
with D. BoWETr, supra note 400, at46-55 (article51 preserving preexisting customary law ofself-defense).
411. See Linnan supra note 73, at 77-84.
412. Defense counsel argued but lost this argument, because it failed to meet collateral requirements
for the application of the self-defense concept. See id. at 75-76.
413. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICiANO, supra note 284, at 231-32.
414. While the issue is directly addressed by few publicists, even strong adherents to customary law
views of self-defense should reject the idea of any putative self-defense doctrine. See 2 G.
SCIiWARZENBERGER, supra note 304, at 31 (citing Mazuia Incident). But see R. GABoprr, supra note 286,
at 35 (no responsibility should attach to reasonable mistake).
415. See supra notes 376-96 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 397-408 and accompanying text.
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compensatory state responsibility principles rather than under aggression or
similar principles.
3. Military Necessity
The concept of military necessity is sometimes taken to justify extraordi-
nary action in warfare, and thus is relevant to the Flight 655 incident. The
military necessity concept has been used inconsistently over time in a variety
of settings.417 Older law often characterized war generally as vis major and
a state of necessity beyond law, but this broad approach has fallen into disfavor
with the development of the modern law of warfare.418
Under a view predating turn of the century treaty codification of the laws
of warfare, but espoused by German scholarship in World War I,"' necessity
in war could place military operations beyond the reach of prohibitions under
the laws of warfare (the controversial idea Kriegsraison geht vor
Kriegsmanier).42 This inquiry has already noted U.S. rejection of a general
necessity position asserted by Germany in support of war zones, mining and
submarine warfare during World War I.421 However, the idea of military
exigency displacing even seemingly absolute prohibitions under the laws of
warfare was generally rejected in the war crimes trials following World War
1I. These included, for example, rejection of military exigencies as a justifica-
tion for killing prisoners of war to avoid detection when encircled by the
417. See generally B. RoDICK, THE DOCTRINE OF NEcESsrrY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-96 (1928);
Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 251 (1953); Dunbar, Military
Necessity in War Crimes Trials, 1953 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 442; Similar considerations were already in
evidence during World War I. See de Visscher, supra note 84. But the broader scope of the concept applied
olderforce majeure ideas which arguably belong in a discussion of military operationsperse as precursors
of modem humanitarian principles implicit in an approach such as that under the Lieber Code, See B.
RoDICK, supra note 474. This combined approach is also visible in commentators following the older
terminology of the "necessities of war." See, e.g., 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 304, at 128-36.
418. Our inquiry will subsequently touch on one traditional usage (the "imperious necessity of war,"
derived from Vattel), reflecting the concept offorce majeure as applied to noncombatant losses incidental
to hostilities. See infra notes 510-49 and accompanying text. The law of land warfare provides that civilian
lives and property should be protected to the greatest extent possible. Beyond unintended destruction,
however, within the scope of engagement, the fortuitous event concept also seems to encompass the
authority to take measures directed against noncombatants necessary to attack or defense per se directed
against belligerents. Beyond the scope of engagement, limited precedent exists in situations resembling
municipal law's public necessity permitting destruction of neutral civilian property if necessary to the
prosecution of acts of war (such as the burning of dwellings feared to harbor disease, following its outbreak
among troops quartered nearby during wartime. 6 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 25 (1913). The modem
understanding of military necessity, however, has abandoned these older categories embedded in surviving
law for a more general'approach to the question whether the laws of warfare themselves may be displaced
by general necessity arguments.
419. At one point in time, the broad view was also current in the United States. Despite the tenor of
the Lieber Code in reviewing Civil War damages claims, the Supreme Court pursued in dicta very broad
views of military necessity encapsulated in the older view salus populi suprema lex. See United States v.
Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 233-34 (1887).
420. See De Visscher, supra note 84.
421. See supra notes 139-57.
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enemy, or machine-gunning survivors from a torpedoed vessel to obliterate
signs of a submarine's passage. 4n
Under the surviving narrow approach, military necessity permits only the
choice among measures allowed by the laws of warfare. American views
reaching back to the Lieber Code, issued in the Civil War,4' defined the
bounds of military necessity as follows: "[m]ilitary necessity, as understood
by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful
according to the modern law and usages of war. "'424
The Lieber Code recognized that the ultimate purpose of warfare was the
return to peace; the speedy destruction of the enemy and his fighting capacity
were considered means to this end.4' Nonetheless, restrictions under human-
itarian principles imposed the duty to avoid measures in warfare more destruc-
tive than necessary (involving proportionality as under jus in bello). The
reference to "lawful measures according to the modern law and usages of
war"426 incorporated a more specific list of permissible and prohibited activi-
ties.427 While questions may remain concerning whether a particular activity
is prohibited, this view seems to have entered international law under the 1907
Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 42'
and has been maintained under modern American views.429 Regarding sea
warfare law, military necessity -- as formulated in the 1955 Law of Naval
Warfare and the 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook -- approaches limita-
tions imposed by the Caroline test requirements of necessity and proportionali-
ty.430 The same absence of necessity negating any concept of putative self-
422. See Dunbar, supra note 417 (citing cases). See also I. DE LuPis, TBE LAW OF WAR 335-37
(1987); C. ROUSSEAU, supra note 229, at 176; 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook, supra note 18,
at 5-4 n.5; 1955 LAW Op NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 105, § 220a.
423. Instructions for the Government ofArmies of the United States in the Field (1863), reprinted in
UNTED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DISCUSSIoNS, 1903, at 115 (1904)
[hereinafter Lieber Code]. The Lieber Code was promulgated to regulate the Union Army, and constituted
the first well-known formulation of the laws of land warfare for use by the individual soldier. The Lieber
Code served as a model for the early Hague Conventions.
424. Id. at art. 14. The abandonment of older views that war knew no bounds is also visible in art.
30. Views on reprisals are evident in arts. 27-28. See id. at arts. 27-28, 30.
425. Id. at art. 29.
426. Id. at art. 14.
427. Id. at arts. 15-30.
428. Article 22 provides '[tihe right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited." 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
at art. 22. Article 23g states that 'it is especially forbidden.., to destroy or seize the enemy's property,
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war." Id. at art. 23g.
These articles prohibit wanton destruction.
429. See 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook, supra note 18, at 5-4 to 5-5 n.5; 1955 LAw OF
NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 105, § 200; 1976 LAW OF AIR WARFARE, supra note 198, at 1-5, 1-6.
430. Section 220(a) provides:
The principle of military necessity permits a belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of
regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete
submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.
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defense also serves under American views of international law to exclude
application of military necessity concepts in the Vincennes' situation.
4. Force Majeure and Self-Defense: Exceptions to Primary Obligations
General principles of international law may operate to render apparent
violations of primary obligations not wrongful, as in the case of events charac-
terized as force majeure. Under older views, war itself was considered force
majeure. A force majeure characterization, despite any alleged violation of
international law obligations by the Vincennes, might thus excuse the United
States from legal responsibility.431 Upon closer examination, recent state
practice treating noncombatant losses in warfare arguably contains two distinct
varieties of force majeure analysis. The first focuses on the law of war and
application of force majeure to military operations that indirectly cause non-
combatant deaths or property destruction. This view excusing unintended injury
to noncombatants on the battlefield is the lineal descendent of the older ap-
proach. The second focuses on the fortuitous event concept as part of force
majeure, raising the possibility that even intentional injury to noncombatants
under misapprehension of attack might be excused.
War itself is chairacterized as vis major in older law, or alternatively in
more modern precedents its resulting losses are characterized as "inevitable
accidents."432 Under either formulation, the losses suffered are due to the
location of civilians and their property within a narrowly delimited battle zone.
The application of the concept is actually determined by the physical dimen-
sions of the battle, because collateral doctrines exist specifying that property
or lives taken outside of the immediate area of the battle normally will be
viewed either as unlawful "wanton destruction," or as the compensable taking
of property. Traditionally, this law is clearest in its application to neutral
civilians caught up in land warfare, but its principles are arguably behind the
modem international humanitarian law rules generally limiting attacks on
civilians and civilian targets.433 This inquiry refers to this application of force
1955 Law of Naval Warfare, supra note 105, § 220(a).
431. As a concept of international lawforce majeure contains elements of the common law's familiar
act of God (vis major under Roman law) as well as the less familiar doctrine of fortuitous event (in the
sense of inevitable accident, casusfortuitous under Roman law). Fortuitous event is included specifically
in article 31 of the Draft Code. A variety of doctrinal distinctions have been offered over time and
terminology has not been consistently applied by publicists or in state practice on a historical basis. See
e.g., Force Majeure Report, supra note 401, at 66-71.
432. American and British commentators tend to use "act of war" terminology, acknowledging that
not all such acts of war are noncompensable, while continental commentators tend to use the "inevitable
accident' terminology. These terminological differences are probably insignificant because the categories
and factual precedents have common origins.
433. See, e.g., 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608 (1979),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS oF WAR, supra note 111, at 415-16, art. 51; 1978 Red Cross
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majeure principles to armed conflict as a "scope of engagement" doctrine.
Despite recent confusion over the legal basis for reimbursement of war damage
claims,434 the older law articulating force majeure principles has not been
displaced and is the basis for delimiting the scope of engagement.
Customary law does distinguish between noncompensable war losses and
compensable war claims on the basis of the scope of engagement. This distinc-
tion is important because the exact demarcation of the engagement determines
whether the damage was "incidental" to combat, and thus uncompensable under
a force majeure or necessity analysis. Not surprisingly, the "incidental"
concept is visible in the Legal Adviser's testimony, although applied in a
technically incorrect and overbroad fashion.435 The ultimate issue depends
in part on whether the downing of Flight 655 should be understood as occur-
ring within the confines of the substantially contemporaneous surface engage-
ment (the speedboat attack) or as a legally severable event. If considered
legally part of the speedboat engagement disregarding the complication that
the Vincennes intentionally fired on it, the likely answer is that Flight 655's
downing would be deemed incidental and an inevitable accident. On the other
hand, if the Vincennes' firing at Flight 655 is severed-from the speedboat
engagement the mistaken self-defense problem must be confronted squarely.
A scope of engagement approach characterizes incidental civilian losses
in the course of an engagement between belligerents as "inevitable accidents
of war." The question is what meaning is assigned to the open-ended concept
"incidental." The law of war has employed varying terminology in connection
with the loss of neutral lives or property. In more recent times, however, the
"inevitable accident" rationale has been restricted to the narrowly drawn
geographic battlefield and loss of property not otherwise appropriated by the
belligerents.435 Since the late nineteenth century, neutral losses outside the
battlefield have not been viewed invariably as "inevitable accidents," and
Fundamental Rules of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, reprinted in id. at
470.
434. See infra notes 540-46 and accompanying text.
435. A similar overbreadth may account for the claim that the downing of Flight 655 does not require
compensation because "[i]t is generally accepted that injuries done to civilians in a combat zone are not
legally required to be compensated by the state that causes the injury." Maier, Ex Gratia Payments and
the Iranian Airline Tragedy, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (1989). The reference to a "combat zone" does
not provide guidance although it appears to contemplate inclusion of an entire theater of operations. The
scope of engagement term refers to where this line of demarcation is drawn, the focus in this inquiry is
on the legality of the use of force itself against Flight 655. This inquiry employs neutral terminology in
using "scope of engagement" as descriptive in an area where there is no accepted legal term of art.
436. One must include bombarded towns in the definition of "battlefield," since related claims for
neutral losses were more often raised when such bombardments were permitted by then current ideas of
the law of war, which distinguishes between "defended" and "open" towns). See supra notes 532-49 and
accompanying text.
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indemnity of right (as opposed to ex gratia) has been granted in specific
circumstances.437
' The implicit distinction underlying the definition of incidental losses reaches
back to Vattel's eighteenth century attempt to articulate indemnity rules for war -
losses recompensable by a state to its own citizens. 438 Vattel first distin-
guished between losses caused by a state and those caused by its enemy, with
no indemnity payable for losses caused by the enemy. Finer distinctions were
drawn concerning losses caused by the state. Indemnity was recognized for
losses caused by the state's own voluntary and deliberate action by way of
precaution or strategy essentially on a talings theory.439 However, no indem-
nity was payable for accidents of war in combat operations, to the extent they
might be considered unintentional."' These natural law principles regarding
inevitable accident" 1 were originally oriented more toward what modern
views consider municipal law and were applied by municipal courts, 2 only
entering modern state practice more slowly toward the end of the nineteenth
century." 3 While they touch on allowable military operations resulting in
neutral losses,4" our interest here is in their limitations on recovery, which
437. See e.g., E. BORcHARD, STATE INSOLVENCY AND FOREIGN BONDHOLDERS 255-62 (1951).
438. 2 E. DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE: APPLIED
TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, Bk. III, § 232 (J. Coote ed. 1760). Vattel
himself was trying to make sense out of a division of commentators reaching back to Grotius.
439. For example, occupation of land or a building for a fortified position, or destruction of crops
to deny food to the enemy. Id.
440. For example, the destruction caused by artillery in retaking a town from the enemy. Id.
441. The term is sometimes referred to as the "imperious necessity of war," which may confuse true
unintentional damage from poorly-aimed fire with well-aimed fire under military necessity rationales as
where the enemy must be attacked on neutral property.
442. France has followed this approach since the eighteenth century, as have other continental nations.
E. BORCHARD, supra note 437, at 247-48. In the United States, Vattel's ideas were considered by the
Supreme Court in damages cases arising out of the Civil War. In United States v. Pacific Railroad, for
example, the Court paid lip service to Vattel, but then articulated a very broad definition of military
necessity. United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 234-35 (1887). In dictum, the Court expressed
the view that the destruction of privately-owned railway bridges to impede the enemy's progress was an
uncompensable necessity of war. This definition was inconsistent with Vattel's position that the destruction
of crops to deny them to the enemy, for example, is compensable under a takings rationale. The opinion
interestingly discusses three other attempts to obtain indemnity for war damages that follow Vattel more
closely in spirit and bear evidence of the deep roots of the distinction between noncompensable war losses
and compensable damages. Id. at 235-39; see infra notes 525-30 and accompanying text.
443. During much of the nineteenth century, international law generally provided that a neutral civilian
residing in a belligerent's territory assumed the risk of wartime devastation to. the same degree as did
belligerent civilians. The United States adopted this view during the Civil War, and Great Britain followed
suit when determining not to support the claims of British subjects for property destroyed in France during
the Franco-Prussian War. Nonetheless, a distinction was drawn between neutral's property destroyed in
the direct prosecution of a war versus apparently wanton damages away from the battlefield as a matter
of equity rather than right. See 2 F. WHARTON, supra note 193, at 586-87. The assumption of risk view
did not encompass positive violations of the laws of war, which were themselves vague and unsettled.
Neutral property rights did not receive generally accepted protection until the 1856 Declaration of Paris
under the law of maritime warfare, rather than under land warfare principles.
444. It would be possible to pursue delineation of the scope of battle additionally through examining
what constitutes "post-battle" wanton destruction, but that would require a general review of military
manuals and court-martial records of various nations, which is beyond the scope of this inquiry.
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indirectly define the scope of the engagement as the boundary of force ma-
jeure.445
The congressional treatment of war damages, dating as far back as the
Revolutionary War, demonstrates the concept of the scope of engagement and
proper interpretation of incidental, noncompensable war losses under American
law." For example, the House of Representatives denied a compensation
petition for the 1776 burning of a house by order of an American general who
sought to dislodge British troops on the basis that such general ravages of war
were never compensated." 7 The House of Representatives declined another
compensation petition for inundation of a Louisiana plantation during the War
of 1812, when an American general purposefully breached a levee to hinder
British troops from advancing on New Orleans. 44 By contrast, the Civil War
Senate was inclined to grant the compensation petition of a loyal citizen when
his house, located in a Union state within rifleshot of a fort, was destroyed by
order of the fort commander to prevent its use for sniping during Confederate
attacks. 449 Throughout the Civil War period claims for compensation for any
losses inflicted in the course of military operations on foreign property located
in the Confederacy were generally denied on the theory that foreigners through
residency assumed risks identical to those of belligerent civilians.45 Howev-
er, as seen above, on the municipal law side, a different view was sometimes
taken toward civilian losses incurred during Confederate incursions on Union
territory.4"' Eventually, the broader traditional view that the ravages of war
were generally uncompensable gave way to a distinction paralleling Vattel,
holding uncompensable only those damages incidental to actual combat.
445. Neutral losses even on the battlefield must be unintentional for the force majeure principle to
apply, as demonstratedby two cases decidedby the same arbitrator following a Peruvian civil war. In 1894,
an Italian citizen was apparently killed by government fire when impressed by insurgents to bear a flag
of truce during a lull in an engagement. Cresceri Case (Italy v. Peru), 15 R. IrNT'L ARB. AWARDS 449,
449-52 (1901). The government was held responsible for his death due to the negligence of its forces,
despite a failure to prove that his death resulted from aimed government fire. In rendering a decision, the
arbitrator indicated that "the armed conflict. .. cannot be regarded as a pitched battle in the course of
which persons foreign to the struggle might have been struck accidentally [and neutral civilians were not
encouraged to take shelter in advance]." Id. at 451. In the same insurrection, however, an Italian citizen
was killed by government fire from outside while within his residence's courtyard. Piola Case (Italy v.
Peru), id. at 444-45. Responsibility was denied on the grounds that the death was unintentional under the
circumstances and constituted a fortuitous accident (recognizingforce majeure by implication). Id.
446. For the history of American treatment of war claims, see generally REPORT OF WAR CLAIMS
COMMISSION H.R. Doc. No. 580, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. vii-viii, 8-13 (1950) [hereinafter WCC REPORT];
WAR CLAIMS ARiswnG OUT OF WORLD WAR II, H.R. Doc. No. 67, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 62-91 (1953)
[hereinafter WCC SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT].
447. See United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 235-36 (1887) (Frothingham claim).
448. See id. at 236 (Villiers claim).
449. See id. at 236-39 (Best claim, eventually rejected under presidential veto as inviting other costly
claims and on grounds that such claims had been paid in the past only on an ex gratla basis - an assertion
about the voluntary nature of payment that Vattel would not dispute).
450. See supra note 443.
451. See, e.g., United States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227, 236-39 (1887) (congressional
treatment of Best claim).
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The older views changed visibly with the development of diplomatic
protection practice under the due diligence principle in the protection of
aliens.452 The development of state practice concerning the scope of engage-
ment appears to find its modern roots in nineteenth century insurrection
precedents, particularly in state views expressed in connection with aliens'
losses in fighting between government and rebel forces. Insurrection cases
often deal on the facts with war losses inflicted by government forces in the
course of military operations and so address the force majeure issue separately
from due diligence concerns.
Thus, in the 1881 suppression of an insurrection at Sfax, Tunisia, following
bombardment of the city, certain Italian-owned buildings were occupied by
French troops.453 The Italian government protested that this violated treaty
provisions for the protection of Italian property, to which the French responded
that the infringement arose in a case of force majeure since the acts were part
of the military operation restoring governmental authority in the insurgent
town. Italy rejected the force majeure characterization on the ground that the
bombardment itself had already completely dislodged the insurgents and thus
presumably the battle was over. Similarly, in arbitration relating to a 1902
Venezuelan insurrection an Italian citizen was granted compensation for battle
damage to his house resulting from insurgent fire when government forces
established a position in front of the house.454 In language paralleling Vattel's
original "takings" rational, the award found that by establishing their position
the government troops removed any damage from characterization as an
incidental result of war.
The distinction between treatment of incidental losses within the scope of
battle and losses from general military operations is evident in an arbitration
decision concerning loss of American property in a 1901 Venezuelan insurrec-
tion.455 The property in question involved a single telephone office and the
telephone lines throughout a city. Two different claims were raised. First, the
government originally took possession of the telephone office and used the
lines to assist military operations against the rebels. The property suffered
damage in subsequent attacks by the revolutionaries directed against the
building occupied by government troops. Second, telephone lines in the city
were exposed to damage by a subsequent government naval bombardment of
452. Once closer examination of loss of foreign property in the course of military operations became
necessary, the force majeure doctrine defining the limits of inevitable accident of war seems to go back
to French practice and indirectly to Vattel. Earlier incidents may include reference to force majeure, but
they seem to mean something different as they appear to encompass practically any effects of military
operations not precluded under what were then more loosely defined laws of war.
453. See Force Majeure Report, supra note 401, at 113.
454. Petrocelli Case (Italy v. Venez.), 15 R. INT'L. AR. AWARDS 444 (1903).
455. American Electric and Manufacturing Company Case (U.S. v. Venez), 9 R. INT'LARB. AWARDS
145, 145-46 (1903).
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the city. Compensation for war damage was granted in the former but not in
the latter case based on the following reasoning:
The general principles of international law which establish the non-responsibility
of the government for damages suffered by neutral property owing to imperious
necessities of military operations within the radius of... operations, or as a
consequence of the damages of a battle, incidentally caused by the means of
destruction employed in the war which are not disapproved by the law-of nations,
are well known.
Nevertheless, the said principles likewise have their limitations [as] when the
destruction of the neutral property is due to the previous and deliberate occupation
by the Government for the public benefit or as being essential for the success of
military operations... With reference to [damages to telephone lines in the naval
bombardment], these being the incidental and necessary consequences of a legitimate
act of war on the part of the government's men-of-war, it is therefore dis-
allowed. 4
The localized nature of the scope of battle is recognizable again in arbitration
following a Philippines insurrection. The arbitrator denied indemnity for
damage to a British-owned pumping station, incurred when the American
forces shelled revolutionaries who were dug in approximately fifty yards on
each side of the station.457 The damage was deemed "incident" to military
operations because it did not reach beyond what operations necessarily in-
volved.4"' By the end of World War I, the locational focus of an "act of war"
was advanced by the U.S. Department of State itself in an exchange with Italy
pursuing claims of an American citizen whose house, allegedly located miles
from the Austrian-Italian front, was razed for military purposes.45 9 Italy
456. Id. at 146-47.
457. Luzon Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.) (1926), Nielson's Rep. 596, reprinted in 5
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (G. Hackworth ed. 1943).
458. Limiting excusable damage to the requirements of a reasonable military operation acts as a check
on 'wanton" destruction and appears often in opposition to military necessity. Compare Shattuck Claim
(United States/Mexico 1868), 4 J. MOORE, supra note 75, at 3668, with Force Majeure Report, supra note
401, at 106-07 (British-Belgian exchange of views concerning the 1830 Antwerp bombardment in the course
of a Belgian insurrection), and id. at 124 (British Law Officers' opinion on losses in the 1879-1884
Chilean-Peruvian War). However, this limitation does not go to the scope of engagement but rather, the
problem of acts in violation of the laws of war itself. See also Samoan Claims Decision (U.S. & Gr. Brit.
v. Ger.) (1910), MALLOY 1589, 1591, reprinted in 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 457,
at 694.
459. In re. Joseph Faletich (U.S. v. Italy) (1929), reprinted in 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 457, at 697-99. The State Department employed the term "act of war" "as that term is used
to indicate acts for which no liability attaches." Id. at 697. It denied on the facts that the razing could
constitute a military operation "equivalent to an act of war," or that it was lost "in the track of war as that
term is understood in international practice, or that its destruction was warranted as a police measure."
Id. at 698. "Act of war" was understood by contemporaries as "an act of defense or attack against the
enemy." The reference to "in the track of war" is to both the traditional lawful exception for damages to
private property resulting from troop movements (traditionally field damage). See 2 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 414 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952). For a more figurative reference
to battlefieldlocation, see J. Dania Bembelista (Neth. V. Venez.) (1904), Ralston's Rep. 900-01, reprinted
in 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 457, at 697-99. See also E. BORCHARD, supra note 437,
at 255-62. The reference to "police measures" is an allusion to actions combatting disease or similar
hazards. See The William Hardman (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), 6 R. INT'L ARB. AwARDs 25 (1913) (destruction
of alien's property under necessity rationale permissible to avoid spread of disease among soldiers, and
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essentially argued that all damages incurred in military activities were noncom-
pensable until the U.S. challenged its interpretation of an act of war precluding
a right of indemnity."
This customary law has been overtaken in twentieth century practice
through the insertion of special war reparations clauses in treaties ending
hostilities, in part based on the concept of war guilt." Under such treaties,
the defeated states were forced to make payments indemnifying foreigners'
personal losses merely on the basis that they were causally related to the war
and occurred in the defeated state's territory. These arrangements thus aban-
doned the existing distinction between noncompensable war losses incurred
incidental to hostilities, and compensable losses incurred outside the scope of
engagement. American views of the applicable customary international law rule
have not changed, however, based upon the post-World War II proceedings
of the War Claims Commission.
The American War Claims Commission's statutory mandate included the
definition of a compensable war claim." 2 In 1950, it proposed a preliminary
definition tied to the established customary law distinction." 3 Citing Ameri-
can international law sources,' one element of a compensable war claim
was to be "that such loss, injury or damage must be the result of action not
normally incident to the conduct of hostilities." 5 In 1953, the War Claims
Commission noted problems with the application of this definition to a war in
which attacks on civilian targets were common. It went on to opine that its
statutory mandate was generally to provide compensation for all war damages,
consistent with existing treaty practice." 6 However, the Commission itself
both recognized the American international law view of the abiding customary
law, and indicated that its adoption of a broader standard was due to municipal
thus not an act of war).
460. 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 457, at 698. It should be noted that the State
Department used at least one insurrection case in discussing the regular war problem here, a recognition
of their applicability.
461. See R. LILucH & B. WESTON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR SETTLEMENT BY LUMP SUM
AGREEmENTS 116, 122-25, 133-38, 159-60 (1975).
462. See War Claims Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-896, 62 Stat. 1240 (1948), as interpreted in H.R.
Rep. No. 976, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 4 (1947).
463. See WCC REPORT, supra note 446, at 5-6.
464. Id. at6n.9.
465. WCC REPORT, supra note 446, at 6.
466. See WCC SuPPLEMENTARYREPORT, supra note 446, at 113-15. See also Fraleigh, Compensation
for WarDamage to American Property in Allied Countries, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 748, 749-50 (1947). Based
upon the change in treaty practice, some commentators appear to have reached the conclusion that
distinctions under the older customary law have lost their force. See R. LILLICH & B. WESTON, supra note
461, at 204-05; R. LuLUCH & G. CHRISTENSON, INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS: THEIR PREPARATION AND
PRESENTATION 66-67 (1962). This view is understandable because commentators were most interested in
contemporary claims practice under the treaties. Our interest in these customary law distinctions, however,
goes back to its source in doctrinal views of war as necessity or force majeure.
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law concerns. 7 Thus the distinction between force majeure war losses and
compensable war claims still survives, and provides the limits to the scope of
engagement standard.
Advances in modem weaponry do not require a change in this standard.
Naval doctrine in the form of the "bubble" concept is linked to a threat analy-
sis imputing hostile intent to a trespasser, and does not describe the same limits
as the geographic battlefield for purposes of determining the scope of engage-
ment. On a simplistic level, the two should be separated to avoid confusing
naval policy or tactics with legal doctrine. More substantially, however,
Persian Gulf events preceding the downing of Flight 655 demonstrate their
incompatibility. While naval orders in the form of the differing rules of
engagement applicable during the Stark and Vincennes incidents are presumably
still classified, there is some evidence of their content in the form of the 1984
and 1987 NOTAMs giving warning of the potential for defensive measures by
U.S. warships. In effect, the apparent final defensive zone for aircraft visible
in the 1984 NOTAM was the area described by a circle with a radius of five
nautical miles around warships, extending 2,000 feet into the air."5 Howev-
er, missiles were fired at the U.S.S. Stark from a distance of over twenty
nautical miles, 9 and the 1987 NOTAM no longer specified any nominal
defensive zone. While the rules of engagement may contain more detailed
distance indications concerning imputation of hostile intent that were not
announced in the 1987 NOTAM for military reasons, the Vincennes was
already cleared to fire missiles at a distance of twenty nautical miles.47
Given the weapons technology problem and the anticipatory self-defense
concept and assuming the scope of a naval engagement automatically extended
upwards and outward to the range of weapons that might be launched against
combatants from outside the immediate area of hostilities, there would be no
practical limits to the scope of engagement. The expansive scope of the
operational ideas underlying the 1987 NOTAM is implicit in its direction that
467. The War Claims Commission did admit that historical American practice in the war claims area
was mixed. See WCC SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT, supra note 446, at 90, which is certainly accurate through
the Civil War. Following the insurrection cases in the late nineteenth century, however, the distinction
drawn between war losses and war claims was followed and the War Claims Commission accepted it as
the American view. The resolution of what are compensable war damages retains its relevance and
presumably may next be addressed in the context of Iraq's responsibility for war damages in Kuwait
(recalled under U.N. Security Council Resolution 674, 649 and accepted in principle by Iraq under U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) (Lexis, Nexis Library, Wires File)). Here
the issue is whether a general conflict in violation of prohibitions on aggressive war leads to responsibility
for all resulting damage, or whether the older law of war rules, distinguishing between incidental and other
combat damage, applies. See sources cited supra note 518.
468. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
469. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
470. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The increased difficulty of these problems following
developments in modem weapons technology is discussed above in the context of anticipatory self-defense
and the problem of absorbing the first blow.
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civil aircraft monitor IAD or MAD frequencies over the entire Gulf. Fixing
the scope of engagement at the limits of potential weapons that might be used
would swallow up any legal rule.
The downing of Flight 655 did not occur within the scope of engagement,
understood as the confines of the battlefield derived from precedent. The
destruction of Flight 655 was therefore not "incidental" to the concurrent
surface engagement, and thus the resulting damage cannot be excused under
force majeure. To argue that Flight 655 entered the scope of engagement when
it was mistakenly identified at a distance as an Iranian F-14 on an attack run,
confuses misapprehension of attack with the scope of engagement and ignores
the fact that it was traveling within an international civil air corridor. The
downing of Flight 655 should not be deemed lawful merely because the
Vincennes' commanding officer reasonably mistook the situation as presenting
an integrated surface and air attack.
Reconceptualizing the incident as a mistake problem does not excuse the
Vincennes from liability. While there is no international law doctrine of
mistake as such, the mistake problem probably lies doctrinally closest to the
fortuitous event concept underforce majeure (Roman law's casusfortuitous).
If under a scope of engagement approach war itself is vis major and consequent
losses are noncompensable, should injury caused by a misapprehension of
attack also be noncompensable? The outcomes in the Dogger Bank, Waima,
Mazuia and Mukden Incidents, involving responsibility for the unlawful use
of force against individuals, demonstrate that under normal circumstances
injuries caused by an act of putative self-defense are not viewed as inevitable
accidents of war precluding a finding of violation of the primary obliga-
tion.47 The liability question in these precedents did not turn on whether the
mistakes in question were viewed as reasonable or unreasonable. Thus,
regardless of the reasonableness of the Vincennes' mistake, the downing of
Flight 655 cannot be considered a noncompensable fortuitous event.
VI. THE SECONDARY OBLIGATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Establishing the secondary obligation of state responsibility presents its own
complications in five distinct areas: 1) the ILC Draft Code including its
proposed criminalization of state responsibility; 2) ile doctrinal dispute over
the subjective or objective basis of state responsibility (the Roman law roots
of culpa and mistake); 3) the ICI judges' problem in deciding the Flight 655
incident, as illuminated by the Corfu Channel Case; 4) the interplay of the
attribution problem with the subjective or objective basis of state responsibility
471. The result is arguably the same in the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian FronderIncdent, but there the case
may be treated as a territorial invasion case, raising further complications.
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Oinking an individual's act to a state); and 5) the twentieth century develop-
ment of indemnity for the unlawful or mistaken use of force.
A. Criminalization and the Perception Gap Between American Views and the
ILC Draft Code
Iran claimed before the ICAO Council that the downing of Flight 655 was
a criminal act entailing state responsibility under international law.472 Iran's
application to the ICJ alleges that the actions by the United States amounted
to a criminal violation of the Montreal Convention.'I If the American juris-
dictional challenge to the Montreal Convention claim succeeds or if the Iranian
substantive argument fails, Iran's logical recourse would be to argue that the
ILC's Draft Code recognizes the criminalization of unlawful force under
general principles of state responsibility. American scholarship has remained
skeptical of the ILC's Draft Code project since the 1950s,474 when the ILC
abandoned the substantive American view of state responsibility475 keyed to
the protection of aliens in favor of a more abstract articulation of secondary
obligations.4 76 This skepticism has clouded understanding of the functioning
472. See Iranian ICJ Application, supra note 1, at 6.
473. Montreal Convention, supra note 60.
474. American commentators generally believe that Rapporteur Ago's views are simply too abstract
to attract much attention, and so by inference should exercise little or no influence on development of the
law. See, e.g., Lillich, The Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 21 (R. Lillich ed. 1983). Ago's
views have also been criticized by continental commentators. See, e.g., STAATENVERANTWORTLICHKEIT
13, 83-84, 87-88, 94-95, 99, 108, 113-114 (1984) (1983 Deutsche Gessellschaft fiir V61kerrecht) (critical
comments on Ago's theories of international crime and effects of breach on third party states, and departure
from decentralized nature of international law system); Zemanek, Schuld-und Erfolgshaftung im Ennwurf
der Vlkerrechts Kommission uber Staatenverantwortlichkeit: Zugleich Bemerungen zum Prozess der
Kodification in Rahmen der VereintenNationen, FESTSCHRIFFOR RUDOLF BINDSCHEDLER:BOTSC-AFTER,
PROFESSOR DR. IuR, ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG AM. 8. JULI 1980 315 (1980); Marek, Criminalising State
Responsibility, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DRO1T INTERNATIONAL 466 (1978-79). However, the attractiveness
of certain of the Rapporteur's views on political grounds to some states, the Rapporteur's stature as an ICJ
member, and the fact that these views in effect have the ILC imprimatur make them potentially quite
influential. Another work makes the point that the Rapporteur's views have been criticized by continental
publicists, but implies that the dearth of Anglo-American discussion concerning Ago's ideas is merely the
result of language barriers whereas it is more likely a problem of fundamentally different views of
international law. See Simma, Grundfragen der Staatenverantworthlichkeit in der Arbeit der International
Law Commission, 24 ARCmv DES V6LKERRECHTS 357, 364 n.22 (1986).
475. See Lilich, supra note 474, at 20-21; Lillich, Duties of States Regarding the Civil Rights of
Aliens, 3 REc. DES COuRS 329, 379 (1978). This tendency has also been noted by non-American commenta-
tors. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 474, at 363-64.
476. See e.g., Lillich, supra note 474, at 1-60. The Restatement Second dedicated its entire Part IV
to the topic of "Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens." In the introductory notes to Part IV, it notes
simply that its coverage is directed solely at that class of state conduct that involves the exercise of
territorialjurisdiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
497-98 (1962) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT SECOND]. It also goverifed other violations of international law
in peacetime, while it excluded wartime injuries. However, the Restatement Third posits that the older law
of state responsibility relating to injury to aliens has largely been displaced in practice by human rights
law. See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 74.
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of the Draft Code, making difficult any assessment of its application to the
Flight 655 incident.4 'I
The Draft Code and its official commentary were strongly influenced by
the continental legal science views of Roberto Ago, ILC Special Rapporteur
for the Draft Code from 1963 to 1980. 41 s Ago's attempt to define the theoret-
ical aspects of state responsibility as pure secondary rules is the most recent
product of the ILC's deliberations in this area.479 Because Ago is a current
member of the ICJ, the Draft Code may play a role in the eventual disposition
of the Flight 655 incident. But even if the Draft Code were a codification of
existing law, which it emphatically is not,48° it would be incorrect to apply
its provisions on international crime to a situation involving the mistaken use
of force.
477. The doctrinal views of state responsibility expressed in some of the Corfu Channel Case opinions,
are close to the view of objective responsibility underlying the Restatement Second. However, it is unlikely
that the current Restatement Third view, which maintains that traditional state responsibility ideas have been
largely displaced by human rights law, would find ready acceptance before the ICI.
478. See Tsutsui, A Turning Point for the Theory of Self-Defence: In Relation to an Article Proposed
by the ILCDraft Convention Concerning "State Responsibility," 80 KoKUsAiH6 GAiK6 ZASsI 1 (293), 111-
12 (403-404) (1981). The views concerning self-defense and necessity found in the official commentary
are of Ago and not those of the ILC, as evidenced by the ILC's decision that its opinions concerning the
role of necessity and self-defense under the U.N. Charter could only be determined by proper U.N. organs,
not by the ILC.
479. Concepts of state responsibility have played an important role in the development of the Draft
Code. State responsibility for injury to aliens was the subject of attempted codification efforts as early as
the 1930 Hague Codification Conference. See Bases of Discssion for the Conference Drawn Up by the
Preparatory Committee, League of Nations Doc. C.75.M.69.1929.V., reprinted in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONALLAW 1930, at 423-702 (Rosenne ed. 1975). This
League of Nations codification effort generally failed due to a lack of consensus among states regarding
the substance of duties owed to aliens, rehearsing the modem division of state opinion on this subject. For
a general history of early codification efforts in the state responsibility area, see Garcfa-Amador, Interna-
tional Responsibility, [19561 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 173, 176-80, U.N. Doc. AICN.4196. In the 1950s,
state responsibility for injury to aliens was again one of the earliest subjects of ILC codification efforts.
Garcfa-Amador as Special Rapporteur approached state responsibility law from the traditional viewpoint
of the protection of aliens. His views that international minimum standards were the basis for protection
of aliens were not acceptable to other segments of the international community. Lillich, supra note 474,
at 17-19. These views did underlie the development of the United Nations human rights movement, and
the approach of the Restatement Third, but it is questionable whether most other states are now more ready
to accept this legal position than was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. See supra note 455 and accompany-
ing text.
As a result, the ILC in 1963 appointed Ago as Special Rapporteur, with a mandate to codify the
theoretical aspects of state responsibility as secondary rules of international law under the new Draft Code,
abandoning efforts to reach agreement on primary obligations. See Lillich, supra note 474 at 19-20. These
views have persisted in the Draft Code beyond Ago's tenure as Special Rapporteur. Riphagen succeeded
Ago as Special Rapporteur in 1980, working on part II of the Draft Code without changing its overall
direction. His chief contribution was his realization, made despite Ago's approach and the mandate of the
ILC, that not all primary rules should be viewed equally when devising secondary rules upon which to
premise responsibility upon breach of the primary rule. See Simma, supra note 474, at 386-87. While this
view is more practical than Ago's vision, it does not avoid and may exacerbate the problems created by
the Draft Code's approach that defines state responsibility essentially as anything beyond the determination
of the duty to pay indemnities.
480. See infra note 540.
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The more problematic aspects of the Draft Code involve its "international
crime" provisions and the issue of whether the Vincennes' use of force against
Flight 655 was lawful. Ago's employment of distinct concepts of international
"crimes" and "delicts" under part I, article 19 of the Draft Code and related
provisions have been sharply criticized.481 Some commentators have dis-
agreed with the "criminalization" of state responsibility because they assert the
entire doctrine is incompatible with the demands of substantive criminal law,
arguing that a state's actions cannot be assessed using principles developed for
flesh-and-blood individuals." More sophisticated criticisms perceive an
attempt to treat substantive categories beyond state aggression (e.g., genocide,
apartheid, and massive pollution) as an uncontrollable new source of interna-
tional law. 4" Meanwhile, Socialist commentators have approached the issue
of "criminalization" not as an attempt to criminalize the law, but as an intellec-
tual shorthand to distinguish certain serious international law breaches from
lesser ones for purposes of establishing enforcement mechanisms beyond the
U.N. collective security system.4 Under Anglo-American views of interna-
tional law, state responsibility should concern itself only with questions of
indemnity.485 In short, the criminalization concept is neither part of custom-
ary law, nor has its introduction in the Draft Code found general acceptance.
Iran's attempt to preserve its ICAO council claim of a criminal act before
the ICJ might be based further on a characterization of the Vincennes' destruc-
tion of Flight 655 as "state terrorism" -- a concept employed more often in
political than in legal discourse. The primary shortcoming of Iran's position
under this approach would be that criminal liability, if any, presumably
requires that the Vincennes knew at the time it fired that the unidentified
aircraft was a civilian airliner.485
481. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 474.
482. See, e.g., Gilbert, The Criminal Responsibility of States, 39 INT'L & CoW. L.Q. 345 (1990).
483. See e.g., Marek, supra note 474.
484. See, e.g., Oeser, Volkerrechtsverletzangenundvo1kerrechtlicheVerantwartlichkeit,inVLKERR-
ECffT GRUNDRat 233-34 (E. Oeser & W. Poeggel eds. 1988); Mohr, The ILC's Distinction Between
"International Crimes and IntenationalDelicts "and its Implications, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 115 (M. Spinedi & B. Simma eds. 1987); Graefrath & Mohr, Volkerrechtliche
und strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeitftlr internationale Verbrechen, 35 STAAT UND REcHT 29, 33-34(1986).
485. See, e.g., 11. BROWNLIE, SYSTEMOFTHE LAW OF NATIONS: STATEREsPoNSiBIrY32-3 (1983)
[hereinafter I. BRowNLI, STATE RESPONSIBILMY].
486. The Iranian assertion, that the American failure to accept liability or to pay compensation violated
the Montreal Convention, presents several subsidiary legal problems. Article 1 of the Montreal Convention
criminalizes only intentional in-service destruction of civilian aircraft. See supra note 62, at art. 1. If
following the ICAO Report, the U.S. admits that the Vincennes shot down Flight 655 in the mistaken but
good faith belief that it was an F-14 aircraft, mistake then becomes the relevant issue. The ICJ must then
determine whether the Convention requires merely a general intention to destroy an aircraft (so long as
it turns out to be a civilian aircraft) or an intention to destroy an aircraft with knowledge of its civilian
nature. The Iranian position also faces the issue of self-defense since article 1 criminalizes an individual's
destruction of an aircraft only if the offense is committed "unlawfully." To the extent self-defense, necessity
and similar international law principles exculpate the action of the Vincennes, those actions could not be
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B. Objective Versus Subjective Basis of State Responsibility
At the core of doctrinal disputes concerning state responsibility lies the
issue of whether it arises automatically upon the unexcused breach of a primary
international law obligation (referred to as responsibility on an objective
basis),4"7 or whether the presence of the additional element of fault is re-
quired (called fault or culpa, following Roman law and modern civil law
usage, as responsibility on a subjective basis)."' Even the terms of this dis-
pute are foreign to Anglo-American jurists, however, because its categories
considered unlawful or "wrongful."
487. The current intellectual distance between American views ofinternational law and the ILC's Draft
Code promulgated under Ago's direction is so great that it appears unclear whether there is nominally much
common ground for scholarly discussion. At one time, however, the two views were not so far apart. The
1930 Hague Codification Conference attempted to confirm the subjective basis of liability, by tying it to
private law respondeat superior theories under the French Civil Code. See Borchard, Government
Responsibility in Tort: VII, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577,518-19 (1928) [hereinafter GovernmentalResponsibill-
ty]. American views of state responsibility, on the other hand, were formed through precedents for injury
to aliens by private parties. Here, under due diligence and similar analyses, the difference between an
official's negligence in failing to protect foreigners (a fault analysis) and a breach of duty analysis based
on a standard of reasonable efforts, but no absolute guaranty of protection (an objective analysis), were
regarded as functionally indistinguishable. See Fifth Report on State Responsibility, [19601 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. CoMM'N 61-63, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/125 [hereinafter Fifth Report on State Responsibility]; H. LAUTER-
PACHT, PRiVATE LAW SouRcEs AND ANALOGIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-41 (1927). The American
perspective thus rejected the subjective view of 'wrongful" in favor of an analysis equating a "wrongful
act" with the breach of an international legal obligation, thereby effectively adopting an objective approach.
See Borchard, supra, at 224-27. For an example of this objective approach, see Harvard Draft Convention
on the Responsibility of States, reprinted in 23 AM. 1. INT'L L. 131 Strp. (1929) [hereinafter 1929 Draft
Convention on the Responsibility of States] (shaped subsequent American views of state responsibility).
This Draft Convention is phrased largely in terms of duties of states, while the operative language of its
article 7 provides that "[a] state is responsible if an injury to an alien results from the wrongful act or
omission.' Id. at 157. The commentary indicates that "wrongful" is understood in terms of a failure "to
accord to the alien that protection which is owed to him by international law." Id.
The Restatement Second addressed the issue of wrongfulness specifically in the context of conduct
causing injury to an alien. RESTATEMENT SECOND, supra note 476. It defined wrongfulness in terms of
a departure from the "international standard ofjustice" or a violation of an international agreement, using
an objective view of responsibility. Similarly, it speaks in terms of violations of rights, referring to
developing human rights law, which it notes now overlaps and supplements the older law of responsibility
for injury to aliens. Id. at 144-45. In deciding the Flight 655 incident, however, some ICJ judges may be
receptive to addressing state responsibility in terms of a subjective analysis, as evidenced by many of the
judges' opinions in the Corfu Channel Case. See infra notes 501-25 and accompanying text.
488. The traditional formulation of subjectively-based state responsibility also requires injury and
attribution of the act to the state. Rapporteur Ago omitted the requirement of injury from the Draft Code
that defines a wrongful act of a state as conduct attributable to a state that is in breach of its international
obligations. Part I, art. 3 of Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Adopted by the International Law
Commission on First Reading. Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Thirty-Second Session, [1980] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. CoMM. 30 (part 2), U.N. Doc. No. A/35/101. Article 1 already provides that every internationally
wrongful act of a state entails its international responsibility. While injury beyond mere "legal injury" in
the form of the breach itself has traditionally been required under state responsibility principles, commenta-
tors have noted Ago's interest in expanding state responsibility beyond traditional ideas of reparation and
indemnity to derive a method for enforcing substantive international law that may have led him to dispose
of the injury requirement. See Tanzi, Is Damage a Distinct Conditionfor the Existence ofan Internationally
WrangfulAct?, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY 1 (M. Spinedi & B. Simma
eds. 1987). This dilution may simply be a means to permit nations to collectively pursue violations of
so-called erga omnes norms committed against third nations as actually affecting all nations.
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and reasoning are distant from the common-law tradition. Understanding the
Roman law roots of the culpa concept is not a sure guide to the subjective
basis of state responsibility, but it does shed some light .on the confusing array
of doctrinal views expressed in this area.48 9
The original form of delictual action under Roman civil law was narrowly
confined to instances of wrongful damage to property caused by a direct
personal act, the elements of which included the act itself, its illegality, and
the consequent damages. 4' In the course of Praetorian development, howev-
er, claims of indirect causation were permitted under related forms of ac-
tion.49' While illegality in the form of wrongfulness (iniuria), was essentially
assumed under the original form of action, the action's extension to indirect
causation led to distinctions in the form of dolus (intent) and culpa (negli-
gence).492 Dolus was assumed in a direct causation case involving a positive
act as long as the actor had legal capacity (i.e., was neither insane nor a
child). 493 On the other hand, the concept of culpa came to be recognized as
the basis of liability in indirect causation cases involving unintentional harm
(e.g., situations that included the omission and neglect of legal duty). In time,
the Roman law concept of culpa in some situations took on an additional
meaning that equated it to wrongfulness (iniuria).494 This separate and broad-
er meaning of culpa as unjustified wrongfulness characterized certain acts or
omissions as unlawful, as opposed to those acts that might be prima facie
unlawful but not wrongful, as in the case of inflicting injury in self-defense.
In categorical terms, Roman law distinguished sharply between acts (where
intent or dolus was assumed) and omissions (where culpa was needed for
liability). Modern commentators' views of state responsibility based on fault
maintain these categories, tending to distinguish sharply between act and
omission cases. Thus, some publicists maintain that culpa is required for a
state to be responsible for its organs' behavior under an omissions analysis
(typically through the failure to control private parties' behavior that is injuri-
ous to another state's protected interests), but not in "act" cases.495 Others
489. See Force Majeure Report, supra note 401, at 188-201 (categorized list of commentators); I.
VON MONCH, DAS V6LIERRECHTLICHE DELIKT IN DER MODERNEN ENTWICKLUNG DER V6LKERRECHTS-
GEmEINSCHAFT 152-69 (1963); H. LAUTERPACrr, supra note 487, at 134-43. See also Bedjaoui, Responsi-
bility of States: Fault and Strict Liability, 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 358 (1987).
490. The lexAquilia was an older statutory provision originally covering damages to property (damnum
inuria datum), which developed in a fashion somewhat analogous to the development of trespass on the
case. See P. VAN WARMELO, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN CrviL LAW 214-19 (1976).
In that sense, Roman law culpa is analogous to negligence under trespass on the case. The actio legis
Aquilia was originally tied to the idea damnum corpore corpori datum. Id. at 214-15.
491. Such related forms of action include the actio infactum or the actio utilis. Id. at 215-16.
492. Id. at 216-17..
493. Id. at 216.
494. Id. at 217-18.
495. See K. STRUPP, DAS V6LKERRECHTUCHE DELIT (1920) (paralleling older dolus versus culpa
distinctions); See Schlochauer, Die Entwicklung des volkerrechtlichen Deliktsrechts, 16 ARCHLY DES
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argue that culpa is a requirement for any finding of state responsibility. 496
The broader meaning of culpa, equating it with injuria as unjustified wrongful-
ness, survives even in nominally neutral formulations of state-responsibility
principles, such as those of the ILC Draft Code, where articles 29-34 set forth
circumstances precluding wrongfulness (such as consent, force majeure,
self-defense, and so forth).497 Although few modern proponents of fault-based
state responsibility would equate their concept of fault directly to the Roman
law standard, its basic conceptual framework remains.
Whether culpa is required to find state responsibility (the objective versus
subjective question), the concept of culpa fits into the broader context of the
assessment of responsibility for injury to protected interests. The structure of
international law continues to be influenced by the Roman law categories.
Roman law juxtaposed negligence (in the sense of the broadest degree of
culpa)49 8 with casus (accident or fortuitous event, constituting part of the
force majeure concept). 499 An approach to state responsibility adopting the
subjective basis view will tend toward a practical universe of injury parallel
to Roman law by use of the concepts of dolus, culpa (both in the sense of
negligence and unjustified wrongfulness), casus, and vis major (as the other
half of the force majeure concept). This inquiry has already touched upon
casus and vis major in connection with the force majeure characterization of
noncompensable war losses. Even if one postulates responsibility on an objec-
tive basis for the unlawful use of force, culpa lives on under older precedents
in terms of its de'nition of the boundary of casus (fortuitous event), which is
recognized to exclude state responsibility under modern law. 500
V6LKERRECHTS 239, 248-56 (1975) (distinguishing primary and secondary delictual acts based upon act
versus omission distinction). But see I. BROWNLIE, STATE RFSPONSMMITY, supra note 485, at 42-43.
496. See, e.g., H. LAUTERPAcHT, supra note 487, at 134-43 (1970).
497. This follows the mixing of culpa with iniuria in the sense of wrongful behavior as opposed to
prima facie unlawful behavior that is justified in fact. The structure of this portion of the Draft Code is
among Special Rapporteur Ago's legacies. Article 35, which reserves the possibility of compensation in
all cases except self-defense and countermeasures (e.g., reprisals), was added as a result ofILC discussions
of his draft. If the availability of either self-defense or necessity were proven in the case of Flight 655,
the Draft Code would preclude characterization of that act as "wrongful." In Ago's eyes, preclusion of
wrongfulness would not necessarily exclude liability in either case, although upon revision the Draft Code,
in recognition of self-defense's special character, eventually came to exclude liability. See U.N. Doc,
AICN.413181Add.5-7, A/CN.4/328/Add.1-4, [1980 1 Y.B. INT'L L. Comm. 190.
498. Late Roman law defined different degrees of negligence, the broadest degree being culpa levis
in abstracto (analogous to the paterfamilias standard in state responsibility doctrine, requiring the utmost
diligence). In precedents and commentary following a subjective approach, however, some argue that the
proper degree is the narrower culpa levis in concreto (analogous to the diligentia quam in suis rebus adhibet
standard in state responsibility doctrine, the level of care which a person would exercise in the conduct
of his own affairs). See P. VAN WARMELO, supra note 490, at 246-48. Exploring these details is beyond
the scope of this article, as no position is taken on the broader question of whether state responsibility
principles are best organized on an objective or subjective basis.
499. Id. at 216-17.
500. Cf. B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 226-32 (1953) ("fault" is equivalent to "unlawful" under objective analysis, but noting under
vis major that unintentional acts evade responsibility). While Cheng made an analogous connection in trying
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For those who espouse fault-based views of state responsibility, some
approaches to culpa may result in denial of state responsibility in cases involv-
ing reasonable mistake. These differing views are visible in the Corfu Channel
Case. 5
0 1
C. Objective Versus Subjective Responsibility in the Corfu Channel Case
The Corfu Channel Case is important as the only prior ICI precedent
addressing the basis of state responsibility in detail. The opinions of individual
judges embody different views of state responsibility and raise the possibility
of different outcomes in the context of the mistaken use of force. Beyond
illuminating the issue of the objective versus subjective basis of state responsi-
bility, the Corfu Channel Case also offers insight into the decisional process
the judges will likely follow in considering the Flight 655 problem. The IC
will be required to resolve the competing sources of the obligation problem
in determining the content and nature of the duty applicable to the Vincennes.
This decision will be difficult, given the view that international law is made
only by its subjects and not by judges.
The Corfu Channel Case involved the alleged responsibility of Albania for
damage to foreign warships which struck mines in Albanian territorial wa-
ters.' °2 Albania had contested over a period of time the legality of foreign
ships' passage through the Corfu Channel, bordering an area in which Greece,
technically at war with Albania, claimed portions of Albanian territory.
Albanian coastal batteries fired toward two British warships making the first
passage through the channel.5 3 Britain informed Albania by diplomatic note
that shore battery-fire would be returned in the future. Orders then were issued
for four warships to traverse the strait to retest the Albanian response.'
Prior to this second passage, however, unknown parties had mined the straits.
Two British warships struck mines, suffering significant damage and loss of
life. Subsequently, the British Navy visited the strait a third time to gather evi-
dence. The incident presented the ICJ with the question of the exact nature of
Albanian involvement with, or responsibility for, the minefield in its territorial
to establish limits to state responsibility if traditional ideas of fault were applied, he considered only the
vis major portion of force majeure, neglecting its casus or fortuitous event branch. Id. While this might
be attributable to differences in terminology, his examples demonstrate that he does not consider casus.
501. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 1 [hereinafter Corfu Channel Case].
502. In addition to the basic issue of Albanian responsibility for the mine damage, the case presented
substantial questions dealing with the law of straits and territorial waters, and the threat or use of force
within another state's jurisdiction. See Linnan, supra note 73, at 95-99. This inquiry does not treat the
question whether the assertion by British warships of disputed innocent passage rights was permissible,
or whether it constituted a violation of Albanian territory.
503. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 27.
504. Id. at 27-28.
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waters given that it apparently lacked the technical capacity to perform the
mining operations.
Britain argued the case on alternative grounds: either Albania laid the
minefield that damaged British warships (or was guilty by complicity of asking
a third state, arguably Yugoslavia, to lay the mines), or Albania had knowl-
edge of the location of the mines in its territorial waters by virtue of its coastal
watch and failed to give warning. 55 Assuming arguendo that fault were re-
quired, these alternate theories incorporated very different conceptions of its
nature. Under the first alternative, fault borders on malicious, willful intent
as a psychological concept (equivalent to dolus). The second alternative was
more open to interpretation, because if Albania had not participated in laying
the mines, it was responsible for the injury only if a duty to warn could be
inferred (an inference that the ICJ eventually made based on humanitarian
principles of law). Britain argued that Albania's failure to warn was "willful,"
implying a psychological state close to the first alternative. However, if
responsibility for failure to warn were based on the simple omission of a
warning (rather than a conscious decision not to warn based on a malicious
desire that the warships be destroyed), the element of fault could at most be
linked to knowledge of the mines' whereabouts and to culpa. This use of culpa
might not equate in substance to "negligence" in the sense of municipal torts
law. Instead, it is similar to the Roman law sense of failure to honor a duty,
which is wrongful per se.
The ICJ rejected Britain's first alternative due to inadequate proof, but
found Albania responsible under the second in finding both knowledge of the
mines and a duty to warn. The ICI relied for its findings on circumstantial
evidence that Albania's coastal watch must have observed the mining activity
close to shore and on Albania's apparent lack of concern following the mine
explosions, suggested that Albania knew of the minefield in advance. The ICJ
applied a control-based evidentiary presumption. Since the mining had occurred
in Albanian territorial waters, Albania was effectively responsible for disprov-
ing that it had knowledge of what had occurred within its own territory. The
ICJ's opinion provoked a number of sharp dissents, sharing the view that the
evidence of Albania's knowledge of the mines was insufficient. The dissents
argued that the ICJ wrongly imposed an objective risk-based responsibility in
the form of absolute liability, simply because the mines were found in Albanian
waters. The merits of the insufficient proof issue, however, are not as impor-
tant as the expression of views on fault-based liability.
505. See I. CHUNG, LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE CORFU CHANNEL INCIDENT 156-57 (1959).
358
Vol. 16:245, 1991
Iran Air Flight 655
Language in the ICJ's opinion, stating that the mere existence of the
minefield in Albanian waters was insufficient for liability,"°6 has been taken
by some commentators as evidence of the I0's view that state responsibility
is subjectively based,"°7 while others are more circumspect in divining the
rationale of the ICJ's finding of responsibility. 0" Still others argue that a
more attractive fact pattern for objective responsibility can hardly be found
than one involving a minefield, and that the ICI's failure to articulate an
objective standard is proof of its adherence to the subjective view.' °9 For
purposes of the mistake problem, the different Corfu Channel Case opinions
illustrate the problem of reconciling various ideas of fault with elements of
knowledge. Thus, one leading commentator postulated that the ICJ's require-
ment of actual knowledge cannot be fault in the sense of dolus or culpa.
Otherwise, a reasonable but mistaken belief on Albania's part that the third
party that laid the mines would notify shipping might excuse Albania from
responsibility."' 0 The contemplated situation is difficult to imagine,511 but
raises the issue of the exact content of "fault" in terms directly applicable to
the mistake problem posed by the Flight 655 incident. Traditional approaches
in state responsibility law may view culpa as a psychological concept, 12
while other, arguably more modern views, simply equate culpa to the breach
of an obligation. 13
Among the dissenting opinions, Judges Ecer and Krylov appeared to adhere
to the traditional view of culpa and dolus. Judge Ecer indicated that, despite
injury to another state, responsibility would not lie if an act were "committed
neither willfully and maliciously nor with culpable negligence. " 514 Judge
506. The ICJ stated that:
It is clear that knowledge of the minelaying cannot be imputed to the Albanian Government by
reason merely of the fact that a minefield discovered in Albanian territorial waters caused the
explosions of which the British warships were victims... This fact, by itself and apart from
other circumstances, neither involves primafacie responsibility nor shifts the burden of proof.
Corfti Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 18.
507. See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 459, at 343.
508. See, e.g., Fifth Report on State Responsibility, supra note 487, at 63 (Garcfa-Amador, whether
actual knowledge of mines should be considered culpa was matter of interpretation); I. CHUNG, supra note
505, at 164-65 (language of ICJ's opinion could be interpreted to apply to only this particular case or more
generally to evidentiary problems).
509. See Hostie, The Corfu Channel Case and International Liability of States, in LIBER AmicoRUM
OF CONGRATULATIONS TO ALGOT BAGGE 89, 92-94 (1956). But see I. CHUNG, supra note 505, at 164-66
(criticizing Hostie for mixing idea of absolute or strict liability with objective responsibility).
510. 1 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 304, at633. See also I. CHUNG, supra note 505, at 166-67.
511. It is unclear why Albania would accept third party mining of its own territorial waters unless
the task were performed at its request.
512. The distinction ties in part into attribution questions. See Force Majeure Report, supra note 401,
at 195; infra notes 531-37 and accompanying text (discussion of attribution problem for individual officials'
misdeeds and related shift in state responsibility doctrine from agency to organ concepts).
513. A pure modernity inference is misleading, as this sense of fault is essentially the alternate Roman
law meaning of culpa as iniuria or wrongfulness itself. See supra note 425 and accompanying text.
514. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 127-28, citing L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAUTERPACHT, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (1948).
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Krylov opined that the notion of culpa need not be used identically as in
Roman law or contemporary civil or criminal law,5" 5 but he paralleled Judge
Ecer's view that for responsibility to lie an act must be either willful and
malicious or culpably negligent. 16 Cairying these two judges' views to their
logical conclusion, responsibility might not lie for the downing of Eight 655
so long as the mistake of the Vincennes' commanding officer were reasonable.
In a more scholarly opinion, Judge Azevedo examined shortcomings of
both the objective and subjective approaches to state responsibility, and
concluded that culpa in this instance equated to knowledge of the mines 17
and thus Albania was responsible under international law.5" 8 His opinion
questioned whether objective views tying responsibility to a simple breach of
an obligation were actually distinct from fault-based concepts,519 arguing that
the changing nature of culpa reflected the common moral basis of objective
and subjective views. Instead, Judge Azevedo distinguished between culpa in
contractual breach (where under the civil law simple failure to honor an
obligation constitutes culpa unless some adequate external cause can be demon-
strated) and delictual culpa (where under the civil law some psychological state
has traditionally been required).520 Stressing the moral elements of culpability
and the somewhat hypothetical aspects of community conscience, Judge
Azevedo characterized fault in the following fashion:
The notion of culpa is always changing and undergoing a slow process of evolution;
moving away from the classical elements of imprudence and negligence, it tends
to draw nearer to the system of objective responsibility; and this has led certain
present day authors to deny that culpa is definitely separate, in regard to a theory
based solely on risk. By departing from the notions of choice and of vigilance, we
arrive, in practice, at a fusion of the solutions suggested by contractual culpa and
delictual culpa.52
While this language in Judge Azevedo's opinion might be viewed as postulating
a convergence of subjective and objective views of responsibility, it is more
properly understood as accepting fault as a morally based concept, while
acknowledging the dilemma of a truly objective system of responsibility.
If objective responsibility posits the existence of obligations against which
one must measure a breach, the argument runs that such an approach will
suffer from centrifugal tendencies. The obligations will tend either to a prolif-
eration of fixed rules (and as a corollary to the view that state responsibility
will attach only if the duty were known in advance), or to a situation in which
tribunals will be forced to make ad hoc decisions in violation of the basic
515. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 71.
516. Id. at 72, citing L. OPPENHEIM & H. LAuTERPAcHT, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (1948).
517. Id. at 93.
518. Id. at 94.
519. Id. at 82.
520. Id. at 84-85.
521. Id. at 85-86.
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international law concept that only its subjects can make international law.5"
Facing this dilemma, Judge Azevedo concluded that any theory of state
responsibility that focused exclusively on the breach of hypothetical duties
would ultimately fail." Under the particular circumstances of the case,
however, Judge Azevedo viewed Albania's knowledge and the egregious nature
of a minefield's existence in peacetime to be sufficient grounds to characterize
its failure to give warning as morally blameworthy. Failure to act on knowl-
edge itself constituted morally blameworthy behavior, even if the traditional
elements of dolus and culpa emphasized in the opinions of Judges Ecer and
Krylov were absent.
The downing of a civil airliner evokes a sense of moral outrage every bit
as strong as the sinking of ships by a minefield. However, the prerequisite for
culpa in the minefield situation was knowledge itself, since Albania was not
held liable simply because the minefield was located in its territorial waters.
The Vincennes possessed no such knowledge, as it fired in mistaken self-
defense. This might not be decisive unless either culpa were considered still
to be a psychological concept (favoring nonresponsibility), or the mistaken use
of force against an unidentified aircraft were viewed as morally blameworthy
(favoring responsibility). However, Flight 655 was misidentified as an attack-
ing Iranian F-14. A moral view of mistake seems to push the misidentification
problem toward a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable mistake.
Yet such a distinction is not apparent in the more modern mistaken use of
force precedents already reviewed.524
Judge Azevedo's hesitancy in deciding the Corfu Channel Case under a
direct moral blameworthiness approach to fault is easily understood in terms
of its unsuitability for judicial development. It hardly supplies principled
guidance to tribunals in deciding future cases. This difficulty can be overcome
to the extent some precedent exists concerning rules of primary obligation in
related areas. Judges may then consult these primary rules for guidance on the
fault question itself. For example, in the Corfu Channel Case, judges referred
to the 1907 Hague Convention (VII), which required the warning of mine-
fields (even though it technically applies only to wartime mining and only to
the state actually laying the mines). 5" In the Flight 655 case, the ICJ pre-
sumably would examine the closest pre-existing primary obligations, requiring
a choice between different sources of the putative duty. Under such a jurispru-
dential approach the ICJ would determine fault and thus articulate a new rule
of secondary obligation with reference to the closest preexisting primary rules.
This process exemplifies Judge Azevedo's belief that subjective and objective
522. Id. at 82-84 (acknowledging Ago as original source of these arguments).
523. Id.
524. See supra notes 413-49 and accompanying text.
525. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 22 (elementary considerations ofhumanity compelled notice).
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concepts of state responsibility merge in practice. When applied to the Flight
655 incident, this approach might lead to the conclusion that the Vincennes'
actions did not involve "fault," even if the culpa concept were admitted to no
longer address intent, knowledge, or negligence in the sense of a psychological
state. 26 This would be the case if misidentification due to a reasonable mis-
take were treated as not morally blameworthy, or if the precedents of The
Marianna Flora and The Palmyra (and related probable cause rules) were
extended from the maritime to the aviation context as embodying the closest
preexisting rules of primary obligation.
In his dissent, Judge Badawi Pasha refused to consider either complicity
or knowledge on Albania's part on the basis that neither had been adequately
proven. 527 However, he went on to review Albanian conduct in terms of
whether fault existed in the form of a violation of legal duty that caused the
explosion, despite the stipulation of Britain's counsel that absent knowledge
responsibility was not possible.52 Judge Badawi Pasha rejected what he
526. See I. CHUNG, supra note 505, at 167-68. Chung is literally correct in stating that Judge Azevedo
did not "clearly indicate the exact meaning attributed to the term 'fault.' Id. at 167. But he missed the
substance of Judge Azevedo's approach, which was concerned more with how a judge might decide an
individual case than with espousing a modern formulation of culpa to serve in the theoretical debate. See
also B. CHENG, supra note 500, at 231 n.231-32, n.44 (criticizing Judge Azevedo's concept of fault for
ambiguity). Cheng interpreted Judge Azevedo's opinion as attempting to apply a system of objective
responsibility based on risk without abandoning the theory of subjective responsibility based on intention
and negligence. Id.
527. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 64-65.
528. Id. at 65. Judge Badawi Pasha's opinion is doctrinally ambiguous, insofar as it refers to both
establishing the international obligation ("[i]l faut donc 6tablir une obligation internationale b la charge de
l'Albanie dont le manquement lui serait imputable et serait la cause de l'explosion") ([its violation] "[rieste
savoir si, inddpendamment de la connivence ou de la cormaissance, il n'existe pas A la charge de l'Albanie
une faute quelconque qui aurait caus6 l'explosion et sur laquelle serait 6ventuellement fondde sa responsi-
bilit6 internationale pour le dommage subi"). Id. The ambiguity lies in whether the judge intended to profess
an objective formulation of state responsibility, resulting from the violation of an obligation, without regard
to fault, or whether he espoused a subjective theory to indicate that fault in modern terms goes beyond the
traditional formulations of willful, malicious, or culpably negligent behavior, as in the case of unjustified
wrongfulness. Cheng argues that Judge Badawi Pasha expressly based international responsibility on the
principle of fault. B. CHENG, supra note 500, at 231-32 n.44 But his opinion is better understood as
avoiding the theoretical basis of responsibility completely. The use of "faute" in the official French version
of the opinion is not a clear use of it in a technical legal sense. The other dissenting opinions employ the
culpa concept when addressing subjective responsibility. One might expect a judicial opinion that carefully
stipulates exactly what areas it considers to have acknowledged a new approach to subjective responsibility,
if that were intended.
Other commentators note that Cheng's approach to fault is eclectic. See Fifth Report on State
Responsibility, supra note 487. While Brownlie praises Cheng's analysis as particularly helpful, he adopts
an objective view of state responsibility and considers the Corou Channel Case itself to be a matter of
"individuality of issues." 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 485, at 39 n.22, 47-48. He characterizes as "more or
less vacuous" many commentators' usage of culpa orfaute to describe a breach of legal duty or an unlawful
act. Id. at 42. By equating wrongfulness with fault, Cheng actually brought himself close to a modern
continental legal science analysis. It is unclear whether Brownlie is not fully aware of the role of culpa
in modern continental approaches, or whether he is fully aware of its import and simply rejects it as
inappropriate in addressing state responsibility. If the latter, Brownlie opined that "[s]tate responsibility
as a matter of law is, and in principle should be, limited to the obligation to make reparation, to compen-
sate." Id. at 33.
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termed the municipal law concept of objective responsibility based on risk
(strict liability in modern terms), but completely avoided employment of the
culpa concept in conjunction with "fault." Instead, his concept of the wrongful
act was phrased purely in terms of the violation of an international legal
obligation. Under this approach, reference is necessary to the particular obliga-
tion to determine if it incorporates an intent element. Judge Badawi Pasha's
concept of state responsibility, if applied to the Flight 655 mistake problem,
would require the ICJ to determine what international law obligations were
applicable to the Vincennes. If its obligations were limited to due care in the
use of armed force, a finding of reasonable mistake would not result in state
responsibility. If, however, its obligations were defined in terms of the lawful
use of force, mistake - reasonable or otherwise - would not matter. Responsi-
bility would lie unless the Vincennes' activities could be brought within the
coverage of self-defense, necessity, or similar exceptions at the level of the
primary obligation. Resolving the competing source of duty problem is thus
even more pressing under such an objective approach, as opposed to the
extension of traditional approaches to culpa as applied by Judge Azevedo.
The Corfu Channel Case opinions do not provide sure guidance for resolv-
ing the Flight 655 incident. It should now be clear that simple characterization
of the theoretical basis of state responsibility as either objective or subjective
does not determine by itself the legal outcome of the mistake problem. Under
either an objective responsibility analysis or a nominally fault-based responsi-
bility analysis equating culpa with violation of a legal duty,529 the exact char-
acterization of the international law obligations binding the Vincennes will
determine the outcome. If a more traditional view of culpa or dolus were
followed, a subjective responsibility analysis should exclude responsibility for
the downing of Flight 655 if the Vincennes' mistake is deemed to have been
reasonable. Under more modern views of culpa as "fault" not amounting to
a psychological state, the specification that a subjective responsibility analysis
applies still does not determine the outcome of the mistake problem. In practi-
cal terms, judges will be compelled to address the questions of fault and of ill-
defined international law duties together, if not actually as different aspects
of the same problem unless clear and undisputed precedents specifically cover
challenged state conduct. Individual judges will work toward resolution of the
529. This is considered the more modern view in nominally fault-based positivist systems of municipal
or international law, as opposed to treating culpa as a matter of psychological state. See, e.g., I. CHUiNG,
supra note 505, at 167-68, citing H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 66 (1949). It is not
correct, however, to equate the objective view of state responsibility with the "wrongfulness" analysis by
finding culpa in the violation of the duty. While the result might be the same under either view in the Flight
655 case, the distinctions lie in collateral areas, such as permissible countermeasures. See Maelanczuk,
Countermeasures and Self-Defense as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness in the International Law
Commission's Draft Article on State Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE
RESPONSIBILIES 197, 202 n.13 (M. Spinedi & B. Simma eds. 1987). See also Simma, supra note 474,
at 382 (suggesting these developments).
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Flight 655 case through a thicket of doctrinal controversy and jurisprudential
restraints on their role in articulating the law.
D. The Historical Development ofAttribution and the Objective Versus Subjec-
tive Basis Problem
States act through human beings, and state responsibility under modern
views requires attribution of an individual's act to a state. This aspect of state
responsibility reaches beyond the doctrinal origins of its objective versus
subjective basis. Prior to the twentieth century, however, the attribution step
itself was often lacking in unlawful use of force cases involving violation of
the laws of war by individual soldiers.53 Attribution of the misbehaving acts
of lesser officials to the state traditionally was problematic, insofar as officials'
duties were presumed to include adherence to law, including international
law. 31 Historically, public law doctrine as applied under international law
did not recognize vicarious liability on any basis analogous to the private law
concept of respondeat superior. State responsibility could only be inferred
under the much-criticized legal fiction that senior state bodies could be culpable
for their appointment and lax supervision of incapable or misbehaving lesser
officials (under culpa in eligendo or culpa in custodiendo),s2 These problems
530. The theoretical responsibility of all community members for a single member's violation of
protected rights was recognized under views of international law preceding Grotius. See Fifth Report on
State Responsibility, supra note 487, at 61. By abandoning this concept, the foundations were laid for the
development of individual-liability principles and the necessity for attribution doctrines. On a formal level
this amounts to a return to Grotius' abandonment of older Germanic principles of collective responsibility
(Sippenhaftung) in fhvor of Roman law-based fault. See Schlochauer, supra note 495, at 254. In the modem
context, individual liability principles and the problem of attribution are visible in dealing with a state's
responsibility both for the misdeeds of its nationals' and the actions of its misbehaving officials.
531. Traditionally, outrages inflicted in violation of the laws of war have not been viewed as a matter
of state responsibility; instead they have been treated separately, due to the special nature of war. See, e.g.,
Green, The Law ofA rmed Conflict and the Enforcement of International Criminal Law, 22 CANADIAN Y.B.
INT'L L. 3, 6-9 (1984). Indemnity for violation of the rules of war was effectively not required because
the behavior of miscreant soldiers was rarely technically attributable to their state. The traditional response
to proven violations of the laws of war, therefore, was direct punishment by the belligerent state of both
its own as well as enemy soldiers who violated the laws of war. Id. at 8-17. The 1907 Hague Convention
(IV) changed the law, however, rendering soldiers' violations of the laws of war imputable to their state,
thereby raising the general question of state responsibility and indemnity in the modem context. 1907 Hague
Convention (IV) Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land at art. 3, reprinted in DocuMNTms
ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 111.
532. Culpa in eligendo posited state negligence in failing to appoint competent officers, whereas culpa
in custodiendo involved the failure to exercise proper supervision. See Governmental Responsibility, supra
note 487, at 584-91. Borchard opined that governmental liability for civil servants' misdeeds appeared to
be on the increase in continental legal systems. Id. at593. But he contemplated the adoption of a respondeat
superior or similar theory beyond existing European public and private law distinctions. Instead, municipal
law developed a system under which an official's misbehavior was the direct basis for his state's liability
vis-t-vis the injured party, with the state retaining regress rights against its official in certain cases. See,
e.g., GRUNDGEsETZ (GG) art. 34 (W. Ger.); BGB § 839 (W. Ger. Municipal Code). The distinction is
important because the state would have available to it the same defenses as the official. Some commentators
suggest that state liability under international law is therefore derivative in a similar manner, implying that
a private-law mistake analysis could be applied to the actions of the Vincennes' commanding officer.
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were finally acted on at the turn of the century at the 1930 Hague Conference
for the Codification of International Law.533 Formally abandoning an agency
concept, the new approach posited that a state acted through its "organs,"
considered to be an integral part of the state itself, thereby neatly sidestepping
the attribution of an individual official's misdeeds in a way that substantially
replicated the effect of respondeat superior under private law.534 However,
this created an additional complication under subjective views, since "fault"
might now be considered as either involving the psychological condition of an
individual official, or as a more philosophical concept applicable to the organ's
"wrongful" act as juridical construct (paralleling the dual meanings of culpa
as negligence and unjustified wrongfulness under Roman law). This overlay
of doctrinal confusion helps explain the divergent views of the basis of state
responsibility visible in the Corfu Channel Case, which, given the mistake
problem, may still influence the ICJ in the Flight 655 proceedings.
Views positing the primacy of municipal law under a sovereignty analysis
face another problem. If an official's acts were in violation of international law
obligations, but were either in conformity with municipal law or compelled
by it, where could "fault" be localized to impose liability under a subjective
analysis?535 New objective approaches to state responsibility resolved this
problem by eliminating the fault requirement. This objective approach focused
on the violation of a duty imposed by international law at the primary level,
coupled with developing attribution principles.536 The above examination of
However, since the 1930 Hague Conference, state responsibility rules recognizing attribution to a state for
injuries caused by its agent have essentially followed a respondeat superior theory.
533. PreliminaryDocuments ofthe Conferenceforthe Codification oflnternationalLaw, CONFERENCE
FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1930), reprinted in AM. J. INT'L L. I SUP. (1930).
See Borchard, Theoretical Aspects of the International Responsibility of States, 1 ZE1TSCHRIFr FOR
AUSLANDiSCHES bFFENTLICHES RECHT UND V6LKERRECHT 223 (1929). See generally Basis of Discussion
for the Conference Drawn Up by the Preparatory Committee: Volume 11 - Responsibility of States for
Damage Caused in Their Territory to the Person or Property of Foreigners, League Doc. No. C.75 M.69
1929 V (1929), reprinted in 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATION-
AL LAW [1930] 423-702 (S. Rosenne ed. 1975) (preparatory materials for conference); Acts of the
Conference for the Codification of International Law IV (Minutes of the Third Committee), League of
Nations Doc. No. C.351(c) M.145(c) 1930 V (1930), reprinted in 4 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE
FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [1930] 1482-1504 (S. Rosenne ed. 1975) (comments
regarding theoretical basis of state responsibility).
534. See Governmental Responsibility, supra note 487, at 518-19 (discussing Gierke's theory).
535. The doctrinal bridge to modem objective views of state responsibility is based upon the work
of Triepel, and was extended by Anzilotti, who dealt with officials' behavior under dualistic conceptions
of international law. See, e.g., Ago, La colpa nell'illecito internazionale, 3 ScRrTi GIURDICI IN ONORE
DI SANTI ROMANO 206 (1940), reprinted in Force Majeure Report, supra note 401, at 190-93 (English
translation); Ago, Le dlit international, 2 REC. DES COURS 415 (1939).
536. There are adherents to both subjective and objective doctrinal views of state responsibility among
international law commentators. See Force Majeure Report, supra note 401, at 193-94 (listing adherents
of fault-based and objective responsibility views). Most Anglo-American and socialist commentators adhere
to the objective view, although there are exceptions. See, e.g., Steiniger, Die allgemeinen Voraussetzungen
der vllkerrechtlichen Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten, 22 WISSENSCHAFTLICHE ZEr1SCHRIFF DER HUM-
EOLDT-UNIvERsrrAT zuBERLIN439, 443 (1973) (D.B. Levin's characterizationof fault in Marxist-Leninist
terms as collective will of predominant class). The fundamental differences of opinion inthis group are
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the individual opinions in the Corfu Channel Case, however, demonstrates the
dead end nature of this doctrinal approach to the mistake problem in the Flight
655 case. Instead, the ICJ will presumably be relegated to state practice and
the jurisprudential approaches discussed above.
E. Twentieth Century Development of Indemnity for Unlawful or Mistaken Use
of Force
Twentieth century precedents reveal the development of a practice requiring
reparations for the use of armed force considered to breach international law
obligations. Such a practice, in light of related precedents involving the
mistaken use of armed force, points toward the general imposition of state
responsibility for the unlawful use of force on an objective basis. Thus,
regardless of the, implications of the general debate concerning the subjective
in the formulation of the primary international law duties that trigger objective responsibility. Continental
commentators, on the other hand, predominantly advocate a fault-based approach to state responsibility.
These proponents employ the term "fault" not as a psychological concept applicable to an individual official,
but as a referent to the philosophical concept of a "wrongful act." State responsibility would thus in theory
be similar to doctrinal views of individual responsibility in municipal criminal law, permitting cross-
fertilization (acknowledged or otherwise).
It is somewhat misleading, however, to speak in monolithic terms of continental legal science,
particularly since the post-World War II continental scholars are more interested in state practice and
precedents than some of the more doctrinally oriented pre-World War II scholars. Ago, who served as
Rapporteur during the crucial period of the Draft Code's creation, belonged to the prewar generation, while
more contemporary scholars decry the fact that the Draft Code would entail a departure from traditional
international law, and the possibility of enforcing international law through the United Nations system.
However, their analysis of the proper scope of state responsibility law shares Ago's basic approach. For
example, both readily rely upon municipal law parallels, such as the justification and excuse doctrines,
in developing consistent views of such problems as the treatment of the exclusion of wrongfulness under
the Draft Code. Such an approach entails integrating the parallel ILC project of considering state responsi-
bility for lawful acts. This results from the fact that, except for self-defense, article 35 of the Draft Code
does not explicitly deny compensation even where the act was lawful. This concept of liability without
illegality has been the subject of sharp criticism, which is consistent with the quasi-torts compensation
approach that characterizes the Anglo-American view of state responsibility. See I. BROWNLIB, supra note
485, at 49-50. Regarding the general question of national schools of international law, see Comparative
Approaches to the Theory of International Law, 1980 PRoc. OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 152, 154-57
(1986) (remarks of Brownlie); Lauterpacht, The So-Called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of
Thought in International Law, 12 Barr. Y.B. INT'L L. 31 (1931).
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versus objective basis of state responsibility, 37 international arbitral and
judicial proceedings concerning the unlawful use of armed force have rarely
considered culpa to be necessary for state responsibility. Under this view, the
breach of primary international obligations should result in the imposition of
a duty of reparation directly upon the breaching state without the interposition
of additional requirements.
The 1902 Samoan Arbitration, conducted by the King of Sweden under a
trilateral arbitration convention with Germany, Great Britain, and the United
States, is among the earliest modern international proceedings to find state
responsibility and to impose a duty of reparation.538 Samoa was administered
at the time under the Berlin Treaty of 1889 by a resident council of three
consuls, one from each foreign power, in conjunction with an indigenous king.
Under the treaty consular actions were to be taken unanimously, yet an
atmosphere of mutual distrust existed among the foreign communities and when
civil war broke out, the German Consul refused British and American requests
to use warships against the rebellious native faction.5 39 Unilateral military
537. Older American international law commentary on state responsibility doctrine shows a full
appreciation for the objective versus subjective debate. See, e.g., Borchard, supra note 533. For other
leading American works, see A. FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR DENIAL
OF JUSTICE (1938); F. DUNN, THE PROTECTION OF NATIONALS (1932); C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSI-
BILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1928). American views of state responsibility derived from
the perceived connection between diplomatic protection and injury to aliens. Insofar as older precedents
purport to follow Grotius and his followers, there is basis for the claim that traditional practice supports
the subjective view (although the precedents speak more of "wrongful acts" than fault). However, more
recent arbitral tribunal precedents, particularly those between the World Wars that involved United States
claims of injury to aliens, arguably follow an objective theory of state responsibility. See 1 G. ScHWARzEN-
BERGER, supra note 304, at 637-41 (reviewing different cases). Schwarzenberger noted a predisposition
to culpa doctrine in older cases, noting that between 1919 and 1939 the pendulum seemed to swing in the
other direction. Id. at 634.
538. See 91 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1898-1899, at 78, 79 (1902) [hereinafter Samoan Arbitra-
tion Agreement] (Convention between Great Britain, Germany, and the United States of America, relating
to the settlement of certain claims in Samoa by arbitration) (submitting to binding arbitration "[aill claims
put forward by [signatories' nationals] for compensation on account of losses which they allege they have
suffered in consequence of unwarranted military action, if this be shown to have occurred, on the part of
British, German or American officers"). For the arbitrator's decision, see 95 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS
1901-1902, at 164 (1905) [hereinafter Samoan Arbitration Decision].
The Samoan trilateral arbitration convention accompanied the colonial partition of the islands in 1899,
under the Convention between Great Britain, Germany, and the United States of America, for the
Adjustment of Questions relating to Samoa. 91 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1898-1899, at 75 (1902).
For the related Convention and Declaration between Great Britain and Germany for the Settlement of the
Samoan and other Questions, see 91 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1898-1899, at 75 (1902). See generally
J. Thacker, The Partition of Samoa (Univ. of South Carolina Ph.D. dissertation 1966); G. RYDEN, THE
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO SAMOA (1933); 1 J. MOORE, supra note 200,
536-54 (1906) (expanded factual background pieced together from various government sources). The
partition occurred due to the inadequacies of the tripartite condominium administration of the islands as
neutral territories under the Berlin Treaty of 1889. See FinalAct of the Conference on the Affairs of Samoa,
81 BRIT. & FOREIGN ST. PAPERS 1888-1889, at 1058 (1901) [hereinafter Berlin Treaty of 1889].
539. Commercial interests and property were largely in the hands of the German colonial community,
so it suffered disproportionately in the ensuing hostilities. While prospective partition served to resolve
political problems within the tripartite arrangement, the arbitration concerning "unwarranted military action
... in conformity with the principles of international law or considerations of equity" was agreed upon
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action took place, however, and damage occurred both in the course of British
and American naval bombardments and as a result of the actions of armed
landing parties and native factions armed by foreign officers.
The arbitrator's decision turned on the interpretive question whether Great
Britain and the United States could take unilateral action affecting control of
the islands by supporting one indigenous faction over another. The decision
was thus grounded in the tripartite cooperative arrangement, rather than on
modem principles restraining the use of armed force or intervention con-
cerns. 5' Nonetheless, the arbitrator found that under the circumstances prop-
erty losses could not be considered force majeure,54 as he determined the
British and American military action to be unwarranted, and also held the two
states financially responsible for the property losses.542 The military action
was effectively treated as falling outside the law of civil or international
war.
543
Various early twentieth century bilateral claims arbitrations between
European states and the United States on the one hand and South and Central
American states on the other relating to injury to aliens or their property
during insurrections, indirectly evidence the development of indemnity obliga-
tions for the unlawful use of force.'" Violence by unsuccessful revolutionar-
ies against foreigners was not attributable to the state as a matter of substantive
international law. Instead, the failure to exercise due diligence, or a denial of
justice in suitable cases, served as the premise for a finding of state responsi-
bility. Indemnity obligations arose from a state's failure to protect, rather than
from its unlawful use of force. 45 However, the force majeure character of
injury incurred during an engagement between government and revolutionary
forces would normally preclude a finding of state responsibility for injury to
in the face of strong public sentiment during the crisis precipitating partition. Samoan Arbitration Agree-
ment, supra note 538, at 79.
540. Samoan Arbitration Decision, supra note 538, at 166-67.
541. Id. at 168. The arbitrator also indicated that factional fighting among the Samoans did not
necessitate the military action taken to protect foreign lives and property, which ultimately served to
exacerbate hostilities. Id. at 168-69.
542. Id. at 169-70. In lieu of returning the matter to arbitration for determination of indemnities owed
in individual circumstances, Great Britain and the United States each agreed to pay half of the amounts
owed to German nationals. Disputes arose as to whether responsibility extended to damages inflicted by
Samoans armed by the foreign military, or only to those losses inflicted directly by the foreign military.
The German claims were eventually settled on the basis of a negotiated lump sum payment, and separate
arrangements were made for compensation of British and American nationals by their respective govern-
ments. See J. Thacker, supra note 538.
543. The Samoan Arbitration Agreement did not require the arbitrator to consider attribution of
individual officers' actions to their respective governments. Samoan Arbitration Agreement, supra note
538.
544. See supra notes 533-35 and accompanying text.
545. The wanton destruction of foreign life or property by government troops combatting insurrections
in violation of the laws of war might theoretically subject the state to liability, but due to then applicable
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aliens, whether such damage was caused by government soldiers or under
successorship principles, by successful revolutionary forces.5' To the extent
injuries to aliens were compensated more generously, such compensation was
offered ex gratia under special treaty terms. 547
Important changes began under the Hague movement to codify the laws
of war. The 1907 Hague Convention (V) Concerning the Laws and Customs
of War on Land would normally depart from contemporary attribution princi-
ples548 by requiring state responsibility for miscreant soldiers' behavior on a
simple respondeat superior basis,549 and specifically contemplated the award
of compensation for such a breach. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907
could not, however, resolve differences among participating states concerning
the belligerent treatment of neutral shipping. As a result, the British Govern-
ment convened the London Naval Conference. The consequent 1909 Declara-
tion of London contained the essentials of an international prize code."50
The Declaration of London focused in part on compensation for the unlaw-
ful use of force in restraint of a neutral's free passage rights. This is evident
in articles providing for indemnity in the case of a capture without good rea-
son,551 and in a requirement of direct indemnity where municipal law con-
cerns impeded the proposed realization of the Declaration's substantive prize
law.55 The basic thrust of the Declaration was to separate the rights of belli-
gerents from those of neutrals, such that incursions on neutral free passage
rights in a manner not consistent with traditional maritime law might be
permissible, although a duty of compensation would be required. As previously
noted, however, the Declaration never entered into force. Nonetheless, it Is
possible to distinguish the broad agreement which existed concerning the
546. This would also be true under related necessities of war rationales. See supra notes 488-519 and
accompanying text. See also notes 488-519 and accompanying text.
547. This was expressly the case, for example, under the revolutionary claims provisions of the related
bilateral agreements with Mexico, which established the claims commissions. See, e.g., A. FELLER, THE
MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION 1923-1934: A STUDY IN THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS 222 (1935).
548. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
549. Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention () provides:
A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said [laws of land warfare under the
Convention] shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible
for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.
1907 Hague Convention (IV) Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, at art. 3, reprinted in
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 111, at 46.
550. Declaration of London, Feb. 26, 1909, reprinted in THE DECLARATION OF LONDON, 1909:
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS (. Scott ed. 1919) [hereinafter Declaration of London].
551. For example, article 64 essentially applied a probable cause standard without using the term.
See General Report on the Declaration Presented to the Naval Conference on Behalf of its Drafting
Committee, reprinted in UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS 1909, at
149 (1910). Articles 52-53 provide damages in lieu of restitution in cases of unwarranted capture and
destruction of a neutral prize (even where sufficient probable cause existed). Id. at 117. Neutral prizes
might still be destroyed essentially on military necessity grounds, but only at the captor's peril.
552. Such a provision was included in the Final Protocol. Id.
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compensatory aspect of the Hague Convention (XII) and the Declaration from
the disagreement over particular substantive rules, the breach of which would
result in imposition of an indemnity obligation. As a result, on the eve of
World War I, an international law compensatory obligation for undue wartime
interference with neutral free passage rights was recognized de lege
ferenda5 5 3
The development under modem international law of general restraints on
the use of armed force began with the 1919 League of Nations Covenant.
Mistaken attack in relation to indemnity for unlawful use of force is evident
already in dual aspects of the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian Frontier Incident. As
previously discussed, the League Council was faced with resolving a dangerous
on-going confrontation involving a Greek military invasion of Bulgarian
territory.'5 4 In the initial Council meeting Briand, as president, noted that
the hostilities were continuing and that there were significant disputes about
their factual basis, distinguishing between the urgent task of bringing hostilities
to an end versus the need for "ascertaining the facts and responsibilities, and
if necessary fixing the amount of reparation due."'55 When the cessation of
hostilities was confirmed three days later, the Council recalled Briand's
original distinction and appointed a Commission of Inquiry empowered to fix
responsibility and to determine indemnity. 5 6 The Council's rapporteur
stressed, in delivering the report, that as a general principle compensation
should be paid for the violation of territory without sufficient cause, even
where the offending state's action was premised on a mistake.5 7 Damages
were allowed for personal injury and death as well as property losses, which
included moral and material damages, thereby rendering it an award for more
than purely economic loss.55
By accepting and adopting the report despite the rapporteur's indications
that Greece might have acted under good faith mistake, the League Council
required Greece to pay an indemnity without apparent attention to culpa 59
While this precedent alone constitutes evidence of international law under state
practice, the Council's action takes on additional significance in conjunction
553. A compensatory duty may have existed against offending ship captains under traditional prize
law, but under old concepts their unlawful acts would not be attributed to their states.
554. See supra notes 436-46 and accompanying text.
555. Council Meeting of Oct. 26, 1925, 6 LEAGuE OF NATIONS O.3. 1697,. 1697-98 (1925).
556. Council Meeting of Oct. 29, id. at 1712-13. British Foreign Secretary Austin Chamberlain as
Rapporteur specifically recalled Briand's dual purpose language to the Council, and presented a resolution
embodying the particular charge on the state responsibility question. Id. at 1711-13. Following the adoption
of this resolution, the Bulgarian representative present assented to the determination of any indemnities
to be paid, while the Greek representative indicated that his government would accept any decision taken
by the Council. Id. at 1713.
557. See supra note 444 and accompanying text.
558. See Seventh Assembly Report, supra note 371, at 182.
559. See I. BROWNLIE, STATE RESPONsmILITY, supra note 485, at 141.
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with the rapporteur's expressed view of the law. It constitutes a relatively
straightforward assertion of state responsibility on an objective basis for the
unlawful use of armed force in connection with territorial invasion. Here the
older law's disregard of misapprehension of attack or mistaken self-defense
is carried over into the general restrictions on the use of force.s'e
Following the 1925 Greco-Bulgaian Frontier Incident, long-running
disagreements within the League of Nations concerning enforcement and the
legal versus moral nature of obligations under the League Covenant particular-
ly under article 10, complicate any views of the state practice during this
period. Arbitral and judicial precedents from the post-World War II period
dealing with the unlawful use of armed force are relatively rare, possibly due
to the highly politicized nature of such incidents as well as typical state reser-
vations to ICJ jurisdiction. Such disputes usually have been settled by negotia-
tion to avoid political friction, as in the case of the mistaken Israeli attack on
the U.S.S. Liberty, or have not been resolved, as in the case of the Soviet
downing of Korean Airlines Flight KE 007.551
In addition to the Corfu Channel Case,;52 two ICJ cases have con-
fronted the indemnity question in the context of the unlawful use of armed
force. In the Hostages Case, the ICJ analyzed the seizure of the U.S. embassy
and the taking of various diplomats hostage by Iranian militants in terms of
a violation of diplomatic immunity. 3 The ICJ concerned itself with modern
treaty law, but to the extent diplomatic facilities and persons traditionally are
considered extraterritorial, a violent attack upon them by armed militants
arguably approaches armed band activity directed against the foreign state. In
addition to its order directing Iran to release American diplomats and to vacate
the premises enjoying diplomatic or consular immunities, the ICJ imposed an
obligation on Iran to make reparations, the form and amount to be settled
subsequently by the ICJ, absent the parties' agreement. Shortly after the ICJ's
560. War guilt provisions of the peace treaties ending both World Wars and related agreements
addressing the mechanics of compensating war claims have obscured general reparations principles relating
to the unlawful use of force. They tended to impose a pattern of compensation beyond the requirements
of customary law, under which preparation for war-related losses of Allied nationals typically was provided
for simply on the basis of causation and property location in enemy territory. See supra notes 512-19 and
accompanying text. It seems unwise, however, to derive new principles of customary law on the basis of
peace treaties more reflective of political realities than of legal principles. The political as opposed to the
legal nature of these arrangements is born out by the fact that the defeated powers also agreed not to press
their own nationals' compensable claims for war losses inflicted by the Allied powers.
561. Cases before military or other municipal tribunals involving allegations of misconduct by
individual soldiers in warfare are not relevant here, as such proceedings are generally criminal in nature
and thus not helpful on reparations and indemnity issues.
562. Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. 1, 27. The ICJ did find that the British naval presence in force
on the third passage to gather evidence of the mines constituted an unlawful manifestation of warships in
Albanian territorial waters. Whether the British naval presence was regarded as merely an unlawful threat
to use force, or constituted an actual unlawful use of force, the ICJ simply declared the behavior unlawful
without imposing an indemnity obligation. Id.
563. Hostage Case, 1980 I.C.J. 3.
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opinion was delivered, the United States withdrew its claims against Iran
before the ICJ. 64 For that reason, the ICJ never articulated the appropriate
nature of reparations. However, by virtue of its opinion distinguishing prospec-
tive respect for diplomatic immunities from past injury, the ICJ appeared ready
to award indemnity in the case.
The Nicaragua Case is the ICJ's latest pronouncement in the area of self-
defense and the unlawful use of force . 65 The ICJ characterized the acts
attributable to the United States -- the unlawful supply of weapons and finan-
cial support to the contras - largely as acts of intervention rather than as the
unlawful use of force. However, the ICJ's opinion also covered mining
operations to impede maritime trade, allegedly carried out by foreign nationals
in littoral areas at the behest of the United States. The ICJ formally attributed
the mining to the United States, and cited the Corfu Channel Case for the
proposition that the United States' breach of international law obligations lay
in its failure to give notice of the mines. The ICJ included this mining activity
among the grounds giving rise to a duty of the United States to make repara-
tions.
Yet in portraying the case as an intervention problem, the ICJ failed to
appreciate the significance of attributing the mining to the United States (as
opposed to the Corfu Channel Case, in which neither Albania's participation
nor complicity in the mining itself could be adequately proven). Mines are
weapons of naval warfare. Their placement in the path of foreign merchant
vessels should be considered equivalent to the use of armed force. While it
may be argued that the ICJ's basic decision on collective self-defense principles
was incorrect and thus the use of armed force by the United States was lawful,
it is disingenuous not to acknowledge the true nature of the mining activity.
If the ICJ otherwise meant to infer that the mining itself was not unlawful (i.e.,
the sole fault was failure to give notice), this reasoning leads to the untenable
position that the peacetime mining of foreign waters is lawful as long as notice
is given.5
Taken in this light, the portion of the Nicaragua Case relating to mining
indicates that indemnity obligations arise in naval warfare from the unlawful
use of force under modern views of general restraints on its employment. This
564. Declaration of Algeria, 20 I.L.M. 223, 227 (1981).
565. Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 4. The decision has been criticized by many commentators. See
e.g., Linnan, supra note 73, at 98-108.
566. It seems difficult to argue that sowing explosive devices in navigable foreign waters for the
express purpose of impeding shipping does not constitute the use of armed force. The IC's opinion finds
some indication that the size of devices may have been large enough to inflict damage, but not necessarily
large enough to sink ocean-going ships. However, the choice of smaller weapons to interfere with but not
destroy merchant shipping is essentially a tactical decision rather than one that changes the legal nature
of the activity. Under the circumstances, the IC's lapse of legal analysis in this entire area can only be
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position is not controversial, since a consensus exists that the rule of the 1907
Hague Convention (V) imposing responsibility on a state for misdeeds of its
armed forces in land warfare has entered customary law and now extends to
sea warfare. 67 Most recently, in a resolution addressing Iraq's attempted
annexation of Kuwait, the Security Council indicated that Iraq would be "liable
[under international law] for any loss, damage or injury arising in regard to
Kuwait and third states, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait."56 The Security Council clearly
contemplated that a duty of indemnity attaches to the unlawful use of armed
force, both for breaches of the humanitarian rules of armed conflict and for
the use of unlawful armed force itself. As in the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian
Frontier Incident, neither the Security Council in the Kuwait crisis nor the ICI
in the Nicaragua Case appeared to condition state responsibility on a showing
of culpa. Instead, state responsibility was imposed on an objective basis.
The uniform application of the objective approach to liability for the
unlawful mistaken use of force by a state is demonstrated in the Waima,
Mazuia and Dogger Bank Incidents despite differences in the general areas of
the applicable laws. While the Waima Incident involved a clash between the
forces of the two states, it was not a law of war precedent. Both the Mazuia
and Dogger Bank Incidents involved belligerents' mistaken attacks on neutrals.
They differed insofar as the former required the application of land while the
latter involved maritime warfare legal principles; but mistake relieved responsi-
bility in neither case. In terms of the law's development, however, the chrono-
logical order of the precedents may be of comparatively more importance than
the particular body of law applied. Arbitration of the Waima Incident came
first, and contemporaries expressed the view that this precedent indirectly may
have affected the outcome of the Dogger Bank Incident.569
Since the assessment of the 1925 Greco-Bulgarian Frontier Incident,
violations of legal restrictions on the use of force usually involve two aspects.
First, they involve the more openly political problem of bringing on-going
hostilities to an expeditious end. Second, they involve issues of responsibility
for the injury caused by the hostilities -- legal issues that are more often than
not compromised expressly or implicitly on political grounds. Yet, since the
Permanent International Court of Justice's decision in the Chorzow Factory
Case,5 70 full reparation as a manner of law may be expected for any state's
breach of its international law obligations. Judicial determination of the nature
567. See e.g., 1955 LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 105, § 3-03 n.4.
568. S.C. Res. 674, U.N. Doc. S/RES/674, 29 I.L.M. 1561-63 (1990). See also S.C. Res. 687, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires File).
569. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
570. Chorzow Factory Case (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26); 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13).
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and amount of required reparations remains problematic, but this is more a
function of problems with dispute resolution mechanisms than with applicable
substantive law. While indemnity is not inevitable in cases of unlawful force,
on balance these twentieth century state responsibility precedents reveal both
a tendency to impose responsibility on an objective basis, without requiring
culpa, and a duty of reparation imposed normally in the form of indemnity.
VII. RECONCILIATION OF PRIMARY USE OF FORCE AND SECONDARY STATE
RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSIS wITH EXTENSION OF PRINCIPLES TO
TERRITORIAL OVERFLIGHT
This inquiry concludes that it is best to apply an objective state responsibil-
ity approach under the modern use of force law to the Flight 655 incident, an
approach that is found mostly in territorial invasion and general law of warfare
precedents. While conceptual differences exist between the high seas as res
nullius in traditional terms and an invaded state's territory, these differences
are not significant enough to warrant distinguishing between naval and land
warfare situations in determining which modern rule to apply to mistaken
self-defense. The same approach may apply to the more common situation of
the downing of unauthorized civilian aircraft over a state's territory.
A. Sources of the Duty
The scope of the duty governing the Vincennes' downing of Flight 655 can
be sought in existing lines of precedent that also provide a basis for evaluating
the positions of the prospective state litigants with regard to the applicable
substantive law. The ICJ could employ at least five alternative sources of law
to dispose of the Fight 655 incident: 1) treaty-based international civil aviation
law; 2) traditional freedom of the seas principles; 3) self-defense and similar
principles under the U.N. Charter as the modern equivalent ofjus ad bellum;
4) restraints under the largely customary law of air and sea warfare as the
modern equivalent ofjus in bello; or 5) fundamental human rights principles.
In the sphere of treaty-based international civil aviation law, the Iranian
ICJ Application invokes duties in support of air safety under the Chicago
Convention and, to a lesser extent, the Montreal Convention. Whereas some
argue that this body of treay law contains an absolute duty not to use weapons
against civil aircraft in flight, others claim that the Chicago and Montreal
Conventions do not displace a state's rights of self-defense and necessity under
the U.N. Charter. Based upon states' views expressed before the ICAO, it
appears that the duty not to use weapons against civil aircraft in flight is
subject to the right lawfully to employ armed force under the U.N. Charter.
Article 89 does not fully suspend the Chicago Convention in case of war, but
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incorporates and refocuses attention on the law governing the conduct of
hostilities by a process of renvoi. This specific invocation of law of armed
conflict principles, which incorporates their own protections for noncomba-
tants, militates against the separate application of human rights principles under
current views of the law.
Traditional freedom of the seas principles and the combatants' duties to
respect them appear in two contexts. First, they underlie portions of the
customary law of air and sea warfare, in particular the rules governing treat-
ment of neutral vessels and aircraft by combatants. Second, these principles
form the implicit legal basis for U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf asserting
general protection against unwarranted belligerent interference with neutral
shipping. A hidden tension exists between these two because belligerent and
neutral rights exist in a balance. It is difficult to deny benefitting neutral
warships or military aircraft to those of belligerents. Under traditional ideas
of the appropriate balance, last appearing in the 1939 Draft Convention on
Neutral Rights, responsibility would lie with the United States for the downing
of Flight 655 unless it were demonstrated that the Vincennes' warnings were
received or the aircraft had been destroyed within the scope of the surface
engagement. It is unclear whether this approach, which builds on traditional
maritime law and the 1923 Hague Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules, still
dominates the international community's views of the applicable law. Limited
evidence indicates that this may be the case in connection with recommendation
2.6/1. 1 The apparent U.S. position, whether cast as the American view of
international law or as naval policy and ship defense doctrine since World War
II, does not connect neutral rights with free passage principles in the overflight
of naval operations. The lack of this connection has serious implications for
the freedom of the seas, and in particular for the free passage for oil tankers.
There is a broader debate on the legality of armed forces, which the ICJ
must address in the Flight 655 proceedings. The permissible scope of self-
defense commonly arises in connection with U.N. Charter articles 2(4) and
51, and different national views of international law. This inquiry takes the
position that lawful self-defense under the Charter should be construed accord-
ing to a restrictive view of customary law. Even assuming that the use of
armed force is generally permissible under the Charter, secondary questions
with respect to its unlawfulness may arise in particular situations. On this level
much of the so-called traditional law of war survives, together with the appli-
cation of general principles such as force majeure and necessity. Under
traditional views of armed conflict, the loss of Flight 655 would be non-
compensable were it destroyed within the scope of the Vincennes' surface
engagement.
571. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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The customary law of air and sea warfare combines neutral free passage
rights with a combatant's right the use force. The older laws of free passage,
visible in article 30 of the 1923 Hague Aerial Warfare Rules and article 102
of the 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral Rights, is applicable to Flight 655.
Under official American views, however, these rules have been displaced by
a necessary force analysis purporting to comply with the law of armed conflict.
The few available land-based precedents concerning use of armed force under
misapprehension of attack seem to contemplate an absolute duty. By contrast,
the idea that the use of force in sea warfare is subject only to a duty of due
care, as opposed to responsibility attaching to even a reasonable mistake,
follows principles of probable cause that were analogized from precedents such
as The Marianna Flora and The Palmyra. However, these precedents, tied
specifically to the law of the sea, are out of step with modern international law
and with U.S. views concerning the use of armed force.
The choice of law for Flight 655 incident can be reduced to whether a
special rule should be recognized for naval warfare law on the basis of older
precedents, or whether the more modern mistake rule largely articulated in
land-based incidents, with the notable exception of the Dogger Bank Incident,
should also apply to sea warfare. Overall, the better view seems to be that the
general rule recognizing state responsibility in cases of the mistaken use of
armed force should apply equally to incidents at sea as well as on land. The
position of states before the ICAO that international civil aviation law's
treaty-based safety undertakings are qualified by states' rights under the U.N.
Charter, implies that these limitations arise directly out of restrictive views of
the use of armed force under modern international law. Regardless whether
similar principles survive on a customary law basis under the law of the sea,
states' opinion indicate that for purposes of civil aviation law the general
approach to the lawful use of force applies. Older maritime precedents, appar-
ently excusing reasonable mistake in connection with the forcible seizure of
foreign flagged vessels, deal with duties applicable under freedom of the high
seas, rather than as restrictions on the use of armed forceper se. In the case
of noncombatant aircraft overflights of naval operations, the United States
applies a lawful force analysis rather than free passage principles.
Five general policy considerations favor application of a uniform rule
imposing objective responsibility for mistaken self-defense under principles
governing the lawful use of force against civil aircraft. First, restrictions on
the lawful use of force under modern international law favor its application
to both land and sea cases. Second, no compelling reason exists for differenti-
ating aircraft downings over water from those occurring over a state's territo-
ry. Third, it would be difficult to administer any rule attempting to distinguish
between reasonable and unreasonable mistaken self-defense. Given high stress
levels in anticipation of combat, a tendency to make mistakes should be
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expected. This psychological predisposition is evident in both the Dogger Bank
Incident and in the misinterpretation of objective data from Flight 655 by Vin-
cennes CIC personnel. Under these circumstances either the distinction be-
tween reasonable and unreasonable mistakes would be arbitrary, or the rule
would gravitate toward the position that mistakes under stress are reasonable
per se and so state responsibility should never be recognized in cases of
mistaken self-defense. Fourth, any rule avoiding state responsibility in an
obvious case of mistaken self-defense would result in efforts to restrict the
scope of permissible self-defense. On a long-term basis, it is preferable to
admit responsibility in tragic accident cases to preserve the scope of legitimate
self-defense where needed. Finally, it is unclear why the innocent airline and
its passengers should bear the risk of destruction while apparently adhering
to international civil aviation norms and regulations. Claims that shifting the
risk of liability to the airline would help avoid tragic accidents are misguided,
because they are based on the false assumption that the general danger faced
by civil aircraft in a war theater does not sufficiently encourage parties to
minimize the risks.
A final issue concerns whether imposing state responsibility for mistaken
self-defense would change the behavior of military personnel faced with an
apparent hostile threat. In other words, will imposition of state responsibility
in the Vincennes situation encourage more U.S.S. Stark-type incidents? This
should not be the case, unless one assumes that military commanders would
change their reactions to a perceived threat. States will continue to direct their
armed forces to give priority to self-protection where appropriate. In high
speed multiple threat environments, military personnel will be compelled to
act on imperfect information, as did the commander of the Vincennes. This
situation may render mistaken self-defense reasonable, but that characterization
is a matter of military policy'rather than one possessing legal significance.
Presumably, states will continue to monitor for their own purposes whether
mistaken self-defense in individual instances is reasonable or involves negli-
gence on the part of military personnel. If state responsibility were recognized
under a theory that mistaken self-defense does not satisfy the legal require-
ments of self-defense, any situation involving the mistaken use of armed force
situation would be unsuited to the imposition of international law sanctions on
individuals.
B. Legal Analysis of the Flight 655 Incident
Our inquiry returns now to the Legal Adviser's original position stated in
his congressional testimony, which can be subdivided into three different types
of legal claims. The first, touching on the operation of the aircraft, implicates
principles of free passage and regulatory competence. The second views the
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causal relationship between the Iranian speedboat attack and the downing of
Flight 655 as precluding claims. The third focuses on the particular situation
of the Vincennes and its use of force.
1. American Claims of Iranian Control over the Operation of Flight 655
In his congressional testimony the Legal Adviser stated that "[Iran] also
should not have allowed a passenger airline [sic] to fly over a battle zone --
especially not unless it was equipped and prepared to respond to our Navy's
repeated warnings. ' " For these purposes, this inquiry assumes that the
Legal Adviser intended his statement to be an assertion of Iran's international
legal obligations under an omission analysis."7 Based upon similar language
in the report issued after the official Department of Defense inquiry, 74 the
position stated by the Legal Adviser may be explored in the form of three
related claims that assume the violation of an as yet unspecified duty. First,
Iran knew of the ongoing surface engagement between the Revolutionary
Guard speedboats and the Vincennes, but nonetheless permitted Flight 655's
overflight. Second, Iran was negligent in permitting overflight by an airliner
unequipped and unprepared to respond to the Vincennes' repeated warnings.
Third and more generally, Iran was irresponsible in permitting Flight 655 to
overfly the Persian Gulf at a relatively low altitude during a period of general
hostilities.
Regarding the first claim, the facts surrounding the Flight 655 incident
should be recalled. The Legal Adviser's statement implies that Iran's knowl-
edge of the Vincennes' surface engagement supports a claim of an assumption
of risk or a violation of a duty in knowingly permitting Flight 655 to overfly
the area of combat. However, the surface engagement commenced on July 3,
1988 at 9:43 a.m. Flight 655 took off from Bandar Abbas at 9:47 a.m. and
was shot down at 9:54 a.m. Given the short time, it seems unrealistic even to
discuss shared responsibility unless there was prior Iranian knowledge of
pending hostilities. Imputing advance knowledge is unjustified because it
572. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
573. See RESTATEMENT THMD, supra note 73, § 207.
574. The DOD Repon concluded that:
Iran must share the responsibility for the tragedy by hazarding one of their civilian airliners by
allowing it to fly a relatively [sic] low altitude air route in close proximity to hostilities that had
been ongoing [sic] for several hours, and where [Iranian Revolutionary Guard] boats were
actively engaged in armed conflict with U.S. Naval vessels.
DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-46. In contrast to the Legal Adviser's position, this sentiment does not
as clearly state a legal as opposed to a political position. However, it provides the rationale that buttresses
the Legal Adviser's general inference that Iran violated some duty in permitting Flight 655 to fly over the
Persian Gulf. Otherwise, it still remains unclear what international legal duty Iran might be deemed to have
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analyzes the situation in a fashion that is only reasonable with the benefit of
hindsight. The succession-of events supporting prior knowledge.presumably
included: 1) the U.S. policy of providing protection to all neutral vessels as
declared on April 29, 1988;'7 2) the Montgomery's July 2, 1988, single
warning shot encouraging an Iranian gunboat to cease harassment of a neutral
vessel; 76 3) the July 3, 1988, dispatch of the Montgomery and Vincennes
shortly after 7:00 a.m. to investigate alleged Iranian gunboat attacks on neutral
shipping;' and 4) the Iranian fire directed toward the Vincennes' helicopter
at approximately 9:15 a.m., which drew the Vincennes and Montgomery to the
scene of the surface engagement. ,
Prior to July 2, the United States had never acted on the April 29 declara-
tion of protection for neutral shipping. On July 3, U.S. naval forces actively
pursued alleged Iranian attacks on neutral shipping but without significant
contact prior to the artillery fire around the Vincennes' helicopter at approxi-
mately 9:15 a.m. It is unclear whether that Iranian fire was directed at the
U.S. helicopter or was meant to warn it off,57 in which case the Iranian
speedboats would not have expected a response in the form of the surface
engagement thirty minutes later. The maximum warning time of the pending
engagement was thirty minutes. This assumes Iran believed that an immediate
armed response would be forthcoming, which had not always been the case
in prior instances when it had fired around U.S. naval vessels during the
Iran-Iraq War. Further, any such expectation on the part of the Iranian crew
would have required communication with military authorities ashore and in
turn their warning of Iranian civilian air traffic control in time to reach Flight
655. The ICAO Report indicated that Iran had an alert system for warning civil
aircraft to avoid areas where hostilities were expected, but that no such alert
was in place on July 3.579 In view of these facts, any inferences of prior
Iranian knowledge of the surface engagement are sufficiently weak to make
it unrealistic to fault Iran for the failure to issue a warning advising civil air
traffic to avoid the area.
The claim that Iran should not have allowed Flight 655 to overfly the
combat area unless it were equipped and prepared to respond to U.S. Navy
warnings is directed at the operation of the aircraft. Flight 655 was equipped
with radios capable of receiving LAD frequency warnings and was operating
under an Iran Air directive requiring that the IAD frequency be monitored at
575. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
576. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
577. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. The Montgomery reported hearing radio questioning
of merchant ships in the area followed by numerous explosions from the north at 7:11 a.m., but no request
for help from a merchant ship was forthcoming. DOD Report, supra note 6, at E-26. At 7:12 a.m., the
Vincennes was ordered North, closer to the Montgomery, to investigate these reports. Id.
578. See Carlson Letter, supra note 48, at 92.
579. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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all. times over the Persian Gulf. Absent recovery of Flight 655's flight record-
er, it remains impossible to determine whether Flight 655 complied with and
failed to recognize the challenges directed at it, or whether in the crucial
moments both of Flight 655's radios were tuned to other frequencies. In any
event the challenges issued to Flight 655 were not unambiguous. Failing any
indication that Flight 655 received and consciously disregarded the warnings,
the question becomes the issue of residual risk and then which party, either
the combatant warship or the overflying civilian airliner, should bear the risk
that a warning will not be received.
Since the Legal Adviser's inference of fault focuses on the equipment and
operation of a civil airliner, the question presented is whether Iran really
controlled these matters or whether they were determined by international civil
aviation law. Under the Chicago Convention, if Flight 655 had been operating
over the high seas, the only mandatory civil aviation rules would have been
the ICAO Rules of the Air. In that case, ICAO and not Iranian regulations
would have controlled Flight 655's equipment and operation at the time it was
shot' down. Since Flight 655 was downed over an international strait, a strong
argument can be made that Iran similarly lacked general regulatory power over
international aviation in overflight under the transit passage regime, which the
United States accepts as part of customary law. Even assuming that transit
passage concepts do not apply and Flight 655 had been shot down within
Iranian territorial waters that are beyond the Rules' mandatory coverage, the
ICAO itself encourages uniform regulation. It would seem unrealistic to expect
special rules for Iran, despite Iran's legal power to set operating regulations
under those circumstance. The ICAO Report stressed that the Flight 655
communications equipment did not malfunction and that the crew did not
commit any blatant mistakes. However, at crucial moments, various reciprocal
incompatibilities of equipment and procedures impeded normal communication
between the Vincennes, Flight 655, and the responsible air traffic control-
lers.580
In short, Flight 655 complied with ICAO regulations. The ICAO Report
suggested, parallel to recommendation 2.6/1,81 that military equipment and
communications monitoring be adapted to the civil aviation system and that
the military in the area be in contact with local air traffic control centers to
track and identify civilian aircraft.8 ' This presents a problem in a war the-
580. The only shared radio frequency on which some of the incennes'requests for identification were
transmitted was the general aviation distress frequency 121.5 Mhz (TAD). Although civilian and military
forces regularly use different frequencies, Flight 655 was directed by Iran Air to monitor the IAD frequency
when flying over the Gulf. Even if it had been monitoring a common frequency, the ICAO Report indicates
that the Vincennes'requests were in such a form that the Flight 655 crew probably could not have identified
them.
581. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
582. Safety Recommendation 4.1, ICAC Report, supra note 6, at 26.
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ater where cooperation among combatants or politically antagonistic parties
can hardly be expected.5s However, as the responsible regulatory authority
under international law, the ICAO may promulgate the applicable rules with
a view toward preserving its general overflight regulations. Given the general
recognition that only compliance with mandatory ICAO rules is required, the
ICAO Report's "recommendation" for civil and military cooperation is merely
hortatory. In any case, it would be difficult for it ever to achieve higher status,
since most suggestions are directed at the conduct and equipment of military
forces rather than the civil aircraft in overflight, thereby raising questions of
regulatory competence and contradicting article 89 of the Chicago Convention.
The claim that Iran had an independent duty to prevent Flight 655's
overflight of a "battle zone" is tenuous because of the previously noted prob-
lems in attributing to Iran timely knowledge of the ongoing Vincennes engage-
ment. Were the actions of the Revolutionary Guard speedboats not legally
attributable to Iran, or were the United States to encounter difficulties satisfy-
ing the evidentiary burden concerning these irregularities, it would be even
more difficult to credit Iran with such knowledge. Even ignoring the issue of
Iranian knowledge, traditional free passage ideas underlying the 1923 Hague
Radio and Aerial Warfare Rules and the 1939 Draft Convention on Neutral
Rights include the duty to warn civilian aircraft to avoid battle zones and to
place the risk of a failed communication on the combatant.
To the extent that the Legal Adviser intended the term "battle zone" to be
understood broadly as a war zone concept, finding fault with Iran permitting
Flight 655's general transit over a war zone on a recognized international
aviation route is an extraordinarily broad assertion. It would represent a
marked departure from the traditional American rejection of war or exclusion-
ary zones and of the argument that civilian traffic on (or here over) internation-
al waters is present at its own peril. Taken to an extreme, such a position
might effectively close international air routes over broad geographic areas,
which would neither be in the interest of the United States nor reflect a
reasonable balance of civil aviation law and the rights of combatants.
Finally, the U.S. argument in faulting Iran for the operation of Flight 655
is inconsistent with its prior positions in cases involving the downing of aircraft
by other countries. In 1955, an El Al airliner whose passengers included
American citizens strayed over Bulgarian territory and was shot down by
Bulgarian air defense forces."' The United States condemned the Bulgarian
action, asserting a breach of international obligations in downing a civilian
airliner and demanding reparations. It vigorously rejected Bulgarian arguments
583. Since it believed Flight 655 to be an F-14 aircraft that had taken off from a mixed use airfield,
the Vincennes might have feared a false civil aircraft identification as a ruse de guerre in a true attack
situation.
584. See supra note 262.
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that the apparent navigational error of the El Al aircraft diminished Bulgaria's
responsibility in any way.5"' Even were there an identifiable international
law obligation that Iran neglected by permitting the overflight of Flight 655,
it would be difficult to distinguish Iran's supposed neglect of its duty from the
El Al flight's navigational error. An analogous argument can be made from
the U.S. position concerning Soviet responsibility for the 1983 downing of
Flight KE 007.
2. American Claims of Iranian Involvement in the Downing of Flight 655
One recalls again the Legal Adviser's congressional testimony that "[tihe
Government of Iran should not have allowed gunboats to attack our vessels
and aircraft. 586 The Legal Adviser's statement amounts to a "but-for" argu-
ment that the destruction of Flight 655 would not have occurred absent the
speedboat attack on the Vincennes. Assuming arguendo that the speedboat
attack entailed a violation of Iran's international law obligations, should Flight
655's destruction be attributed to Iran because it would not have occurred but
for the speedboat attack linked to Iran's own violation of its international law
obligations?
Iran's violation of its obligations might lie alternatively in a failure to
exercise due care in preventing its territory from being used to launch attacks
by armed bands, or in the direct attribution to Iran of an unlawful armed
speedboat attack on the Vincennes. In the first case, some publicists might
reject the self-caused loss argument by distinguishing the fact that Iran's
behavior constituted an omission, while the U.S. behavior involved a positive
act.5 7 To the extent an international law duty is breached involving the use
of armed force, however, it is immaterial whether the breach is affected by
an act or omission. Instead, it should be recognized that the downing of Flight
655 raises concerns analogous to those faced under municipal delictual law in
conjunction with assigning liability for foreseeable injuries subsequently caused
by a secondary independent tortfeasor. Under a plain language interpretation,
it arguably was foreseeable on Iran's part that some civil vessel or aircraft
might be damaged or destroyed in hostile actions involving the speedboat
attacks tolerated or organized by Iran.
"But for" causation theories are suspect even under municipal delictual law,
so any analogous argument in international law should be subject to close
examination. The question must also be asked whether the special nature of
585. See Briggs, United States v. Bulgaria: Domestic Jurisdiction and Sovereign Determination of
Legal Irresponsibility, MALANGES OFFERTS A HENRm RouiN 13, 14-15 (1964).
586. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
587. See supra note 495 and accompanying text.
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states in international law precludes a foreseeability-type analysis, assigning
responsibility for another state's behavior.
The attribution approach of modern international law, which requires an
individual's act to be imputed as a condition for state responsibility, seemingly
militates against recognizing responsibility for the act of another independent
state. The traditional rejection of respondeat superior as the basis for state
responsibility casts doubt on any vicarious assignment of responsibility.
However, the available precedent is less clear. On the one hand, common
sense and numerous cases incorporating the principle of individual responsibili-
ty indicate that a state may only be held responsible for the acts of others in
exceptional circumstances."' 8 "But for" causation here would be deemed
insufficient, as in the 1926 Mendel Case,589 in which the German-American
Mixed Claims Commission declined to award compensation literally permitted
under the Treaty of Versailles against Germany based on the principle of
individual responsibility.
On the other hand, omissions cases by nature involve injury at the hands
of a third party. Here we recall the Legal Adviser's apparent view that the
speedboat attack on the Vincennes was tied to Iran under an omissions analysis.
Drawing on the Alabama arbitration,590 one could argue that, had the speed-
boat attack resulted in the sinking of the Vincennes, reparations for Iran's
breach of its obligations would include compensation for the loss of the
Vincennes. This would involve Iranian liability for damages resulting from the
acts of armed bands whose acts are not expressly attributable to Iran. Although
the attacks of the Confederate raider on shipping were also not formally
attributable to Great Britain in the Alabama precedent, Britain was found
responsible for violating its obligations as a neutral party in permitting the
raider to be outfitted in British shipyards. In the context of Flight 655, Iran's
obligations attaching to territorial sovereignty would be equivalent to Britain's
obligations as a neutral since the mistaken downing of a civilian aircraft in
defending against the speedboat attack is no less foreseeable than the sinking
of merchant ships by the Alabama as a foreign raider. Permitting recovery for
these injuries attaches liability for the acts of a foreign state under an implicit
foreseeability analysis.
Given the general rule of individual state responsibility, the mere foresee-
ability of harm to innocent parties resulting from the response of one state to
the breach of international law obligations by another cannot be sufficient to
create responsibility for the acts of the other state. However, strict adherence
to the rule of individual state responsibility may be misplaced when the state
that failed to observe its international law obligations caused the injurious
588. See, e.g., B. CHENG, supra note 500, at 208-14.
589. See id. at 211-12.
590. See supra note 77.
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behavior. One approach might differentiate between injury to the interests of
an uninvolved third state and injury to the interests of that state whose unlawful
act or omission led to the foreseeable injury, based upon the concept that an
uninvolved state could not avoid the injury. Another approach might examine
the question whether the unlawful acts or omissions of the two states are
qualitatively different. Yet in the present case the use of armed force was
effectively connected to the behavior of both states and any such balancing
would be subjective.
While there is no formulaic answer,591 in the case of Flight 655 it appears
preferable to maintain the general rule of individual state responsibility. Given
the inherent danger involved in any use of armed force, it seems wisest to
choose the approach that encourages states to be most conservative even in its
lawful use. This appears more likely if states remain responsible for the results
of their use of armed force, 92 even where its usage is causally related to
another state's violation of its international law obligations. 93 Under this
view, the United States would be responsible for the downing of Flight 655
even if the speedboat attack were attributable to Iran as a matter of internation-
al law. However, this would not foreclose a claim against Iran based on the
injury suffered by the United States as a result of a speedboat attack attribut-
able to Iran or Iran's failure to use due care in preventing armed bands from
misusing Iranian territory as a base for attacks on neutral shipping in interna-
tional waters. 5
94
3. American Claims of Necessary Force and Reasonable Mistake
While the analysis articulated in the Legal Adviser's congressional testimo-
ny speaks of the downing of Flight 655 as involving "lawful force," it also
591. Continental theorists have made preliminary attempts to establish consistent rules under varying
causal patterns in connection with a determination of when to deny the illicit nature or wrongfulness of
a state's conduct. See, e.g., Salmon, Les circonstances excluantl'illicitd, RESPONSABIL1TAINTERNATIONALE
89, 208-25 (P. Weil ed. 1987) (category entitled "La faute de la victime fait suite causalement h l'acte
illicit6");B. BOLLECKER-STERN, LE PREJUDICE DANS LA THEORIEDE LA RESPONSABL1TINTERNATONALE
(1973); J. PERSONNAZ, LA REPARATION DU PREJUDICE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIQUE (1939). While
the collection and categorization of precedents is useful, it is doubtful whether analytic rules of any greater
predictive value than the foreseeability or proximate causation rules of municipal tort law can be derived
from such an analysis.
592. This is subject to the caveat that other international law principles could apply, such as the
noncompensability of war losses within the scope of an otherwise lawful engagement. Therefore, mere
responsibility will not automatically lead to state responsibility for reparations.
593. Cf. Waima Incident, supra note 369 (France would be held liable even for death and wounding
of British soldiers by their own gunfire once France was held responsible for causing incident).
594. Here the largely consensual nature of the ICJ's jurisdiction might create difficulties, since
jurisdiction over the Flight 655 incident arises out of civil aviation treaty law. In addition, once the ICJ
asserts jurisdiction over an isolated incident, the criticized state may seek to expand the controversy to
encompass general relations between the two states. In this fashion, Iran tried to expand the issues before
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draws upon prior expressions of naval policy and U.S. government views of
international law in arguing that under a "necessary force" rationale a neutral
aircraft is at risk of destruction if it fails to follow the command of a combat-
ant warship to change course."95 While ambiguous, the asserted analysis on
its face claims legitimacy under the traditional laws of warfare.
However, this justification is inaccurate in its assertion that reasonable
mistake in the exercise of putative self-defense will not lead to state responsi-
bility. As such, it confuses the question of whether a mistake is reasonable
with the issue of whether a state is responsible for any injury resulting from
the mistake. Although the character of the mistake may be important f6r a state
in determining whether to take disciplinary action against its responsible
military officers, the negligence question has been separated from legality and
state responsibility issues ever since the Dogger Bank Incident.596
This inquiry has attempted to demonstrate that traditional law evaluated
responsibility for the loss of innocent life or property under one of two unrelat-
ed analyses: 1) principles governing the uncompensated destruction of the
property of neutrals, and 2) principles governing responsibility for the use of
force under misapprehension of attack. Modern precedents in the area of
mistaken self-defense do not differentiate between reasonable and unreasonable
mistakes. Since the United States argues the destruction of Flight 655 to be
"incidental" to the surface engagement of the Vincennes, it would treat the
downing as a noncompensable war loss. Despite Iranian claims before the
U.N. Security Council and the ICAO Council that the Vincennes knowingly
shot down a civilian airliner, the facts do not support this claim. Both the
official Department of Defense and the neutral ICAO investigations concluded
that Flight 655 was shot down when it was mistaken for an Iranian military
aircraft manifesting hostile intentions against the Vincennes. This sharp dis-
agreement on the facts may have carried over into a faulty legal conviction that
state responsibility would not attach to Flight 655's destruction if only the
mistake were reasonable.597
Viewing the events of July 3, 1988 through the eyes of the Vincennes'
commander, his ship was caught up in a surface engagement with Iranian
Revolutionary Guard speedboats. His mistake was in extending the engagement
to an aerial one when faced with an Iranian P-3 aircraft claiming to be engaged
595. This is already apparent in the 1941 Tentative Instructions for the Navy, but becomes more
strongly expressed in the 1955 Law of Naval Warfare and the 1989 Annotated Commander's Handbook.
See supra notes 207-11, 220-34 and accompanying text.
596. Cf. cases cited supra note 101.
597. To the extent the Flight 655 incident has been discussed in the sophisticated military press, there
is evidence of a muted debate conducted in terms of whether the Vincennes' actions were reasonable. See
sources cited supra note 48. The Department of Defense investigation concluded that the actions of the
Vincennes' commanding officer were taken within the parameters of the rules of engagement. See supra
note 251. This question, however, obscures the international law issue.
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in a routine search mission but exhibiting "targeting behavior," and an uniden-
tified aircraft bearing down directly on the Vincennes and the Montgomery and
behaving as though it were an attacking F-14 aircraft. Since he misconceived
the tactical situation, later analysis should not rely on his error to extend the
scope of the existing surface action.59 Under these circumstances, Flight 655
was destroyed outside of the scope of the surface engagement that defines the
traditional limits of noncompensable damage and under circumstances not
rendering it a fortuitous event under international law. Absent justification for
self-defense and the use of force, the United States will fail to make a showing
necessary to prove that its actions were lawful under the U.N. Charter, which
qualifies obligations under international civil aviation law not to use weapons
against civilian aircraft. Subject to offset under related claims against Iran, the
United States violated international civil aviation principles under the Chicago
Convention and related customary law, with the result that it owes appropriate
reparation for its breach of international obligations.
C. Uniform Rules Over Land and Sea
The above analysis of the Flight 655 incident treats separately its destruc-
tion under traditional ideas of incidental war damage and the use of armed
force in situations of mistaken self-defense. Incidental damage ideas are
holdovers underforce majeure and necessity principles from the older law of
war and should not apply to the typical unauthorized peacetime overflight of
a state's territory by a foreign civilian airliner. However, if the downing of
an aircraft over international waters can be analyzed doctrinally as mistaken
self-defense, and therefore as an unlawful use of force problem without regard
to freedom of the seas principles or special rules of airspace jurisdiction under
the Chicago Convention, the analysis should also apply to the downing of
civilian airliners over land. As a formal matter, the Chicago Convention and
related law prohibiting the use of weapons against a civil airliner would apply,
subject to a state's rights under the U.N. Charter.
There are two potential difficulties with the application of the unlawful use
of force analysis. First, states and publicists adhering to a textualist view of
self-defense under U.N. Charter articles 2(4) and 51 will have difficulty
applying an international law self-defense concept within their state's borders.
They may agree that protective measures taken on the high seas are governed
by self-defense principles. Despite state practice in ICJ proceedings and before
the ICAO relating to aircraft downings, publicists espousing these views tend
to argue that the downing of civil aircraft over a state's territory is more
598. The mistake is not necessarily personal in nature, because the officer in question presumably
followed the still classified rules of engagement imputing hostile intent. Id.
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properly characterized as a human rights problem. Beyond Flight 655's posture
as a limited conflict incident, this position distinguishes between the Flight 655
and Flight KE 007 situations on the basis that the prohibition on the use of
armed force under the U.N. Charter does not bind a state within its own
borders.5 It turns on issues of Charter interpretation, which as this inquiry
indicated favors the customary law approach under a restrictive self-preser-
vation rationale. Second, the objection may be raised that any application of
such principles would invade matters essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of a state under article 2(7).1 Yet this position misconstrues article
2(7), which bars only U.N. actions as opposed to specifying what matters are
beyond international law; it also ignores modern human rights principles and
traditional state responsibility law that protect aliens within a state's borders.
Technical arguments based on civil aviation treaty law could claim that a,
state's power to regulate the airspace over its territory does not necessarily
imply that the airspace is part of its territory."°1 Those favoring a human
rights analysis might also argue that the same result would be reached regard-
less of whether human rights or self-defense principles were to govern these
situations. However, this viewpoint does not consider the unsettled nature of
human rights law,6"2 which cannot supply ready rules to govern state conduct
and would abandon the traditional focus of air law on regulating aircraft rather
than passengers.
Neither of the two potential difficulties mentioned above is compelling, and
self-defense would provide a uniform approach benefitting international civil
aviation. Both objections ignore the fact that the issues exist largely beyond
the U.N. Charter, as generally regulated by international civil aviation treaties
and related law. As witnessed by the views of states expressed before the
ICAO, international civil aviation law and the Chicago Convention both
establish the general rule that weapons may not be used against civil airliners,
599. See, e.g., DiE GRENZEN DES V6LKERRECHTLICHEN GEWALTvERBOTS, supra note 267, at 67-68
(Hailbronner paper); see also ICAO Extraordinary Assembly, supra note 256, at 25-26, 35, 37, 72
(statements of delegates of the USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba, and Vietnam, stressing ideas of national sovereignty
over territorial airspace). In this context, the reaction of various states to humanitarian intervention assisting
Kurds in Iraq does not appear promising. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. Doe. S/RES/688 (1991) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Wires File); Security Council Demands Iraq End Repression of Civilians, Xinhua Gen. Overseas
News Serv., Apr. 5, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Wires file); Soviet Foreign Ministry Press Centre
Briefing on Current International Affairs, Fed. Information Systems Corp., Apr. 12, 1991, (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Wires file).
600. See sources cited infra note 603.
601. The formal question whether the territorial airspace regime would follow the free passage analogy
of the high seas or the strict sovereignty analysis of land territory was definitively resolved in article 1 of
the 1919 Paris Convention and later adopted in article 1 of the Chicago Convention. Goedhuis, supra note
88, at 214. Despite the sovereignty formulation, however, some free passage rights might be inferred based
on linguistic arguments. See, e.g., id. at 209-10. The full assertion of sovereignty also might be challenged
under the abuse of rights doctrine. See, e.g., J. BENTZIEN, supra note 255, at 9-11.
602. The chief benefit of a human rights analysis is that it might encompass foreign and domestic
aircraft as well as persons. Therefore, it might provide the basis for applying the rules of self-defense.
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subject to limitations under U.N. Charter provisions. However, it does not
appear that the Chicago Convention intended to surrender ultimate safety
concerns by granting a state control of aircraft in the airspace above its
territory. The acknowledged ability of a state to promulgate airspace regula-
tions and to punish deviations simply does not equal its ability to destroy
aircraft without legally sufficient cause. Under these circumstances, interna-
tional law will at least prevent destruction of a foreign airliner when it would
be disproportionate to the harm caused by a violation of airspace regula-
tions. 3 The disproportionate character of the destruction is not determined
by whether airspace regulations were actually violated, but rather focuses on
the basis on which these regulations were disobeyed. Satisfaction of the high
standard of self-defense as generally governing restrictive modern views of the
use of force should be required before denying state responsibility in cases
where a foreign civil airliner is destroyed.
The final question involves how a state should react to an aircraft creating
a potential self-defense situation when it ignores attempts to be contacted or
when it fails to follow instructions. Partly as a result of the Flight 655 incident,
the ICAO has proposed that belligerents should cooperate more fully with local
air traffic control and has already issued guidelines under annex 2 to govern
interception of civil aircraft. Both proposals generally assume that an aircraft
is responsive to external communications. However, the ICAO's regulatory
competence to govern more than the operation of the civil aircraft is question-
able.6" Thus, a state's reaction to a nonresponsive civil aircraft is not gov-
erned by current civil aviation treaty law. Under self-defense principles, it may
be difficult for a state to prove the requisite necessity and proportionality when
an aircraft does not respond to radio challenges and absent recovery of the
flight recorder, as with Flight 655. Concerns about receipt of warnings with
a reasonable time to react may be addressed by a rebuttable presumption that
any warning given was inadequate or not received. A state could then prove
either under a preponderance of the evidence standard that an adequate warning
was actually received in a timely fashion, or under a clear and convincing
evidence standard that constructive receipt of an adequate and timely warning
should be inferred. Under such a formulation, mere transmission of warnings
should not be viewed as minimally sufficient unless given on frequencies that,
under the applicable civil aviation regime, must be monitored at that time by
the aircraft. Further, the warning should be sufficiently specific and directed
at the particular aircraft in a form reasonably recognizable by its crew in
603. This approach has been suggested by Cheng, supra note 109, 259, at 71-72 (general principle
that use of deadly force against an alien for a minor violation of a state's municipal law violates internation-
al law). See also ICAO Extraordinary Assembly, supra note 256, at 29 (British delegate's references to
arbitral decisions of U.S.IMexico Claims Commission in 1920s and I'm Alone case).
604. See supra notes 268-74 and accompanying text.
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considering relevant factors such as the number of surrounding aircraft and
their distances to the challenged aircraft. ICAO-recommended formulations
would satisfy such a standard. Even if there is no absolute liability for the
downing of a civilian aircraft over any territory, the interests at stake justify
assigning a high burden of proof to the party denying state responsibility by
pleading self-defense under modern use of force law.
The focal point of the proposed standard is that mistaken self-defense does
not excuse the use of armed force. Since a state's alleged exercise of
self-defense under international law is not self-judging, its conduct in shooting
down unauthorized civilian aircraft within its airspace should be subject to
review, and indemnity should be imposed in the case of mistaken self-defense.

